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Using a framework of cultural studies-informed political economy, this dissertation is a 
critical examination of private team ownership in the major North American professional sports 
leagues. Despite drawbacks that are apparent to players, fans, media, and scholars, private 
ownership has been taken for granted as the natural way of organizing professional sport. This 
analysis argues that private ownership became the norm as the result of social class conflict in the 
mid-nineteenth century, and the efforts of upper-class sport participants to exclude the working 
class from the playing field. A decades-long effort to first prevent, and later control, working class 
sport participation eventually led to the formation of the first major professional sports leagues, 
with the men in charge guided by the same ethos of exclusion and control. In the era of neoliberal 
capitalism, private ownership has served to enrich owners at the expense of players, fans, and the 
public, who are on the losing ends of collective bargaining negotiations and stadium subsidy deals. 
To make these arguments, this dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of how the professional 
sport industry developed; an overview of how the professional leagues currently operate; and a 
proposal for a hybrid ownership model that gives the players control of league operations and 
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It is June 19th, 2016, shortly before eleven on the East Coast. Game 7 of the National 
Basketball Association Finals has just concluded with LeBron James and the Cleveland 
Cavaliers completing an unprecedented comeback from 3-1 down to defeat the heavily favored 
Golden State Warriors. It is not just one of the great feats in basketball history, but a seminal 
moment in the history of Cleveland. The city had long been known for its sporting failures, from 
last-second losses to James’ departure in free agency six years earlier. The Cavaliers’ win 
marked the city’s first pro sports championship in 52 years. 
Yet when the NBA Larry O’Brien trophy was handed out during the trophy presentation, 
the first person to hoist the trophy was not James, the Akron-born star who has been linked 
inextricably to Cleveland—as a high-school up-and-comer on the cover of Sports Illustrated, a 
rising young star in the NBA, a hated villain who absconded to South Beach with the city’s title 
aspirations, and then the favorite son who returned—for his entire career. It was not handed to a 
representative of Cleveland’s sports angst, such as a long-suffering fan or one of the city’s past 
greats. Instead, the first person to hoist the trophy was Dan Gilbert, the Detroit businessman who 
purchased the Cavaliers in 2005 (two years after James was drafted and 35 years after the 
franchise was founded). Gilbert was best known to sports fans for castigating James in a letter 
after the latter departed in free agency, and best known outside of the sporting realm as the 
founder of Quicken Loans Inc., a mortgage giant that in 2011 was slapped with nearly three 
million in punitive damages and legal costs after it was found to have misled and defrauded a 
borrower (Asbury, 2011).  
It is true that Gilbert spent the money to sign the Cavaliers’ best players, James, Kyrie 
Irving, and Kevin Love, a financial toll that set the team up for a record luxury tax bill under 
NBA regulations. Other than providing the funds to assemble the eventual NBA champions, 
however, Gilbert had nothing to do with the result on the court. He did not chase down Golden 
State’s Andre Iguodala and block a sure lay-up. He did not hit the go-ahead three-pointer in the 




prevented a tying shot. Moreover, Gilbert had nothing to do with the 52 years of sport-related 
suffering that afflicted the city of Cleveland. Yet when all was said and done, it was his trophy to 
hold. Because when it is all said and done, the Cavaliers do not belong to the players or to 
Cleveland—the team is Gilbert’s private property. 
Flash forward a few months. It is November 2, 2016, approaching midnight in Chicago. 
One of the greatest baseball games ever played has just concluded, with an inconceivable 
result—the Chicago Cubs have won the World Series for the first time in 108 years. If the 
Cavaliers’ victory is a civic triumph, the Cubs’ win is a national event, attracting a television 
audience of nearly 50 million during its peak quarter-hour (“World Series,” 2016). In the Cubs 
clubhouse, amidst the celebrating players, team architect Theo Epstein and well-regarded 
manager Joe Maddon, the commissioner is set to award the trophy.  
It may not surprise that instead of Epstein, or Maddon, or one of the players, or even a 
long-suffering fan like Bill Murray, the trophy was first handed to a quite unfamiliar face—that 
of team chairman Tom Ricketts. The Ricketts family purchased the team from Tribune Company 
in 2009, with Tom touting himself and his siblings as “Cubs fans” who “share the goal of Cubs 
fans everywhere to win a World Series” (“Cubs decide,” 2009, ¶3). Yet as recently as 2013, the 
clan was said to be not “well known or understood” in Chicago (Smith, 2013, ¶3). Where the 
Ricketts are well known is in the world of politics, where Tom’s brother Pete and father Joe have 
been active—the former now the governor of Nebraska and the latter a prominent fundraiser—in 
supporting Republican politicians, including Donald Trump.  
As with Gilbert, the Ricketts provided the funds, but little else. It was Epstein who put 
the team together, Maddon who managed the players, and the players who won the games. After 
such a titanic victory, one of the most memorable in modern American sports, they each had to 
wait their turn with the trophy. Because like the Cavaliers, the Cubs are private property. The 
fans’ 108 years of suffering was not for the Chicago Cubs, but the property of a slew of owners.  
The Jerry Seinfeld joke about sports fans rooting for laundry may be missing the bigger 
picture. Fans root for the playthings of billionaires, sometimes corporations. Perhaps if the teams 




owner Fred Zollner), the situation would be clearer. The “Cleveland Gilberts” and “Chicago 
Ricketts” would inspire a lot less loyalty, one presumes, than their current incarnations. Who 
would wear the interlocking H.S. of the “Hal Steinbrenner Yankees?” Surely far fewer than the 
interlocking N.Y. of the New York Yankees, an international symbol recognized far beyond 
baseball. By naming teams after the cities in which they play, franchises connote a false sense of 
loyalty to their consumers. Every now and again, that spell is broken rather violently by teams 
moving to a new city in search of a better financial opportunity. Cleveland Browns fans did not 
realize that they were really rooting for Art Modell’s property until it was too late.1 Seattle 
SuperSonics fans recognized Clay Bennett’s intentions quickly after the Oklahoma businessman 
purchased the team in 2006 but could do nothing to stop him. Now Bennett’s property goes by a 
different name, the Oklahoma City Thunder. 
Put a giant “Gilbert” across the front of LeBron James’ old “Cleveland” jersey and one 
wonders whether he ever makes the trek back to Ohio from sunny Miami. James had to swallow 
some pride to play for Gilbert again after the previously mentioned 2010 letter; one imagines that 
he did so not out of obligation to ‘his owner’ but to the city that claimed him. Turn on a game 
and see “Jones 24, Mara 21” and one might be less willing to stay tuned than if it were “Dallas 
24, N.Y. Giants 21.” Much of the appeal of professional major league sport is based on the belief 
that teams represent the cities and regions in which they are based, rather than the billionaire in 
the luxury box. Only when scorned does it become apparent, such as in St. Louis—where low-
profile, media averse Rams owner Stan Kroenke quickly became public enemy #1 after moving 
the team to Los Angeles in 2015. 
Part of that belief is facilitated by sports owners’ general reclusiveness. There are big 
bold-named exceptions, such as Jerry Jones and Mark Cuban in Dallas, but many sports owners 
are far less visible than their high-profile employees. In San Francisco, NFL 49ers CEO Jed 
York exerts so much control over his visibility that, per San Jose Mercury-News writer Tim 
Kawakami, NFL broadcasters are “ordered not to show him” during games (Kawakami, 2016). 
Even when owners are shown in television cutaways—by the networks paying them for rights to 
                                                           




air games—their appearances are tightly controlled. The viewer sees what the owner wants them 
to see (their wardrobe, their rich friends, their spouses), but other pertinent information is 
obscured. “Over the course of the game,” Gay (2019) noted, “little or no attention is paid to how 
the [owner] first became important—i.e., they founded a company that made microprocessors, 
sold commercial real estate, rubber ducks, or, luckiest of all, had the good fortune of being born 
to another important person, now deceased” (¶14). Indeed, as Thomas (2019) observed, the team 
owner is not known primarily for being rich, or even for having a particular skill. “What he is 
known for, really, is his ability to walk into a locker room filled with some of the richest and 
most famous athletes in the world and receive deference. In short, he’s known for his position 
with regard to the people he pays” (¶1). Contrast that with the players, whose journey up the 
ranks from high school to college to the pros is often well-chronicled. When owners finally do 
come out to accept their trophies at the end of the season, the average fan could be forgiven for 
asking, as Chicago Magazine did of the Ricketts, “Who Are These People?”  
It is not necessarily the case that owners are seeking anonymity. In the NFL, the league’s 
31 owners—or the “membership” in the league’s parlance—“fashion themselves as pillars of 
their communities, although many of them are in fact despised in their hometowns and remain 
stubbornly out of view … [they] envision themselves as noble stewards of their communities and 
wield their status with an assumption of permanence” (Leibovich 2018, pp. 15, 17). Given the 
one-sided dynamics between team owners and the communities in which they operate—an 
owner can easily uproot his team while no community has ever successfully ousted an owner2—
team owners can become enduring local institutions for decades. It is after all “hard to dislodge a 
pillar” (p. 15). One might ask how that jibes with the notion of owners as reclusive. Safe in their 
status, owners are under no obligation to be available, or accountable, to the public. When 49ers 
owner York held a news conference at the end of a two-win 2016 season to announce the firings 
of the team’s head coach and general manager, he was asked why he should not join the ranks of 
the unemployed. “I own this football team,” he said. “You don’t dismiss owners.” (“49ers’ Jed,” 
                                                           
2 As will be discussed later in this text, the cities of Oakland and Baltimore both made failed attempts to 
seize the local NFL teams, the Raiders and Colts, respectively, from their owners via eminent domain. In 




2017, ¶5). It was a reminder to the reporter who posed the question, and to fans angry about 
another lost season, that the buck stops somewhere before the owners’ suite. More brash was 
New York Knicks owner James Dolan, who when told by a heckler that he should “sell the 
team,” responded by having the fan held by security and apparently banned from Madison 
Square Garden, which he owns (“Knicks’ Dolan,” 2019). 
The popular ideal of pro sports as city vs. city, franchise vs. franchise, and player vs. 
player is to a large extent a myth. The reality is that pro sport is a battle of investments held by 
mostly invisible, unaccountable men who, with few exceptions, value the bottom line more than 
wins and losses. It is true that some owners have a competitive fire that fuels a desire to win; one 
need only recall Cuban’s fury when the Mavericks were the victims of questionable calls in the 
2006 NBA Finals (“Cuban fined,” 2006). Yet even Cuban blew up a championship team in 2011 
to avoid a more stringent luxury tax. Few owners are willing to tolerate a substantial financial hit 
even if it means winning a title. Donald Sterling, former owner of the Clippers, spent decades 
barely fielding a competitive team. Winning may be the top priority for the players and for the 
fans. Not so for the owners. An item from a profile of the Ricketts family is emblematic. Trying 
to sell his father Joe on purchasing the Cubs, Tom took him up to a rooftop overlooking Wrigley 
field: 
Tom said, “Look at this.” 
Joe replied, “Yeah, that’s pretty beautiful.” 
“They sell three million tickets a year, win or lose,” Tom told him. 
Joe said, “Oh, this is a business.” (Smith, 2013, emphasis in original) 
The aesthetic value of sport—the histories, venues, stars and laundry that inspire loyalty among 
fans and even players—is less impactful than the fact that the teams make money, win or lose. 
These franchises that players put their blood and sweat into, that fans put their mental energies 
and anguish into, that municipalities pour crucial public funds into, are just investments. Money 





A Brief Overview of the Sports Industry 
There are few industries as integral to global economics, culture, and daily life as 
professional sport. Whether the Premier League in the United Kingdom, the National Football 
League in the United States, or the many smaller leagues in between, organized team sport long 
ago transformed into a worldwide financial juggernaut with the patronage of presidents, prime 
ministers, and billions of paying fans—whether ticket-buyers, television viewers, or taxpayers 
whose funds support the palatial stadiums in which games take place.  
There are few industries as central to a nation’s sense of self as sport, which has often 
served as a symbol of national unity, of Western resilience and civilization during times of crisis. 
From the post-9/11 image of U.S. president George W. Bush throwing the first pitch at a World 
Series game to nightly national anthems, sport has provided a stage on which to perform rituals 
of national pride—the heroic struggle of the athletes, whose differences and backgrounds are 
sanded away in place of certain common values; the cacophonous unanimity of the cheering 
fans; even the ubiquitous corporate logos symbolizing unrestrained capitalism. The sporting 
stage has also served as a site of ideological lessons for the viewing public, a model for children 
to follow during its best times and as a cautionary tale at others. Such lessons are performed by 
players on the field and observed in the stands, bars, and myriad homes, for the benefit of owners 
and other executives.  
Sport is by most popular accounts apolitical. One really has to look to notice the 
ideologies under the surface, as most viewers are so focused on the result of the game that much 
else is ignored or forgotten. In fact, broaching the subject of the politics and ideologies intrinsic 
in the sports industry is a breach of an unspoken but widely understood agreement: that the 
playing surface is an oasis from such real-world concerns. If sport has a tendency toward a 
certain form of propaganda, only in its most blatant form is that noticed by the typical observer. 
Viewing the oversized American flags on NFL and Major League Baseball fields, some might 
note the lack of subtlety in those sports’ compulsory patriotism. Others could cast an aside 
glance at the relationships between sport and political organizations, from contracts struck by the 




Donald Trump at a campaign rally in 2016. Outside of such glaring arrangements, however, 
public attention is usually limited to the score and whatever narrative ESPN is focused on that 
week. As for the watchdogs whose purpose is to rouse the public, the corporate media have too 
much at stake to ever truly trouble the status quo, and, as will be argued in a subsequent section, 
the academy does not see in sport a subject serious enough for rigorous examination. 
Beyond the ideological component, there is the simple fact that sport is—both directly 
and indirectly—a crucial aspect of everyday American life. It is both a topic of great interest to 
many and a site of blatant economic exploitation. One can point to collegiate ‘student athletes’ 
receiving paltry compensation while generating billions for schools and television networks, or 
to cash-strapped cities paying for glittering new stadiums while spending little on infrastructure 
or schools, all to avoid the dreaded threat of team relocation. There is an opportunity to use sport, 
a domain in which much of the public is both versed and invested (both as fans and taxpayers), 
to spark a larger discussion about capitalism. Far from the ‘toy department of life,’ the 
apocryphal put-down attributed to Howard Cosell, sport may be the site on which capitalism’s 
shortcomings are easiest to discern, and to a broad audience not usually targeted by academic 
scholarship. 
With that as a preamble, the following is a brief summary of this dissertation project, 
with a more in-depth summary to come in the next chapter. In the upcoming analysis, I plan to 
use critical political economy to examine how and why control of organized sport became 
concentrated not in the hands of the players or of fans, but of a few dozen billionaires.  
Together, the NBA, National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), 
and Major League Baseball (MLB) form the core of the North American professional sports 
industry, one of the world’s most lucrative oligopolies. More Exxon than the toy aisle, the sports 
industry consists almost exclusively of private ownership groups armed with billions in revenue, 
influence over federal and local governments, favorable anti-union contracts, and a symbiotic 
relationship with another oligopolistic behemoth—the corporate media. Yet for all of its obvious 
power, corporatized sport has rarely faced the fundamental questions that guide my research: 




Over the course of five chapters, this dissertation aims to answer those questions. 
Specifically, it will address the historical developments led to the industry taking its current 
form; the ways in which the private ownership system affects the leagues’ players, customers, 
and media partners; and finally, if there are other ways to organize sport that are less 
exploitative. In doing so, it seeks to fill a gap left by both the media and academia, which, it will 
be argued, have insufficiently addressed these issues. Media coverage of sport only occasionally 
strays from the field into the executive suites, and when it has, the focus has been individual 
cases of subpar ownership. Such reporting has rarely addressed the shortcomings of a system that 
has granted unfettered control of civic institutions to a few wealthy individuals. Academia has 
also tended to overlook systemic issues, with volumes written about the negative effects of 
corporatized sport on society, but comparably little addressing the underlying structural causes. 
That is in part due to an academic elitism that writes off sport as insufficiently serious for study 
or intrinsically problematic. The proposed analysis would seek to contribute to an understanding 
of how and why the sports industry operates as it does. 
Tying it together is a framework of cultural studies-informed political economy, a hybrid 
methodology suited to understanding economic power relations and the conditions undergirding 
them, while avoiding the pitfalls of economic determinism that have on occasion marred such 
theoretical approaches. The chief question asked in political economic analysis is what function 
for capital the institution in question serves, and it would seem clear that in its current form, 
organized sport in the West exists to generate exponential capital for a billionaire class. In 
understanding how and why that took place, it is hoped that this dissertation can discover how to 





CHAPTER ONE: SPORT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 In the four major North American professional sports leagues, the National Football 
League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL) and 
Major League Baseball (MLB), the franchises are with one exception exclusively privately 
owned. There are community-owned sports teams all over the world, including the F.C. 
Barcelona soccer club, every team in the German Bundesliga, and three teams in the Canadian 
Football League. Yet in the so-called “Big Four” leagues—which, along with the English 
Premier League, are the richest in the world—there is only one publicly-owned franchise, the 
NFL Green Bay Packers.3 To the casual fan, and even avid observers, private ownership appears 
to be the natural state of affairs. “No one has ever been able to explain why closely-held private 
ownership of publicly cherished professional sports franchises is necessary at all,” Scheid (2014) 
wrote, “let alone why the public should bear so much of the costs of these franchises when all the 
profits end up in the pockets of plutocrats” (¶7). 
Among sports fans, and even those who study sport within the academy, there is little 
discussion of the economic system employed by the major leagues. There is regular scrutiny and 
debate of the economic system on a collegiate level, where athletes go unpaid despite generating 
billions for the NCAA and member schools. On the professional level, however, the economic 
system typically comes to the fore only during collective bargaining negotiations. That is despite 
the numerous shortcomings of the private ownership model for players and fans. In the NBA, 
NFL and NHL, professional athletes have had their share of revenue artificially lowered through 
policies intended to increase owners’ profits. Though the players are in many cases still 
millionaires, they have collectively transferred billions of dollars to the owners in recent 
collective bargaining agreements. Fans and the general public have also, though indirectly, seen 
                                                           
3 Several teams have sold minority stakes to the public, though that practice is no longer common. In 
1986, the NBA Boston Celtics made an initial public offering of 40% of stock in the franchise and were 
publicly traded for the next 16 years. The MLB Cleveland Indians went public in 1998, but shareholders 
owned only 29% of the team and had “less than 1 percent of voting rights” (Zimbalist, 2010, p. 11). The 
team went private again after two years. Going back further, the NBA’s Milwaukee Bucks (1968-79) and 
Cleveland Cavaliers (1970-84) were publicly traded, as were the Baltimore Orioles of MLB (1968-79) 




billions of their dollars transferred to the owners via public subsidies for stadiums. In those 
circumstances when cities reject spending on new stadiums—or simply are not enthusiastic 
enough about said spending—teams have had no qualms about pulling up roots and moving 
someplace else. The NFL’s 2016 game of musical chairs, with the St. Louis Rams, San Diego 
Chargers, and Oakland Raiders each vying for two spots in Los Angeles (which lost a pair of 
teams to relocation just twenty years earlier), is representative. Even in those cases in which 
teams are satisfied with their city and stadium, the private ownership model has a slew of 
everyday frustrations for the consumer. There has been no shortage of complaints over exorbitant 
ticket prices or rosters being decimated to save money. Yet even as fans resent the products of 
private ownership in professional sports, they tend not to fully recognize the culprit. Chanting 
“Kroenke sucks” may be cathartic for St. Louis fans furious with Stan Kroenke for moving the 
Rams to L.A., but it misses the forest for the trees—Kroenke is less of a problem than the system 
in which he and his colleagues operate. 
Even when the drawbacks of private sports ownership have been readily apparent, the 
system tends to be taken as a given. That is even the case among those who would ordinarily be 
considered watchdogs: the media and the academy. Sportswriters have on numerous occasions 
noted the ways in which owners exploit fans and players, but such critiques have rarely included 
any discussion of alternatives to private, for-profit ownership. Scholars have frequently critiqued 
the sports industry as part of a broader ideological apparatus, but even within academia there has 
been little discussion of an alternative means of organizing sport. 
Discussion of sports ownership in the popular press. Beyond occasional praise of the 
Packers’ public ownership model, traditional media have generally overlooked alternative forms 
of franchise ownership. There is no shortage of material criticizing the excesses of sports team 
owners, but far less describing any real way to displace them. The following section will offer a 
sampling of how the media have covered sports ownership, including a few critical exceptions. 
In one of the most in-depth, and recent, examinations of sports team ownership ever 
written, Leibovich (2018) spent a four-year period embedded with NFL owners as they faced a 




U.S. president Donald Trump. The portrayal was less-than-flattering. Leibovich described the 
“freakish assembly” of owners as “sweethearts, criminals, and a fair number of Dirty Old Men 
… tycoons of enlarged ego, delusion, and prostate” (p. 29). The roster included a veritable all-
star team of corruption: 
a truck-stop operator whose company admitted to defrauding its customers in a $92 
million judicial settlement, a duo of New Jersey real estate developers who were forced to 
pay $84.5 million in compensatory damages because, according to a judge, they ‘used 
organized crime-type activities’ to fleece their business partners, an energy baron who 
funded an antigay initiative … tax evaders, etc.  
Yet not once in 373 pages was there any suggestion of an alternative format. The Packers’ public 
ownership structure received some cursory attention, with Leibovich saying he “much 
[preferred]” the team’s shareholders “to the billionaires” (p. 250), but for a book about NFL 
owners, Green Bay’s 360,000 got by far the least attention.  
As a work of fly-on-the-wall journalism, perhaps Leibovich is not the right place to go 
for advocacy. Opinion columns have not been much better. In a 2013 column, sportswriter John 
Feinstein noted the incompetence of owners in numerous sports, addressing issues such as the 
use of public money on stadiums, without suggesting a change to the system. His solution was 
that league commissioners acquire the ability to ‘fire’ transgressing owners (Feinstein, 2013). 
The previous year in The New Republic, Robert Lipsyte referred to team owners as the “most 
dangerous fraction of the One Percenters” and took particular aim at the political ambitions of 
Jets owner Woody Johnson (who years later would join the Donald Trump presidential 
administration as an ambassador). Fans, Lipsyte wrote, “keep forgetting [owners] might have 
more important games to win,” namely political (Lipsyte, 2012, ¶10). Despite his critique, no 
mention was given of a different ownership system. 
In 2014, a year of unusual scrutiny of NBA owners due to the Donald Sterling scandal,4 
multiple articles took note of the league’s other scandalous owners. The Washington Post noted 
                                                           
4 Sterling, owner of the Los Angeles Clippers, was recorded making racist comments on a tape that was 




the anti-gay views of then-Orlando Magic owner Rich Devos; the subprime loans sold by 
Cleveland Cavaliers owner Dan Gilbert; the oil fracking of Oklahoma City Thunder minority 
owners Tom Ward and the since-deceased Aubrey McClendon; and the “Putin-esque” 
connections of Brooklyn Nets owner Mikhail Prokhorov without bringing any scrutiny to bear on 
the overarching structure (Wise, 2014). A Newark Star-Ledger editorial chronicled the lowlights 
of those same five owners and of Washington Wizards owner Ted Leonsis, sarcastically noting 
the “parade of laudable business partners” new commissioner Adam Silver had inherited from 
predecessor David Stern (D’Alessandro, 2014, ¶1). In Rolling Stone, Lund (2014) chronicled the 
15 worst owners in all of sports, with the subhead “you don’t need to be a bad person to won a 
pro franchise, but it certainly helps.” The author laid bare owners’ misdeeds: 
They bilk the public for tax breaks, exemptions and steep discounts on policing; they 
ignore impact and destroy surrounding infrastructure; they hold municipalities hostage; 
and they sit on their asses and reap millions annually in shared revenue while plundering 
young men (often of color and often from poor backgrounds) of their health and 
condemning them for wearing baggy pants, having tattoos, being "greedy" and "wrecking 
the game." As such, the correct answer to who is the worst owner in sports is all of them. 
(¶3-4, emphasis in original) 
Despite making the case for team owners as roundly unethical, none of the above-mentioned 
articles suggested any alternatives to the private ownership structure. 
Even when the discussion has related to the business of the league, rather than the 
character deficiencies of the owners, alternatives have been few and far between. After the MLB 
Miami Marlins sold for $1.2 billion in 2017, providing team owner Jeffrey Loria “a large profit 
after 15 years of losing, petty controversies, public outrages, personnel churn and strange 
baseball decisions,” ESPN writer Sam Miller noted the foolproof nature of ownership: “In a 
game so often described as one of failure, in a game that promises to be one of meritocracy, there 
is one job immune to both: the owner’s. … If Loria’s Marlins can’t decline in value, a major 
league baseball team can’t decline in value” (Miller, 2017, ¶1, 3). The criticism, although biting, 




In Sports Illustrated, Jack Dickey (2017) also took aim at Loria but contrasted him with 
the “owners in markets big and small [who] have demonstrated reasonable, responsible models 
for stewardship” (¶3). Instead of an indication of private ownership’s failings, Loria was 
positioned as an exception to mostly benevolent rule. 
In a 2014 column, then-ESPN.com writer Bill Simmons noted the rise of the “extortion 
city,” or markets owners used as relocation threats when they did not like the terms in their 
current cities. “These days, the mere threat [of relocation] can get a state-of-the-art arena built” 
(Simmons, 2014, ¶24). Far from critical of the status quo, the column ended by romanticizing the 
benefits of ownership.5 
Such examples are the norm in the mainstream sports media, serving to merely raise 
readers’ ire about terrible owners without informing them of the broader structural problem, how 
said problem formed, and any possible way to change the state of affairs. It should be noted that 
mainstream sport media outlets are, with few exceptions, owned by major corporations, many of 
which have close and lucrative relationships with the major leagues. Writers for corporate sports 
media outlets have a personal stake in keeping their jobs, a goal made easier by not challenging 
the entitles with whom their bosses do business. ESPN writer Jemele Hill suggested in October 
2017 that fans upset with Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones boycott the team’s sponsors and 
was suspended for three weeks as a result; within a year she was no longer with the network 
(Deitsch, 2018). 
Of course, there are always exceptions. During the most recent NBA owners’ lockout, 
Simmons and Kang (2011) engaged in a loose discussion proposing a player-owned league, 
albeit one bankrolled by a billionaire. The writers proposed Larry Ellison, at the time the third-
richest man in the United States, who had previously missed out on purchasing the Golden State 
Warriors. (“If not him,” Simmons wrote, “we’ll find another billionaire with deep pockets, thin 
                                                           
5 Simmons ended the column likening owning an NBA team to owning a house on “the single best beach 
in the world,” painting an aspirational, almost sentimental picture: “Get one of those 30 houses and you 
can invite your friends down for the weekend, show them around, make them drinks and eventually head 
out to your deck. And you can look out and watch the sun slowly setting, and you can hear the water 





skin and a big ego.”) Under their plan, some of the league’s more “entrepreneurial stars would 
‘buy’ franchises from Ellison and serve as captains” (¶7, 16). Needless to say, such an 
arrangement would not constitute a player-owned league, but a league owned by a single private 
entity in which the players ran the teams. Even so, it was still a shift from the private ownership 
model. 
During the same 2011 lockout, after New York Knicks player Amare Stoudemire floated 
the possibility of a player-run league, several articles were published ridiculing—or otherwise 
skeptical of—the concept. Among the exceptions, Berri (2011) used the opportunity to propose 
his own player-run concept, as will be noted in a later chapter. Then-ESPN writer Henry Abbott, 
while skeptical, used the opportunity to ask a question rarely posed in the mainstream sporting 
press: “So long as taxpayers pay for the stadiums, and players do the work, why, again, do we 
cut owners in on the deal?” (Abbott, 2011a, ¶3). 
Earlier in 2011, during the run-up to an owner-imposed lockout in the NFL, ESPN.com 
contributor Patrick Hruby (2011) explicitly argued in favor of abandoning pro sports’ private 
ownership model, positioning the Packers’ public ownership structure as a cure for the sports 
industry’s ills: 
Want to lower the odds of future pro football lockouts? Of teams loading up moving fans 
and bolting for greener financial pastures in the middle of the night? Of clubs being run by 
shortsighted whim and knee-jerk fiat? Of franchises ruthlessly extracting wealth from 
communities without adding any value? Heck, would you just like to see beer and ticket 
prices remain relatively affordable? … Cheer for the Green Bay Packers. (¶1-4) 
While praise for the Packers’ ownership model is far from uncommon in mainstream, corporate-
owned sports media outlets, Hruby’s article was a rare instance of outright advocacy for public 
ownership. The Packers, Hruby wrote, provided a “working model for a better way to organize 
and administer pro sports. Namely, through public ownership, a system that could mitigate some 
of the most irritating ills plaguing our games—and with little downside to boot” (para 7-8). 
 The above examples are few and far between in the mainstream sports media. More 




player-run concept generated a bit of press attention thanks to some saber-rattling by new 
National Basketball Players Association executive director Michele Roberts. Roberts gave an 
interview to ESPN in which she systematically took apart the owners’ rationale for splitting 
basketball-related income with the players, whom she described as the driving force behind the 
game’s success: “There would be no money if not for the players. … Thirty more owners can 
come in and nothing will change. These guys [the players] go? The game will change” (Torre, 
2014, ¶2-3). She also took a dim view of the league’s salary cap, a limit on team spending the 
owners convinced the players to accept in 1983,6 calling it an “incredibly un-American” policy 
that offended her DNA. Her bold comments, coming just three years after the owners fleeced the 
players in the 2011 negotiations, prompted an article in Salon ruminating on the possibility of a 
player-owned league. “Roberts,” the author wrote, “has provoked an imagination of a socialistic 
league, a revolutionary model that is, strictly speaking, non-capitalist” (Pulver, 2014, ¶4). None 
of it was to be; the Roberts-led union agreed to a new CBA in 2016 in the smoothest negotiation 
between the NBA and NBPA in decades. 
 As one would expect, given how generally well-received the Packers’ model has been, 
there have also been articles advocating for the community-owned structure. The author Neil 
deMause has written articles in Vice and Sports on Earth calling for community ownership, 
particularly as a remedy for the use of public funds on private stadiums (deMause, 2014a, 
2014b). The Nation writer Zirin (2010) argued for the dismantling of the private ownership 
model in sports—advocating that “every last shred of absolute power [the owners] possess 
should be stripped from their hands” (p. 3)—using the Packers’ model as the ideal alternative. 
Southern Utah economics professor David Berri (2011), as mentioned previously, outlined what 
a publicly owned alternative to the NBA would look like in The Huffington Post.  
Some have argued for a hybrid of the player- and community-owned models. In BeltMag, 
Scheid (2014) extolled the feasibility of both, adding that a “partnership between pro athletes and 
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the community is even easier to conceive; one that would be glad to use its own profits, instead 
of billions in tax dollars, to pay for its own facilities” (¶14). Writing in web magazine The 
Weeklings, DeFranco (2014) pondered a player-run league funded in part by community 
investors. In TruthDig, Wasserman (2014) suggested cities use eminent domain to “condemn all 
these franchises, buy out their ‘owners’ and have the teams run by the cities, counties and/or 
states in which they reside” (¶14). 
 That the more ambitious discussions took place in books, left-leaning news outlets and 
relative unknowns like BeltMag and The Weeklings should be no surprise. The field of radical 
sports journalism has provided fertile ground on which to imagine alternative, even utopian, 
possibilities for professional sport. As Forde and Wilson (2018) noted, while such journalism has 
received “little attention” (p. 66) from critical sport scholars, “the apparently burgeoning 
linkages between academics, activists, and journalists interested in sport-related social issues 
seems to be a promising avenue for change” (p. 73). Radical perspectives on professional sport 
remain an exception to the rule. The more mainstream sports media outlets, which often have 
direct business relationships with the leagues and organizations that they cover, have been, with 
few exceptions, enduring enablers of the status quo. 
Writing of capitalism in general, Mander (2013) noted the taboo of suggesting 
alternatives to current system. To critique capitalism as unsustainable, inherently flawed—an 
idea not only out-of-date but actively dangerous to the present and future—is to be labeled a 
heretic. “It remains okay to critique certain aspects of the system,” the author noted, “but not the 
system itself, as if global capitalism occupies a virtually permanent existence, like a religion, a 
gift of God, infallible” (p. 13). It may be an overstatement to describe pro sports’ ownership 
model in such a fashion, but the fundamentals of critique are the same. It is common to see 
criticism of certain aspects of the system, such as team relocation, publicly-funded stadiums, or 
the issue of player safety, but it is rare outside of radical publications to see the entire system 
subject to scrutiny. It is taken for granted as a given.  
McChesney (2014) argued that capitalism’s immutability is beginning to show signs of 




amenable to alternatives than their predecessors. He specifically cited the 2011 Occupy protests 
as having awakened a “sleeping giant,” if only briefly (p. 15). No such galvanizing event has yet 
occurred within pro sport, even for a short time. In a late-2010s era of renewed athlete activism, 
there has been no substantive movement against the ownership structure. 
 Neoliberalism, sport and academia. There is no shortage of critical scholarship 
examining the role of sport within the broader project of neoliberal capitalism, a term that 
requires some explication. Neoliberalism, briefly, is an ideological and political project that 
seeks to subsume all aspects of society to the logic of the proverbial free market, particularly 
those areas controlled by the state. It is a “contested and unstable term” (King, 2014, p. 76) and 
one that is not without contradictions, chief among them regular deviations from the free market 
in the form of generous corporate welfare. Or as Grantham and Miller (2010) put it, “a passion 
for intervention in the name of nonintervention” (p. 174).7 Nor is it markedly different than the 
kind of monopoly capitalism, chronicled in the eponymous book by Baran and Sweezy (1966), 
that was already depleting public resources in the decades preceding 1970. 
Yet neoliberalism can be described, without a great deal of overstatement, as “one of the 
most successful attempts to reshape individuals in human history” (Grantham & Miller, 2010, p. 
174). It has “become a hegemonic discourse with pervasive effects on ways of thought and 
economic practices to the point where it is now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live 
in, and understand the world” (Harvey, 2007, p. 22). For the similarities between neoliberal and 
monopoly capitalism, neoliberalism’s scope has been far more ambitious.  
Neoliberalism can be understood as an “intensification of the influence and dominance of 
capital” (Thompson, 2005, p. 22), such that “its prelates opined on every topic imaginable, from 
birth rates to divorce, from suicide to abortion, from performance-enhancing drugs to altruism” 
(Grantham & Miller, 2010, p. 174). Or as McChesney (2014) described it, “capitalism with the 
gloves off, a political regime in which the interests of capital are elevated and the interests of the 
working class are demonized and demolished” (p. 126). Through its all-encompassing nature, 
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and through acolytes that include whole political parties and media organizations, neoliberalism 
has been able to embed certain myths within the national and international consciousness: “that 
consumption is sovereign, labor is a problem, the economy works because of entrepreneurs and 
executives, meritocracy is real and omnipresent, and collective action (by progressives) is 
wrong” (p. 176).  
Neoliberalism rose to the fore as a response to specific societal shifts. It was, in the words 
of Harvey, a “counterrevolutionary” response by the economic ruling class at a moment of threat 
from labor unions and radical movements worldwide (Risager, 2016, ¶7; McChesney, 2014). For 
as much as it foregrounds the values of individualism and self-reliance, neoliberalism’s true goal 
has been “to strengthen, restore, or in some cases, constitute anew the power of economic elites” 
(Thompson, 2005, p. 22). It did so through what Harvey (2007) termed accumulation by 
dispossession, or the depletion and displacement of public resources by, among other things, 
privatization of institutions previously untouched by the market. Its ascendance in the 1970s, and 
codification in the Reagan- and Thatcher-led 1980s, brought about a prolonged loss of power and 
influence among those who would challenge ruling class dominance—among them regulators, 
unions, and journalists (via increasing corporate control of media)—and set in motion a yawning 
chasm between the power elite and their subjects. After three decades of neoliberal policies and 
ideologies, the “gap between what labor produces and what it reaps” had become “greater than at 
any point in recorded history” (Grantham & Miller, 2010, p. 175).  
The impact of neoliberal capitalism is far from solely economic. It has also brought about 
the destruction of “divisions of labor, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, 
ways of life, attachments to the land, habits of the heart, ways of thought, and the like” (Harvey, 
2007, p. 23). The weakening of institutions, combined with a prolonged economic malaise 
outside of the richest sliver of the economy, has left in its wake a citizenry that alternates 
between cynicism and radicalization, paving the way for the kind of neo-fascist world leaders 
who emerged in the late 2010s. Neoliberalism, McChesney wrote, has “accomplished in stealth 
fashion … exactly the outcome that fascist movements invariably seek—a demolished 




enfeebled” (Foster, 2017, foreword, p. 11). Into that breach can step the likes of Donald Trump. 
“After years of feeling ignored by the dominant neoliberal ideology,” Foster noted, large 
portions of the ‘white working class’ “rallied to Trump’s economic nationalist, overtly racist 
cause” (p. 40). Neoliberalism creates the state instability and personal isolation that paves the 
way for something even more sinister. 
 Critical scholarship on the professional sport industry has focused on where sport is 
located within the neoliberal apparatus. A partial list includes a volume examining the nexus of 
sport and neoliberalism (Andrews & Silk, 2014); books examining how Major League Baseball 
has constructed and legitimized American values and ideologies, both domestically and abroad 
(Butterworth, 2010; Elias, 2010); scholarship on the pervasive reach of neoliberal ideology in the 
sport of NASCAR (Newman & Giardina, 2011); and analysis of the use of athlete endorsers such 
as Michael Jordan to not just perpetuate capitalist values but also provide a fig leaf of post-racial 
harmony (Andrews & Mower, 2012). The thrust of such research is that sport, in its corporatized, 
spectacularized form, is both constitutive of and constituted by neoliberalism—an institution that 
is shaped by the ideologies of private, individual profiteering and in turn reifies those values at 
every turn. In Andrews and Silk (2018), the authors described corporate sport as “a subliminal 
paean to the prevailing neoliberal order,” (p. 516) and “a covert corroborator of neoliberalism’s 
privatizing, marketizing, and individualizing logics” (p. 527). Miller (2012) termed sport the 
“almost-identical” twin of neoliberalism (p. 25). Denzin (2012) called for readers to imagine 
neoliberalism as “an ugly, huge, sprawling, multiheaded beast, like a beached whale stranded on 
the shoals of a rocky island,” and sport and the physical sporting body as “lovely, sometimes 
elegant, sometimes disfigured organisms buried deep inside the belly of this grotesque, 
monstrous beast” (pp. 296-297). McDonald (2009), while calling for Marxist scholarship “to 
understand [sport’s] limitations and its [utopian] potential” (p. 44), still noted that ‘sport 
contributes to the legitimacy of extant social relations of power, and serves to incorporate us into 
a system that causes immense human suffering” (p. 45). 
The idea of corporate sport as a tool of neoliberal indoctrination is a common thread in 




stadium subsidies, the meritocratic myths that permeate sporting narratives, and the very idea of 
civic institutions being owned by private businessmen in the first place, are all in keeping with 
neoliberal capitalism. Yet the discussion of sport vis-à-vis neoliberalism can sometimes veer into 
essentialism. Consider a passage from Andrews and Silk (2018): 
As a spectacle pitting individuals or collections of individuals against each other in 
contest-based, zero-sum, and highly competitive physical performances, it is clear that 
sport serves as an almost unavoidable emissary of neoliberal common sense within a 
political conjuncture steeped in the normalized notions of competitive individualism. (p. 
524) 
There is in that description little room for the possibility of change. Is it possible that sport could 
serve other ends than those of neoliberalism? Can sport even be used to dismantle ‘neoliberal 
common sense’? 
 According to Dart (2014), “[p]rofessional sport has always been about the production of a 
commodity, typically a live sports event, which is sold at a profit” (p. 530). This is a difficult 
statement to dispute. Yet ‘always’ starts somewhere. How did professional sport take on these 
qualities, and is it possible that it could exist without them? 
 Where the above scholarship has fallen short is in answering those questions. For as 
much scholarship exists on professional sport, there is comparably little examining how it took 
on the qualities it has today. Take for example the book Sport and Neoliberalism, a volume of 
academic scholarship edited by Andrews and Silk (2008). The scholars identified several 
questions that guided the research in the volume, each of which would seem to relate, at least in 
part, to the private ownership system. For example: 
How has sport been affected by, and indeed affected, the role of the state, the market, or 
the subject within a neoliberal conjecture? Do sporting institutions, organizations, and 
forms bolster or reject the advancement of the free market, and how do individuals 
experience sport within our neoliberal present? (p. 9) 
Despite posing such questions, and despite focusing on the symbiotic relationship between sport 




professional leagues (both domestic and abroad). Whether assumed or given brief mention as 
part of a broader analysis, the notion of sport team ownership as the domain of private enterprise 
was not challenged or examined. There was copious scholarship examining the impact of the 
sports industry on society, but far less examining the structure of sports industry itself. The result 
was counterintuitive: the acceptance of professional sport in its present form, even by those who 
would seek to critique it. 
Scholarship that does suggest a different way of organizing professional sport tends 
toward keeping too much, or too little, of the current model. Ross and Szymanski (2008), for 
example, noted the problems associated with sports’ economic structure but still repeatedly 
stressed their firm support for, and disdain for alternatives to, free market capitalism. As will be 
summarized in a later chapter, the scholars developed an alternative ownership structure that 
preserved private ownership control of the teams. Rosentraub (2004) also noted the problems 
resulting from what he called “the American system” of cartel-like ownership (p. 102). However, 
his alternatives did not remotely trouble the existing private ownership model; one suggestion 
was to increase competition within the existing market system, and the other was to allow cities 
to apply for franchises and have leagues auction off ownership.  
On the other side of the coin, there is a growing body of scholarship on ‘post-sport’ 
physical culture. In contrast to corporate sport, which is dominated by “cultural ethics of 
consumption, competition, and rational body perfection,” post-sport according to Atkinson 
(2014) is “moral, reflexive, community-oriented … decisively anticommercial, cooperative over 
competitive … socially inclusionary rather than hierarchical” (pp. 194-195). There also exists 
Physical Cultural Studies (PCS), a field developed by Andrews (2008) which encompasses a 
wide range of physical activities that reinforce and/or challenge dominant power relations. PCS 
provides spaces in which “social divisions are imposed, experienced, and at times contested” 
(Bush, Silk, Andrews & Lauder, 2013, p. 83) and is defined by its “clear communitarian, 
political, moral, and ethical concerns” (p. 1). These alternatives only go so far. As McDonald 




offering more potential for progressive politics … they offer only limited possibilities for 
challenging organizational and structural power” (pp. 43-44). 
If one is looking for a non-exploitative vision of sport that maintains some level of 
familiarity—organized teams in cities across the country competing over the course of a 
season—there is little. When professional sport is perceived as intrinsically exploitative, 
intrinsically part of neoliberalism, that will necessarily preempt discussion of how it may be 
redeemed. Or to put it another way, if sport has always, and will always, serve neoliberal ends, 
then there is little reason to know how it came to be or how it can be changed. Conceding 
professional sport to private enterprise, and to neoliberalism more broadly, leaves few options 
for those who enjoy pro sports but would like to see its more exploitative excesses curtailed. At 
issue is whether pro sport can be separated from said excesses; the answer in much of 
scholarship appears to be no.  
 There has long been reluctance in academia to consider sport an appropriate topic of 
inquiry. “Calls to ‘take sport seriously’ have been made by those doing critical work in sport 
studies for many years,” Forde & Wilson (2018) observed. Paraphrasing Donnelly (2011), the 
scholars argued that “sport-related social issues fly under the radar because sport is too often 
viewed as trivial, or not worthy of serious scholarly attention” (p. 74). In one indicative account, 
sport scholar Grainger (2013) confessed that when asked what he studied, he found himself 
“answering ‘cultural studies,’ evasively avoiding any mention of ‘sport’” (p. 558). The 
phenomenon dates back to the early years of organized sport. As far back as Scheler (1927), it 
was noted that though sport had “grown immeasurably in scope and in social importance,” its 
meaning “received little in the way of serious attention” (as cited in Guttmann, 2004, p. ix). 
The low position of sport in academic circles has resulted in what Grainger (2013) called 
“a kind of academic pessimism” (p. 559), or a seeking of legitimacy through a compulsorily 
critical stance. He continued: 
One certainly likes to think that, in exposing the disguised oppressive elements and 
contradictions of sport in late capitalist society, the aim of sport scholars is to free others 




the field, at times this positive program seems to contain nothing more substantial than an 
instinctive, gloomy dislike for ‘domination’ or ‘hierarchies.’ (p. 559) 
As Jhally (1989) noted, the critical Left has viewed sport as “an activity that channels potentially 
critical political activity into a safe and neutral realm … an ‘opiate of the masses’” (p. 70). There 
is more than an element of truth to such criticism, but academia’s critical approach toward 
sport—when it pays attention to sport at all—leaves little room for alternatives. Perhaps this 
explains the general lack of critical scholarship advocating for a new economic system in 
professional sport. It can be easy to throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater and deride 
sport as fundamentally a tool for exploitation and the status quo. 
Related to that academic pessimism, it is argued here, is a tendency to talk past sport—to 
address the issues that it can bring to light (from stadium subsidies to consumerism) without 
spending much time on the teams or leagues involved. With some exceptions, the leagues are 
rarely under examination even when they are ‘under examination.’ For scholars seeking to write 
about sport, it may be the case that while sport is considered insufficiently serious and complex 
for serious academic scrutiny, the effects of sport on society are a worthier topic. Sport may be 
so taken for granted as a tool of capitalist domination that it becomes a given that team owners 
are, invariably, private businessmen who benefit from and contribute to the overarching capitalist 
system. That assumption is far from baseless, but taking it for granted ignores the possibility of 
change. Moreover, there may be an inability—or even an unwillingness—to conceive of sport in 
terms that are anything but oppressive, owing both to a degree of academic elitism and to the 
pessimism to which Grainger (2013) referred. Writing specifically of how sport journalism is 
perceived among sport sociology scholars, Weedon, Wilson, Yoon & Lawson (2018) noted that 
it “is commonly the subject of offhanded critique—but is rarely examined with balanced 
attention to both the problems and strengths of particular forms of sports writing” (p. 647). 
Extrapolating from sport media to sport broadly, it is the goal of this paper to avoid the pitfalls of 
off-handed critique, and subject organized, professional sport to an in-depth analysis, one that 




 There is existing scholarship challenging the notion that sport has always been a tool of 
neoliberalism. Karak (2017), to use one example, examined what he called the “accumulation by 
dispossession in English football,” (p. 629) or the takeover and transformation of English soccer 
by the five richest clubs, “controlled by businessmen looking to make quick speculative profits” 
(p. 626). The author chronicled soccer’s creeping commercialism, which for many years was 
held in check by Football Association policies intended to limit profit-making and ensure fair 
competition. The broader economic struggles of the 1970s and the shift toward Thatcherite 
neoliberalism in the 1980s saw a simultaneous relaxing of those rules and a rebellion by the ‘Big 
Five’ clubs, who used their influence to shift English soccer in the direction of profit-
maximization and “huge inequality” (p. 629). That effort culminated in the launch of the English 
Premier League in 1992, a major league on economic par with the “Big Four” in the United 
States that has all-but-monopolized English soccer. It is that kind of scholarship that this 
dissertation project seeks to emulate. It avoids taking sport’s existing structure for granted and 
shows that the corporatized, neoliberal status quo is not intrinsic, but the result of efforts by 
specific, influential stakeholders to maximize their already considerable power. 
The idea of professional sport as inevitably corporate and exploitative is overdue for 
challenge. Key to that effort is to interrogate the system of private ownership that has come to 
represent the norm in professional leagues.  
Methodology 
This dissertation will apply a political economic framework to the private ownership 
system in professional sport. The following section outlines how and why. To begin with, it will 
provide an overview of political economy itself, a methodological approach that requires no 
small amount of explication. 
Political economy. Political economy is a contested term. As defined by Mosco (2008), 
it is “the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute 
the production, distribution, and consumption of resources, including communication resources” 
(p. 1). That definition, perhaps overly vague, has its critics. “Think about this formulation for a 




and it becomes instantly apparent that a blank, promissory cheque is being issued. It is 
difficult to think of any work of substance engaging with the totality of society… that does 
not consider social relations in relation to resources. This elastic definition enables Mosco 
to define the political economy of communications as, more or less, anything that interests 
him. (Hardy, 2014, foreword, p. xi) 
In Mosco’s defense, political economy is a notoriously difficult field to define. Even amidst his 
criticism, Curran credited Mosco for the “intellectual courage” it took to “map a heterogeneous 
field” (p. xi). 
 “Heterogeneous” is an understatement given that the term political economy can apply 
equally to two diametrically opposed approaches. Political economy refers to one of two primary 
schools of thought, critical political economy (CPE) and a neoclassical, or Chicago school 
version that is associated with neoliberal capitalism (Palley, 2005). The former will guide the 
analysis in this dissertation. 
 CPE “refers to approaches that place emphasis on the unequal distribution of power and 
are critical of arrangements whereby such inequalities are sustained and reproduced” (Hardy, 
2014, p. 6). The most prominent of these approaches is political economy of media (PEM), a 
critique of the media and economic systems focused on the ways in which the private, corporate 
media ownership has affected content, related industries, and the citizenry as a whole. As 
described by McChesney (2014), the field 
addresses the growing importance of media, advertising and communication in advanced 
capitalist societies, examining how the capitalist structure of communication industries 
shapes media content, as well as the role of media and culture in maintaining the social 
order. In particular, the field explores the way the media ‘depoliticizes’ people, and thereby 
entrenches the privileges of those at the top.” (pp. 188-189) 
PEM’s central claim is that different systems of organizing and financing media “have 
implications for the range and nature of media content, and the ways in which this is consumed 
and used” (Hardy 2014, p. 7). Put another way, the way media are structured shapes the content 




deemed possible or desirable in society. In a concentrated corporate media industry, content will 
tend to support the status quo of monopoly capitalism—or at the very least, avoid significant 
opposition. 
In PEM, and CPE generally, the central question is what purpose for capital does the 
structure in question serve (Smythe, 1977). In the case of the mass media, decades of political 
economy literature have indicated that the purpose served is the normalization and naturalization 
of neoliberal capitalism at the expense of any other possibilities. In the Reagan and Clinton eras 
of so-called ‘deregulation,’ corporate interests faced few restrictions on media ownership, 
turning an already concentrated media system into an oligopoly, or in Bagdikian (2003)’s terms, 
a cartel. As Curran noted, political economy scholarship has sometimes fallen short in answering 
“the obvious question—why does this matter?” (Hardy, 2014, foreword, p. x). A brief and recent 
case study may shed some light. 
Corporate-owned media tend to provide sanitized, trivialized news content that is geared 
primarily toward attracting audiences to sell to advertisers and disinterested in deeper issues that 
could jeopardize relationships with business partners. Those factors were a driving force behind 
the extensive mainstream news media coverage bestowed upon the insurgent presidential 
campaign of Donald Trump, which in the dizzy summer of 2015 was still viewed as that purest 
form of entertainment: a joke. Trump, whose entire public persona was a creation of the 
corporate media—from glowing headlines on Rupert Murdoch’s New York Post to a decade-long 
run hosting the NBC reality show The Apprentice—ended up receiving more ‘free media’ than 
any other candidate in the election. By March of 2016, he had already lapped the field with close 
to $2 billion worth of free exposure (Confessore & Yourish, 2016). By the end of the election, 
his free media had swelled to a value of nearly six billion, more than doubling his chief rival 
Hillary Clinton (Harris, 2016, ¶2). It is surely not breaking any ground to suggest that a news 
media less focused on ratings and more focused on issues would have given Trump one or two 
days of coverage before moving on, if even that. Moreover, in a media system absent corporate 
control, it is highly unlikely that Trump would have become a celebrity in the first place. “It is 




credible information system,” McChesney noted (Foster, 2017, foreword, p. 11). Instead of the 
White House, he would have lived in obscurity—popping up only during reports about his racial 
discrimination suits.  
There are other implications for content, such as the normalization and ubiquity of 
advertising and the corresponding influence of advertisers in all content; the increasing ability of 
advertisers and media providers to track and influence individual behavior; and concerns over 
the intellectual poverty of much entertainment content. Where CPE/PEM make their most 
provocative argument is on the subject of ideology. Not coincidentally, that is also where it has 
faced the most criticism for being simplistic, reductionist and rigidly structuralist.  
The ideological argument of CPE/PEM is rooted in the Marxian concept of base and 
superstructure. Briefly, as outlined by Hardy (2014), “institutions like the state, law, politics, 
religion, education and culture” serve as the superstructures “whose function is to support the 
[economic] ‘base’, including through generating ideas which legitimate the system.” Taken to an 
extreme, the base determines the superstructure, such that “it is enough to know how the media 
are organised as economic entities to ‘read off’ their content and symbolic meaning” (p. 22). It is 
a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy; one can interpret media content simply by knowing that the 
media are part of the overarching capitalist structure. Media’s primary function in such a 
circumstance is the spreading of ideology. 
 A variation on base-superstructure is Althusser (2014)’s concept of ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs),8 major socializing institutions that are considered separate from the state yet 
serve the interests of the ruling class. There are various ISAs, including religion, trade unions, 
and even family. The media are part of the communications ISA, and sport is part of the cultural 
ISA. Althusser stressed the various functions of ISAs were “not reducible to [the State] ideology, 
but serve it as a support” (p. 77). In other words, ISAs do not exist solely to spread the dominant 
ideology. Even so, ISAs still perpetuate ruling class ideologies in much the same way as under 
base-superstructure. Hence, the concept has much the same weakness as base-superstructure, an 
                                                           




assumption of a mechanistic process by which media content is produced with ideology in mind 
and absorbed by the masses.  
Another variation is Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, a process whereby 
ideology is not simply imposed on a passive public, but instead reconstructed as common norms 
and values that all can share. Through that process, the ruling class can obtain the consent of an 
autonomous public for the continuation of the status quo. By deploying “taken-for-granted 
cultural frameworks and beliefs,” hegemony “enabled ruling class authority to remain generally 
unchallenged” (Hardy, 2014, p. 50). An example of a hegemonic norm would be the myth of 
meritocracy that sustains U.S. capitalism. The idea that anyone can achieve anything if he or she 
works hard enough hardly seem ideological, and in fact seems like the type of lesson one should 
pass on to subsequent generations. Yet such myths protect the status quo by turning systemic 
failings into personal ones, shifting scrutiny away from the broader capitalist system and toward 
individual pathologies. Moreover, they provide an unattainable goal for citizens to seek, with the 
occasional success story granting legitimacy to the idea that anyone can make it if they just try. 
Creating that mindset not only benefits media owners, but also lawmakers, advertisers, and 
anyone else in the proverbial one percent. As for the recipients of those messages, the myths are 
so pervasive and all-encompassing that it is difficult to notice the pitch, so to speak. 
The ideological argument is where critical political economy encounters significant 
pushback. CPE/PEM have not-infrequently been tarred with the brush of paranoia. Schudson 
(1997) argued that PEM has “tended toward ‘conspiracy theory’ 
or simple-minded notions that a ruling directorate of the capitalist class dictates to editors 
and reporters what to run in their newspapers. … Since this ignores the observable fact 
that reporters often initiate stories of their own, that editors rarely meet with publishers, 
and that most working journalists have no idea who sits on the board of directors of the 
institutions they work for, in this form the political economy perspective is easily 
dismissed. (p. 10) 
Indeed, the imposition of ideology is surely not as simple as a cabal of the super-rich getting 




within the hyper-concentrated media industry, and its system of interlocking directorates that 
will soon put Murdochs on the Disney board, there are too many differences between firms for 
there to be a joint propaganda strategy.  
Even so, it seems fairly straightforward that media content, when consolidated into a 
handful of massive conglomerates, might represent the worldviews and desires of the billionaires 
who run said conglomerates, and make popular—or at least acceptable—those worldviews and 
desires among the general public. There is no conspiracy or cabal needed; it is simply, to use a 
familiar term, the invisible hand of self-interest. 
Political economy of sport. One might wonder what applicability political economy of 
media (PEM) has to the sports industry. Sport and the media are firmly intertwined, with the 
media having served a significant role in defining sport’s role in U.S. society during the 
nineteenth century. Even so, the sports industry is not the media industry. While the media have 
a role to inform the public, sport is often perceived as mere entertainment. It is precisely for that 
reason that it is important to examine the ownership structure of professional sport and how that 
impacts sport as a text, as a profession, and as a product to be consumed. To reiterate an earlier 
point, the question at the core of any political economic analysis is what economic function the 
institution in question serves for capital. A political economic analysis of sports team ownership 
would thus examine the ways in which the private ownership model works toward the 
furtherance of a monopoly capitalist agenda that benefits those already in control. 
Is the above suggesting that professional sport, or sport in general, is simply a tool of 
capitalist oppression? That LeBron James dunks and Stephen Curry threes are in service of 
indoctrination? One can sense critics of academia rolling their eyes at the very idea. Yet it can 
scarcely be denied that the on-court exploits are in service of making owners rich. The players 
are certainly not interested in bolstering their bosses’ profits, but when all is said and done the 
action on the court, field or ice is in service of generating capital. Sport organized around 
monopoly capitalist ownership by billionaires will tend to cater to their economic needs as well 
as to their general economic worldview. Such a statement is not alleging a grand conspiracy 




private and public will tend to skew toward billionaires’ interests—a desire to make as much 
profit as possible, and to ensure that conditions remain conducive to making as much profit as 
possible. 
Given neoliberalism’s ever-expanding reach has introduced, or intensified, the profit 
motive into any number of previously sacrosanct institutions, why should sport stand out as a 
topic of inquiry? What really is the downside from having sport under the control of billionaires? 
Higher ticket prices for fans, less lucrative contracts for players? Compared to the impact 
neoliberal capitalism has had on education, on the environment, on the right to vote, the impact 
on sport seems trivial. Yet as this dissertation will argue, the professional sports industry does 
not exist in a vacuum. When players are forced to take less money in what Schiavone (2015) 
termed “concession bargaining,” what does it say for members of unions with lesser influence, 
and for the labor movement as a whole? When fans are continually gouged at the stadiums their 
tax money paid for, what does that say about the commandeering of public space by capital? As 
for those stadium subsidy deals themselves, what does it say about the role of government that 
pro sports owners can get millions and millions in public funds during a time otherwise marked 
by austerity? As Washington and Karen (2010) noted, “the large private corporations and 
individuals who own sports teams make public policy by virtue of their decisions about their 
teams” (p. 3, emphasis added). Sport may not be the most important institution touched by 
monopoly and neoliberal capitalism, but it is nonetheless among them.  
CPE is well-suited to examining where cultural industries such as professional sport fit 
within the broader political and economic apparatus. PEM in particular will serve as a guide for 
the analysis in this dissertation. As noted previously, political economic analyses of the media 
industry focus on media ownership, specifically the highly concentrated, corporate control of the 
overwhelming majority of media outlets. PEM examines how mass media became the exclusive 
domain of a few large corporations, specifically looking at the steady rollback of regulations 
meant to limit monopoly ownership of media outlets. It seeks to understand what the 
implications of such ownership are for content, for media professionals, and for citizens—for 




reporters self-censoring negative stories about important sponsors, to the detriment of their 
viewers and readers (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006). It also proposes alternative means of media 
ownership, for example a “supercharged public broadcasting” system (McChesney, 2004, p. 
249). A political economy approach to professional sport would share these aspects of PEM. 
Summarizing an edited volume pertaining to political economy of sport, Schimmel 
(2005) provided a definition that is applicable to the broader field. Such scholarship “identifies 
powerful economic actors and institutional elites who make decisions and act in ways that 
advance their own interests, who make a profound impact on the nature and functioning of sport-
related industries at the international level and whose actions are experienced at local levels in a 
variety of ways” (p. 2). In the sports industry, a list of powerful elites could include leaders of 
governing bodies, such as the president of FIFA or the head of the International Olympic 
committee; university presidents; league commissioners; even politicians or leaders of ancillary 
businesses, such as CEOs of media and apparel companies like Nike’s Phil Knight or Disney’s 
Bob Iger. This dissertation will examine professional team owners. While few team owners have 
been as prominent as the likes of Sepp Blatter, the former FIFA CEO ousted for corruption, team 
owners are the only sport executives for whom the product is their own personal property. As 
this dissertation will demonstrate, their decision-making directly impacts the athletes who serve 
as their employees, the fans who serve as their customers, and the citizens who experience the 
unintended consequences of the industry’s corporate welfare. The implications of their decision-
making are many. Young (1986) outlined the issues at the core of a political economic analysis 
of sport, and they serve as a useful foundation for the analysis this dissertation will employ:  
Central … are the concepts of profit, capital accumulation, concentration of wealth, 
extraction of surplus value, and externalization of costs as well as the exploitation, 
objectification, and commodification of athletes, games, leagues, and seasons of play. This 
approach is concerned with the ways in which the mode of production of sports is 
organized to socialize the costs of production whereas the profits are privatized. … Profits 
from financing, construction, and auxiliary services to sports all rebound to the private 




through player training programs in school, college, and community, public stadia 
building, low wages and benefits for nonathletes, and ticket and television revenue. (p. 4) 
Add to that list the economic exploitation of pro athletes, who for their million-dollar salaries are 
still subject to artificially reduced wages and, in the case of football players, significant adverse 
health effects. 
A political economy of sport goes beyond outlining the present state of affairs. It also 
explains how and why the status quo came to be the status quo (Young, 1986). This dissertation 
will argue that pro sport took on its current form as part of a long-term project of class-based 
exclusion and control meant to restrict sport participation among the lower classes, a dynamic 
that has persisted from the mid-nineteenth century through present day. Such efforts have been 
led by members of the upper classes, initially as members of sport clubs who wanted to keep 
their membership restricted. 
There is, in the course of making such claims, the risk of oversimplification. In an article 
examining the media-sport relationship, Scherer, Falcous and Jackson (2008) cautioned that 
“there is a danger in simply viewing the media sports cultural complex as one of seamless 
economic synergy and untrammeled affinity between interest groups” (p. 49). Applied generally, 
it is assuredly never the case that social and economic transformations occur neatly, sans 
internecine conflict or major opposition. This dissertation will chronicle how the conflicts within 
the upper-class elite shaped the separate paths of professionalism and amateurism; how said elite 
responded to setbacks and the loss of power in ways that reinforced their dominance; and how 
both players and the public have worked to oppose the private ownership system. The battle for 
control of the sport industry has been hotly contested, despite outward indications of a rout. 
More generally, this dissertation seeks to avoid the excesses of Marxist scholarship, 
specifically the view of cultural forms like sport as intrinsically exploitative, or one-sided 
impositions of ideology on an unthinking public. Borrowing from Carrington and Andrews 
(2013), it is important to understand these cultural industries as sites of struggle, or “contested 
terrain wherein dominant ideologies are found but also resisted, and where ordinary people in 




capitalist logics and neoliberal ideologies” (p. 5). Political economy provides the necessary tools 
to examine the ways in which economic structures are exploitative, but more is necessary for an 
analysis that is truly representative of real-life conditions. 
Marxism, post-structuralism, and the negotiation of meaning. A common criticism of 
critical political economy is that it can veer toward economic reductionism. As mentioned in a 
previous section, when taken to an extreme, Marxist base/superstructure theory requires only an 
understanding of the economic base in order to know how the institutions in the superstructure—
and the people operating within said institutions— function. As Andrews (2009) noted, the 
“functionalist reductionism that plagued much Marxist thought for much of the twentieth century 
… posited the various components of the social superstructure as being rigidly determined by the 
economic base of society” (p. 222). The rigidity of such ‘vulgar’ Marxism makes it difficult to 
offer an accurate understanding of how institutions truly operate under an oppressive economic 
system, particularly the ways in which their structural elements can be negotiated, or even 
contested. There are limits to the power of the economic base; one of the primary debates in 
critical scholarship is the extent of said limits. 
There has long been conflict within critical schools of academic thought between those 
who advocate for a classically Marxist, structural critique of the political, economic and cultural 
apparatus and those who find such an approach lacking, outdated, and rigid. That debate has 
been exemplified in the split between political economic approaches and those of cultural studies 
(CS), which while similar in many ways, have been divided on the balance between structure and 
autonomy. 
CPE, as described in the previous section, is concerned principally with the relationship 
between the dominant economic systems and the major socializing institutions. Typically, said 
relationship is one of mutual reinforcement. That is not to suggest CPE is inherently rigid or 
simplistic, the type of theory that provides the same answer to every question. “The relations 
between economic relations and cultural production,” Whannel (2009) noted, “are necessarily 
complex and contradictory” (p. 68). For one, the dominant power elite is not always of one 




interests can also be somewhat fragile and is filled with gaps and contradictions,” which itself 
creates opportunities for resistance (p. 61). The idea that structural analysis is oversimplified is 
itself an oversimplification. 
Even so, there has long been a stigma surrounding the kind of structural analysis that is 
core to CPE. Returning to Whannel (2009): 
One notable legacy of post-war debates on culture was that terms such as ‘reductionism’ 
and ‘economic determinism’ became derogatory labels in a way that contributed to a 
marginalization of the economic in analysis … The fear of being thought reductionist 
continues to haunt cultural analysis, to the extent that studies of consumption often appear 
to avoid the integration of such a basic concept as ‘profit.’ (p. 69) 
Why such pushback against the specter of reductionism? The following section argues that 
classical Marxism’s use by authoritarian governments, its gaps in logic, and its ineffectuality in 
practice, have contributed to its ill-repute. 
McDonald (2009) posited that Stalinism, which “slaughtered, persecuted and imprisoned 
millions of people all under the banner of Marxism,” necessitated a distancing from classical 
Marxist approaches. It certainly did not help that Stalin himself had written Marxist analyses that 
would not have been far out of place in the existing scholarship.9 For some critics, it was not 
merely the case that Stalinism had falsely coopted Marxism. EP Thompson, for example, 
believed that Stalin and Althusser “possessed common attitudes.” As summarized by Dworkin 
(1997), Thompson believed that: 
Stalin and Althusser shared a comparable indifference to the plight of individuals, were 
political elitists who believed that the working class by itself was condemned to ideology, 
and expressed this elitism theoretically. Their disregard for flesh-and-blood human beings 
manifested itself in an abstract theoretical language in which individuals were given no 
other role than as supports to structural relations or in meaningless slogans. (p. 231, 
emphasis added) 
                                                           
9 Stalin once argued that “[t]he base creates the superstructure precisely in order that it may serve it, that it 




Thompson (1978) went as far as to argue that “Althusserianism is Stalinism reduced to the 
paradigm of theory. It is Stalinism at last, theorised as ideology” (pp. 245-246). In a blistering 
critique of Marxism generally, and Althusser in particular, Thompson argued that structural 
approaches were unfalsifiable, simplistic, and in service of conservative goals. Specifically, he 
argued that in Althusserian theory: 
[t]he dwarfing of human initiatives by ideologies and things is entirely consonant with the 
dominant common-sense of conservative disciplines. Moreover, as political theory … the 
practice can lead to anything and justify everything; in any ‘conjuncture’ a political or 
ideological ‘instance’ can be hypothesized as ‘dominant,’ and the ‘kangaroo factor’10 will 
carry it blithely from one prejudice to the next. (p. 251) 
For Thompson, Althusserian theory was that which could not be put into practice, “no more than 
one of the successive fashions by which the revolting Western intelligentsia can do their thing 
without practical pain.” By minimizing both agency and practical application, Althusser’s 
approach was “actively reinforcing and reproducing the effective passivity before ‘structure’ 
which holds us all prisoners” (p. 251).   
Raymond Williams also took issue with classical Marxism, particularly its impulse 
toward viewing the public as a mass. “Masses,” he wrote, was a “new word for mob; the others, 
the unknown, the unwashed” (Williams, 1989, p. 11). He believed, as summarized by Dworkin 
(1997), that both Marxists and conservatives tended to view people as masses, either helpless or 
dangerous, that needed to be controlled (p. 91). The tendency within classical Marxism to view 
the public capable of being controlled by a central authority—whether the broader economic 
structure, or the institutions serving said structure—could easily map onto an authoritarian 
impulse for similar control. So too could the underlying elitism. Williams (1989) wrote of his 
anger when friends would “talk about the ignorant masses,” noting that “one kind of Communist 
has always talked like this, and has got his answer, at Poznan and Budapest, as the imperialists, 
                                                           
10 Thompson coined the phrase “The Kangaroo Factor” to describe theory that does not engage with the 
social reality it purports to address (Thompson, 1978, p. 167). Or, as Morton (2003) summarized it, “a 
procession of gigantic theoretical bounds through conceptual elements, without prolonged empirical 




making the same assumption, were answered in India, in Indo-China, in Africa” (p. 7). 
Thompson (1978) similarly wrote that there was “no mark more distinctive of Western 
Marxisms, nor more revealing as to their profoundly anti-democratic premises,” than the implied 
imperative of intellectual to enlighten the people. “Whether Frankfurt School or Althusser,” he 
wrote, 
they are marked by their very heavy emphasis upon the ineluctable weight of ideological 
modes of domination—domination which destroys every space for the initiative or 
creativity of the mass of the people—a domination from which only the enlightened 
minority of intellectuals can struggle free. … it is a sad premise from which Socialist 
theory should start (all men and women, except for us, are originally stupid) and one 
which is bound to lead onto pessimistic or authoritarian conclusions. Moreover, it is likely 
to reinforce the intellectual’s disinclination to extend himself in any practical political 
activity. (p. 250).  
The vision of classical Marxism as authoritarian and dehumanizing influenced the post-
structural turn of the mid-twentieth century. So too did the holes in classical Marxist logic. Hall 
(1983), for example, took note of a deficiency in Althusser’s concept of ISAs: “If the function of 
ideology is to ‘reproduce’ capitalist social relations according to the ‘requirements’ of the 
system, how does one account for subversive ideas or for ideological struggle?” (p. 32). Further, 
he addressed the “extremely tricky ground” on which much Marxist ideological work had been 
constructed. Taking issue with “the ‘distortions’ of ideology,” he argued that the use of the word 
“distortions” 
opens immediately the question as to why some people—those living their relation to their 
conditions of exists through the categories of a distorted ideology—cannot recognise that 
it is distorted, while we, with our superior wisdom, or armed with properly formed 
concepts, can. Are the ‘distortions’ simply falsehoods? Are they deliberately sponsored 
falsifications? If so, by whom? Does ideology really function like conscious class 




group of conspirators, how does an economic structure generate a guaranteed set of 
ideological effects? (p. 33) 
For skeptics of classical Marxism, the notion of a necessarily passive mass, beholden to structure 
and ideology and unaware of their plight, did not jibe with reality. Williams (1989) in particular, 
who was brought up in working-class Wales, found such a portrayal glaringly inaccurate. The 
idea of culture as created by and for the upper classes had some truth, as there did exist “an 
English bourgeois culture, with its powerful educational, literary and social institutions, in close 
contact with the actual centres of power” (p. 7). Even so, the idea that the upper-class had an 
exclusive hold on the creation of culture neglected a significant portion of society. The working 
class had its own institutions, Williams argued, and in some cases would want no part of the 
“strictly bourgeois culture” from which they were typically excluded. Williams: 
A great part of the English way of life, and of its arts and learning, is not bourgeois in any 
discoverable sense. There are institutions, and common meanings, which are in no sense 
the sole product of the commercial middle class; and there are art and learning, a common 
English inheritance, produced by many kinds of men, including many who hated the very 
class and system which now take pride in consuming it. … There is a distinct working-
class way of life … So when the Marxists say that we live in a dying culture, and that the 
masses are ignorant, I have to ask them … where on earth they have lived. A dying 
culture, and ignorant masses, are not what I have known and see. (p. 8) 
For Williams, Marxist evidence of mass cultural decline was based on generalizations and 
misconceptions—the conflating of the very worst of mass culture with how people lived their 
everyday lives. “It is easy to assemble, from print and cinema and television, a terrifying and 
fantastic congress of cheap feelings and moronic arguments,” he noted. “Yet do we find this 
confirmed, when we meet people?” (p. 12). 
 In sport, these tendencies in classic Marxism were particularly pronounced. Gruneau 
(1988) noted that Marxist analyses of sport had engaged in similar reductionist analysis, to the 
exclusion of all else. Gruneau: “Marxist writers have tended to pay so much attention to the 




that they have lost sight of the basis for its popular appeal.” So too did they overlook “the active 
and meaningful features of sport as cultural practices,” and “sport’s role in various forms of 
resistance and opposition to capitalist processes and ideological discourses” (p. 26). In its “most 
highly deterministic form” (p. 26), Marxist structural analysis told a simplistic story about 
complete and uncontested domination that was not representative of society. 
Critiques like those cited above noted the multiple ways in which classical Marxism was 
insufficient to address society. Chief among these was an inability, or unwillingness, to account 
for the real humanity of people within the broader structural apparatus, to approach them as 
thinking and autonomous individuals operating within a constrained space, rather than an 
automatist mass defined by external conditions. 
 It should be no surprise that Thompson, Williams and Hall are among the foundational 
scholars of cultural studies (CS), which is chief among the scholarly approaches that emerged in 
opposition to structural Marxism. Such approaches have been generally placed under the 
umbrella of “Western Marxism,” which will be addressed in the following section. 
The post-structural turn. Western Marxism emerged “as a historical and political 
reaction against the rigid economism and determinism of Stalinism,” according to McDonald 
(2009, p. 34). It arose during a period in which the revolutionary zeal of classical Marxism had 
been largely snuffed out. As Dworkin (1997) described it, Western Marxism “surfaced in the 
aftermath of working-class defeat, fascist triumph, and Soviet isolation” (p. 134). Classical 
Marxism had failed to spark the revolutionary change that was promised and proven easily 
coopted by dictators.  
The rise of Western Marxism marked a paradigm shift in critical scholarship. While 
proponents of classical Marxism “were primarily concerned with the historical, political and 
economic dimensions of society,” Western Marxism was focused on “the philosophical, cultural, 
and aesthetic—not just a shift from base to superstructure, but a redefinition of superstructure 
itself” (Dworkin, 1997, p. 137). It was not a full repudiation of Marxism, but instead sought to 
“avoid reductionist and economistic modes of analysis,” and “elaborate upon, interpret and 




determination in the last instance, reciprocal effectivity and relative autonomy” (Whannel, 2009, 
p. 68). It marked the beginning of a thread of critical thought that repositioned Marxism from 
structuralism and economism toward agency.  
 The turn away from classical Marxism is generally referred to as poststructuralism, post-
Marxism, or postmodernism. While these terms are not quite interchangeable, they tend to 
describe the same theoretical phenomenon, the displacement of Marxist structuralism in critical 
scholarship. Observing the prevalence of opposition to traditional Marxism, Hall (1983) termed 
post-Marxism “one of our largest and most flourishing contemporary theoretical schools … Had 
marxism not existed, ‘post-marxism’ would have had to invent it, so that ‘deconstructing’ it once 
more would give the ‘deconstructionists’ something further to do” (p. 28). McChesney (2002) 
lamented “the postmodern or poststructural turn in cultural studies” as having had “disastrous 
implications,” particularly a shift toward apolitical, anti-revolutionary scholarship (p. 78). 
Broadly, these schools of thought seek to move past the base/superstructure formulations 
of classical Marxism; are skeptical of grand narratives, such as that of an overarching power 
structure with influence over wide swaths of society; and seek to avoid the perceived economism 
of traditional Marxism, or the foregrounding of economic issues above all others. For proponents 
of these approaches, as McChesney (2002) noted in a critique, “postmodernism offers a basic 
repudiation of old-fashioned, out-of-date leftist analysis and politics and points the way to a new 
radical democratic future” (p. 79). That is not to suggest a clean break from classical Marxism. 
Hall (1983) wryly observed that “post-marxists use marxist concepts while constantly 
demonstrating their inadequacy. They seem, in fact, to continue to stand on the shoulders of the 
very theories they have just destroyed” (p. 28). In addition, the absence of revolution in Western 
Marxism left it as ineffectual as the traditional Marxism that it sought to transcend. McDonald 
(2009) described Western Marxism as being “characterized by what I call academicism, or the 
non-dialectical privileging of ideas over action … in Western Marxism, cultural resistance has 
masked a retreat from workers’ revolution” (pp. 34-35).  
Of the post-Marxist/poststructuralist/postmodern approaches, the one most pertinent to 




thought have had a fraught relationship. CS predates the post-structural turn, emerging out of a 
postwar period in which scholars sought to understand why Marxist revolution had failed to take 
hold among the British working class. For cultural studies, the failure of the working class to rail 
against the dominant economic system laid the foundation for decades of study. CS examines 
much the same issue as does CPE—how the ruling class maintains its power and avoids popular 
revolt. Where it diverges is from what perspective the issue is approached. For CS, the everyday 
working-class experience takes precedence over the systemic and ideological formations 
examined under CPE and classical Marxism. 
As Carrington (2009) argued, cultural studies had, from the beginning, “always worked 
within and against a Marxist problematic” (p. 19). There had always been, even prior to the 
poststructural turn, a level of skepticism of the economism and elitism of classical Marxism, as 
outlined in the earlier passages from Hall, Williams and Thompson. Yet CS was, at least at the 
outset, still capable of radical Marxist politics. “It was cultural studies—in communication at 
least—that led the way in demanding that mainstream social science explain why it assumed 
capitalist social relations were a given” (McChesney, 2002, p. 78). The poststructural turn shifted 
CS further in the direction of individual agency over systemic constraint, fueling a rupture with 
CPE that was the focus of much academic scrutiny throughout the 1980s and 1990s. “Economic 
relations, and their relation to cultural production, became first marginalized and then repressed 
as the great unspoken of Cultural Studies” (Whannel, 2009, p. 69). 
Along the all-or-nothing continuum of rigid Marxism and apolitical poststructuralism, 
one would have a difficult time finding a theoretical frame that captures the reality of life under 
an oppressive economic and political system. It should be no surprise that some of the most 
distinguished critical scholars found a middle ground.  
Marxism without guarantees. Some cultural studies scholarship has sought to avoid 
throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater as it pertains to Marxism. While critiques of 
Marxism have been prevalent in CS, said criticism has not-infrequently been tempered by an 




culture and structure that is hard to dismiss. The problem with classical Marxism, in these 
interpretations, is one of scope and scale.  
Hall (1983), for example, stressed that he was interested in a ‘reconstruction’ of Marxism 
rather than the ‘deconstruction’ that had come to mark post-Marxism. In an article examining the 
deficiencies in Marxist formulations of ideology, both from Marx himself and from later scholars 
such as Althusser, Hall set out to examine whether said formulations “can be refashioned and 
developed in the positive light of the criticisms advanced … without losing some of the essential 
qualities and insights” (p. 33). He explicitly argued in favor of salvaging what could be salvaged 
from classical Marxist theory, rather than tearing it down altogether. 
I acknowledge the immense force of many of the criticisms advanced. But I am not 
convinced that they wholly and entirely abolish every useful insight, every essential 
starting point, in a materialist theory of ideology. If … all that is left, in light of the 
devastatingly advanced, clever and cogent critiques, is the labor of perpetual 
‘deconstruction,’ this essay is devoted to a little modest work of ‘reconstruction.’ (p. 33) 
To begin with, Hall accepted the most basic argument of Marxist theory, writing that it is “surely 
correct, against all idealisms, to insist that no social practice or set of relations floats free of the 
determinate effects of the concrete relations in which they are located” (p. 43). Where he broke 
with Marxism is to what extent that determinacy prescribes behavior.  
As paraphrased by Carrington (2009), Hall’s argument for “Marxism without (final) 
guarantees” reinterprets structural determinacy “as the setting of limits and parameters, an 
attempt to shape the conditions of material existence within which politics becomes possible” (p. 
19). Under this reinterpretation, Hall (1983) wrote, there would be no room for “absolute 
predictability of particular outcomes. … The paradigm of perfectly closed, perfectly predictable, 
systems of thought is religion or astrology, not science” (p. 43). Which is to say that the 
dominant social institutions, and the economic system generally, may propagate certain 
ideologies, and may restrict what is deemed possible within society, but there are no guarantees 
that these efforts will be effective on the general public. It may be the case that ideologies are 




embedded to dislodge. Such resistance may not be enough to overturn the institutions, or the 
economic system as a whole, but may well be enough for people to construct alternative 
practices within the structural boundaries they find themselves in. Such an approach allows for 
the reality that the economic structure imposes serious constraints on what is and is not deemed 
possible, while also allowing for the possibility of autonomy under said structure. 
Williams (1989) similarly accepted the basic arguments of classical Marxism. Identifying 
three takeaways from Marxist theory “that mattered,” Williams rejected one outright—that a 
change in the economic structure will necessarily change the culture—but did accept in broad 
terms the idea “that a culture must be finally interpreted in relation to its underlying system of 
production,” and that in a class-based culture, the higher-strata is generally closed off to those 
down below (p. 7). Like Hall, Williams viewed the underlying system as constraining, rather 
than determining, culture. As summarized by Whannel (2009), Williams’ approach recognized 
“a relative autonomy of the cultural while also insisting that the economic relations underpinning 
cultural production constantly set limits and exert pressures” (p. 70). 
Gruneau (1988) discussed the limitations of structuralism in the context of sport. While 
noting the importance of understanding “how capitalist social relations have set limits and 
exerted powerful pressures on the constitutions of sport and society and varying historical 
moments,” he called it a “great exaggeration” to assume that the upper classes had “been 
completely successful in adapting every aspect of modern sport to their own uses, or even that 
sport has become fully transformed into an appendance of the capitalist labor process” (p. 27). 
These compromises have not been without opposition. McDonald (2009), for example, 
called Hall’s “attempt to marry a conception of Marxism with the insights of post-structuralism 
… problematic” (p. 39). In particular, he called into question the necessity of Hall’s Marxism 
without guarantees. “[W]ithin the broad Marxist tradition,” he noted, “only the most fatalistically 
naïve Second Internationalist, or the most ideologically driven Stalinist, would insist on the 
‘absolute predictability of particular outcomes’” (p. 40). For McDonald, Marxism did not need to 
be redeemed and replaced by a less-revolutionary alternative. The tools to avoid economic 




been drawn upon to construct a determinate but non-deterministic theory of social development, 
which eschewed fatalism without abandoning the revolutionary kernel of Marxism” (p. 40). 
Internecine debates aside, it is the case that whether from a Marxist or Cultural Studies 
vantage point, a worthwhile critical analysis must understand that there is no mathematical 
formula to how people respond to structural constraints. In accounting for agency within 
structure, the above examples provide a roadmap for this dissertation project. This dissertation 
will argue that the structure of the professional sport system, all-encompassing as it may be, is 
nonetheless subverted by those who recognize private ownership as, functionally, existing in 
name only. For a large portion of those who play in and watch the leagues, ownership truly 
belongs to the fans and/or players. While this dissertation proposes to make that arrangement 
formal, it also recognizes that team ownership is not solely defined as who owns the team. 
The public trust. Professional sport cannot be separated from the economic context in 
which it operates, an exclusionary system in which power accrues, almost exclusively, to the 
very richest sliver of the upper-class. The private ownership structure permeates every aspect of 
the pro sports economy, as this dissertation will demonstrate. With that said, the economic 
domain is not the only one of importance for this project. Culturally and ideologically, the 
private ownership system does not operate with the same impunity. It faces skepticism, 
disregard, and, at times, real opposition. Outside of the economic, the question of ‘who makes 
the game’ has no obvious answer. 
Cultural studies, and post-structural approaches generally, recognize that identifying the 
economic structure is not the end of the argument. The structure may set limits on what is 
deemed possible, but it does not determine how the citizenry will act within those limits. A 
cultural studies approach to professional sport recognizes the ways in which the culture of pro 
sport, as created by players and fans, can operate autonomously from the structural constraints of 
team ownership. Carrington (2009), for example, noted that while “football clubs do have 
owners” with exclusive legal claims to the team, “the very premise and legitimacy of exclusivity 
are called into question by active fan groups and independent supporter associations” (p. 24). 




what is possible, but it is also insufficient to explain all of the dynamics at play. There is cultural 
meaning and value independent of, and oppositional to, the economic structure. “While some 
critics dismiss these forms of resistance as either naïve or misplaced,” Carrington continued, 
the important insight that needs to be recognized is that such fans generate powerful sets 
of counter-hegemonic discourses that challenge the legitimacy of the private commercial 
claims that are made. The fans know who the legal majority shareholders are. The fans are 
not stupid. Rather, they are aware of the limits to capital and are therefore able to contest 
the discourse concerning who owns ‘the people’s game’ by articulating their own 
symbolic ownership claims over the club. (p. 24) 
There is an argument that privately-owned property can take on the qualities of public space, 
particularly in a society where the private sector has come to take on some of the responsibilities 
previously exclusive to an increasingly ‘small government.’ “In some instances,” Belanger 
(2009) noted, “the idea of public space can be extended culturally to certain spaces that are 
privately owned, but where the public over long years of use has come to assume that the space 
actually belongs to them” (p. 55). He provided the example of the Montreal Forum and Maple 
Leaf Gardens in Canada, and plenty of American examples—from Madison Square Garden in 
New York to Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles—fit the bill. “These are spaces … through which 
people move and are addressed more as citizens, or community members, than as consumers” (p. 
55). The teams themselves do not necessarily constitute ‘spaces,’ but it stands to reason that the 
same principle would apply. Fans do not engage with their favorite teams as consumers, but in 
many cases as members of communities, either literal (a Chicago native who loves the Bulls) or 
figurative (a member of ‘Red Sox Nation’ who has never been to Boston).  
To note these symbolic ownership claims is not to put the fans on equal footing with 
ownership. A team owner can uproot a franchise and move it at will, no matter what symbolic 
claim the fans may make. An owner can decide to take apart a successful roster, pull the games 
from local television, or hike prices beyond what is reasonable, all against the will of the fans, 




With that said, symbolic ownership is not meaningless. Fans obviously lack the power of 
ownership, but they are not powerless. To one extent or another, they, and the players, contest 
the most basic idea underpinning the private ownership structure—that pro sports franchises are 
the rightful and exclusive property of the owners. Discussing one Cubs fan’s discomfort with the 
right-wing politics of the Ricketts family, sportswriter Jon Greenberg summed up the dynamic: 
“Mostly, when people talk like this, I remind them while someone rich technically ‘owns’ the 
team, professional sports franchises are really public trusts. In my mind, you own your fandom 
and the team represents what you want it to represent” (Deitsch, 2019, ¶66). Or, in the words of 
former NBA player Shaquille O’Neal, opining at the height of the Donald Sterling scandal: 
“Realistically, the players and the fans, we own this game. The owners are just custodians” 
(“News stream,” 2014, ¶35). Even team executives, and owners themselves, have recognized 
these symbolic ownership claims. “I don’t look at myself as an owner,” New Orleans Pelicans 
owner Gayle Benson said in 2019, “I feel like [the team] is an asset that I am protecting for the 
city” (Duncan, 2019, ¶4). Discussing team ownership on an ESPN roundtable, Golden State 
Warriors COO Rick Welts said that the best owners: 
always are the ones who understand that they don’t really own the team, the fans own the 
team. And for a period of time you’re a steward for that, and you’ll be judged on how well 
you manage that. But there was an owner before you, and there will probably be an owner 
after you. (Durant & Kleiman, 2019, 2:03) 
The owner-as-custodian/steward, ‘technically’ but not actually in charge, makes for a very 
different power dynamic than the owner-as-owner. It is the difference between, returning to 
Welts, “the mindset that this is yours in trust, as opposed to yours to own” (2:23). In the latter 
case, players and fans serve the owner’s bottom-line. Such an arrangement reinforces the general 
power dynamics of neoliberal capitalism. In the former, however, the owner is serving the 
players and fans. That the owner makes money in the process is beside the point; his or her role 
is to facilitate the game on the playing field. 
It should be noted that not everyone recognizes symbolic ownership claims as legitimate. 




Square Garden who had yelled at him to sell the team. Appearing on a New York radio show to 
defend that decision, and others, he engaged in the following exchange with host Michael Kay: 
Dolan: “I’m not a public servant, right?” 
Michael Kay: “But the Knicks are owned by the public. I mean, you’re the one that foots 
the bill—” 
Dolan: “The Knicks are not owned by the public.” 
Kay: “But it’s a public trust.” 
Dolan: “Look, the Knicks are owned by the shareholders of the company, of which I’m 
the majority shareholder, right? So, no.” (Gundling, 2019, 20:54) 
Symbolic ownership claims quickly become illegitimate if the owner does not recognize them. 
While the owner-as-custodian is a steward of a public trust, the owner-as-owner is free to do 
whatever he or she feels like, whether it is banning critics from the arena or moving the team 
altogether. For fans and communities, there is little recourse. 
 Furthermore, even in those cases when owners do recognize fans’ symbolic ownership, 
there is nothing stopping them from violating the public trust. During his tenure as owner of the 
Seattle Supersonics, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz often referred to the team as a public trust 
(Shields, 2002; Allen, 2008). “I've said all along that I view the Seattle SuperSonics as part of 
the public trust of our community and I'm a steward of that trust,” he said not long after buying 
the team in 2001 (“New Supersonics,” 2001, ¶7). In a 2002 New York Times profile—titled “The 
Capitalist Communitarian”—he cast his decision to purchase the team as motivated not by 
money or ego, but by the need to restore the team to glory. “[T]his isn’t about me,” he said at one 
point, “This is about the Seattle SuperSonics and this community” (Shields, 2002, ¶2). He spoke 
of purchasing the Sonics as one would an act of service: “Sounding like a civic patron out only 
for the city he loved—with the grubby business of moneymaking very much an afterthought—he 
promised to treat the team as a kind of sacred civic trust” (Johnson, 2019, ¶16).  
Despite numerous paeans to the public trust, Schultz did not hesitate to sell the team in 




or renovated arena. At a press conference announcing the sale to Oklahoma businessman Clay 
Bennett, he continued to strike the drumbeat of the public trust:  
Five years ago, when I sat here and was in a position to buy this team, I remember saying 
that I view this as my responsibility as part of the public trust. I took that responsibility to 
heart and very seriously. Culminating today, that responsibility is now passed on to this 
group and to Clay Bennett. I believe in my heart … that he understands the public trust of 
Seattle and the Northwest and is going to try and do everything he can to keep the team 
here. (Reid, 2009, 38:02) 
Bennett, as noted previously, promptly moved the team to Oklahoma City in 2008, ending a 41-
year run in Seattle. Schultz’ talk of the public trust, as former Sonics broadcaster Kevin Calabro 
noted in a documentary about the team’s move, was in practice “all empty rhetoric” (38:22). 
If limited in practice, symbolic ownership claims still serve a significant role in crafting a 
critical analysis of the sports industry. The conventional wisdom that sports teams truly belong to 
the fans runs counter to the structuralist portrayal of the sports industry as a tool for reinforcing 
the dominant economic system. It may serve that purpose for the owners, but that does not mean 
the players and fans are just along for the ride. It is thus the case that a post-structural analysis of 
the pro sports industry would not argue against the dominance of neoliberal capitalism in sport, 
but instead argue that such dominance does not go unchallenged. Or as Carrington (2009) put it: 
“This is not an argument against acknowledging the full force of economic relations in 
transforming sport … It is, rather, to remind us of the limits of capital and the opportunities for 
contestation and change that always reside within such spaces” (p. 24). Which is to say, players 
and fans exhibit the agency to reinterpret their relationship with ownership as one that serves 
their ends, not just those of the owners. Such agency only goes so far, but it must be taken into 
account. Returning to Belanger (2009), a privately-owned domain might be “built with the 
singular intent of accumulation and profit,” but: 
these motives of production do not completely determine the moment and ways of 
‘consumption,’ that is, experience and interpretation of such spaces by members of the 




by different people in various contexts, and these spaces can be put to use in divergent, 
potentially even subversive ways. (p. 61, emphasis added) 
Again, Belanger was writing about physical spaces. However, the same likely applies to sports 
franchises. The intention of creating or purchasing a franchise is to make money, though some 
owners may have a bit of competitive zeal as well. The franchise, however, is not merely 
produced by capital, but consumed by different people in various contexts. It can be used as a 
source of pride, or frustration; a tie to the community, or to loved ones; an antagonist to be 
opposed; even a mere tool to pass the time. 
 In a critique of Brohm (1978)’s Sport, a prison of measured time—a structural Marxist 
critique of the sports industry that argues, among other things, that “sport is really nothing more 
than a reflection of industrial capitalism” (p. 66)—Gruneau (1980) picked apart the rigidly 
deterministic view of sport as solely a tool of capitalist oppression. It is one thing, he argued, to 
note that sport can serve to legitimize the broader economic apparatus, but quite another “to 
argue that sport is a completely determined product, a passive mirror, of capitalist productive 
relations and forces … and that the meanings which are attached to sport cannot be anything but 
socially and ideologically reproductive.” Continuing, he chided Brohm for a “mechanistic view” 
that “not only downplays the reflexive capacities of human beings but also ignores the relative 
autonomy of cultural expression and the great range in meanings that humans attribute to their 
social experiences.” He cast a skeptical eye at the idea that sport, even if solely a tool of 
capitalist domination, could successfully indoctrinate the public: 
It is … problematic to conclude that sports effectively and successfully socialize their 
participants with reactionary political views and that through such determinations sports 
always supports the status quo. Sports are active and constitutive features of human 
experience that must be understood in the context of a struggle over human limits and 
possibilities and over the appropriation of the rules and resources that define these limits 
and possibilities. Depending upon their association with divergent interests, the meanings 
of sports, like all cultural products, have the capacity to be either reproductive or 




The determinist critique of sport, he concluded, was indicative of an “unfortunate left-wing 
elitism,” and Brohm in particular had engaged in “polemical simplifications” and “a good deal of 
crude economism and functionalist thinking.” While Gruneau did not believe Brohm was wrong 
about sport being shaped by and constitutive of capitalist social relations, the inability to account 
for any other possibilities left the analysis mired in the same “tired slogans and pat formulae of 
left-idealism, functionalism and crude materialist determinism” that had marred Marxism 
generally (pp. 74-75).  
How can one strike the necessary balance between critiquing the dominant economic 
structure, and accounting for the autonomy individuals have within said structure? Carrington 
(2009) provides a guide. “A critical approach to sport,” he noted, ultimately needs: 
to hold on to and wrestle with the strongest aspect of both the Marxist and Cultural 
Studies traditions—namely, a deep appreciation of the complexity and polyvocal nature of 
cultural formation, in the context of an evolving and powerful set of constraints framed by 
an increasingly militarized world economic system, aligned to analyses that at some level 
seek to demystify, critique and potentially change the conditions of social inequality, 
economic exploitation and human injustice that are found” (p. 26). 
In sport, such an analysis might address the way fans and players create the cultural meanings 
that imbue sports franchises with value. The ‘mystique and aura’ of a Yankee Stadium, or the 
‘curses’ teams like the Red Sox, Cubs, and Cavaliers had to overcome, are not the creations of 
ownership. Much of the cultural resonance of pro sport emanates organically from the games 
themselves, and the importance with which fans and players imbue said games. It is true that 
owners create the stage, but much of the value of pro sport—the stakes, the lore—comes from 
the ground-up. 
 Such an analysis would understand that this autonomy exists within limits set by the 
dominant economic system. There is a reason that, despite their apparent unnecessity, billionaire 
owners continue to run pro teams, and reap the rewards from doing so. The cultural meanings of 




mystique and aura may be created by the fans, the players (and the media), but it is owned by the 
Steinbrenners—and they stand to benefit. 
 Finally, such an analysis would set out to ‘demystify, critique and potentially change’ the 
system, outlining how and why it took on its exploitative nature, and proposing a possible way 
forward that excludes owners from the equation. The following section goes into greater detail 
on how this dissertation intends to handle the task of a critical analysis of pro sports ownership.  
Analytic Framework 
Verstraeten (1996) chided political economy scholars for failing to “sufficiently specify 
their theoretical political-economic framework of analysis,” suggesting that the failure in doing 
so was partly responsible for political economy being tossed aside as “on a par with rudimentary 
economic reductionism” (p. 359). In proposing a political economy of the public sphere, he 
offered his own framework, consisting of the following elements: analysis of economic 
structures, particularly concentration and commercialization; the role of labor, specifically the 
extent to which professionals can exercise personal autonomy within structural constraints; and 
how ideological messages are received, even resisted, be recipients (p. 359). That framework, 
which blends traditional political economic analysis with an element of post-structural, Cultural 
Studies analysis, provides a starting point for this dissertation’s analysis. 
Writing of Harvey’s previously-mentioned concept of accumulation by dispossession, 
Mercille and Murphy (2017) noted the lack of a systematic framework explicating the concept. 
In doing so, they set criteria that are worth mentioning: such a framework would “[outline] its 
causes, manifestations, and consequences in the form of a typology, for example” (p. 1043). This 
dissertation borrows from the above in forming its own political-economic framework, one that 
‘outlines the causes, manifestations, and consequences’ of pro sports’ ownership structure. 
The following chapters will argue that the major pro sports industry reinforces the 
broader power dynamics of monopoly and neoliberal capitalism: intrusion of capital into public 
space; ceding of civic institutions and resources to private control; maximization of labor at the 
lowest possible cost; demoralization of dissent; and insulation from accountability for those in 




project of exclusion and control of lower-class sporting participation on the part of the economic 
upper-class. They will argue that even within such a system, there are opportunities for resistance 
for both players and fans. To make these arguments, it uses a framework consisting of four 
general elements: 1) causes, 2) manifestations, 3) consequences and 4) opposition. 
First, it will examine what has caused the sports industry to exist as a privately-owned 
entity. As Hardy (2014) noted, CPE analyses of the broader economic system challenge the 
perceived neutrality of the market. “Markets are not natural, independent mechanisms, they 
reflect the outcome of political and legal struggles … and so are open to alternative paths of 
decision-making” (p. 62). This dissertation is premised on the same argument. The analysis will 
show that the private ownership system is not neutral or natural, but the result of repeated efforts 
by a social and economic upper-class to achieve a specific result—their continued control of 
organized sport in general and professional sport in particular.  
Second, it will examine the manifestations of the private ownership structure. In political 
economy of media, one would examine media ownership, relationships with advertisers and 
other industries, constraints on content and the diversity of voices, and the impact on viewers and 
public opinion. This dissertation will examine the various intersections of team ownership: those 
that are financial (relationships teams and leagues have with other industries, specifically the 
media), political (the nexus of team ownership and politics, whether supporting certain causes 
nationally or negotiating sweetheart deals locally), and ideological (the neoliberal ethos of 
cowing unions and reaping corporate welfare). 
Third, it will examine the consequences of the current ownership structure for employees, 
fans, and citizens in general. What happens when the logic of capital accumulation—extracting 
the most possible out of individuals and communities while giving up as little as possible—
becomes the guiding ethos of the sports industry? What are the public health and public policy 
implications in an industry where players’ physical bodies and communities’ physical spaces 
constitute lucrative profit opportunities?  
Finally, it will discuss ways in which the current system of private ownership has been 




studies and post-structural criticism aimed in the direction of political economy, Verstraeten 
(1996) noted that the field tends to neglect the autonomy both of labor and of the public. Such a 
tendency is troublesome enough in a field such as PEM, which focuses on a media industry that 
has an expendable labor force and a somewhat passive audience. In sport, where labor is the 
product and the fans create much of the value, both financial and intangible, the neglect of 
autonomy is a more serious error. This dissertation will examine the limits of the private 
ownership structure and possibilities for an entirely new system. 
The above questions and topics will be addressed in the next four chapters. First, a brief 
discussion of how the political economic analysis in this dissertation will be organized. As 
described by Mosco (2009), there are four primary components to political economy of media: 
“social change and history, the social totality, moral philosophy, and praxis” (p. 26). 
Social change and history (causes). Mosco (2009) named history the first pillar of a 
political economic analysis, and with good reason. Deployed effectively, it can provide the 
necessary counterweight against capitalism’s assumed immutability, demonstrating how 
conditions that may seem to have always existed are in fact the product of particular social, 
political, and economic developments. If history can have that effect on the overall economic 
system, it is arguable that it can have that effect on the system of private ownership in 
professional sport. The first part of this dissertation’s political economic framework is to 
examine how the industry took its current form. Historical analyses of sport have been largely 
left to sport historians, many of whom have done valuable work on the subject. Chapters two and 
three of this analysis will rely on these historians’ work to trace the current state of the sports 
industry back to the rise of organized sport in the mid-nineteenth century, outlining the various 
circumstances that shaped team ownership since that period of time. 
Dating back to the self-styled gentlemen of baseball’s Knickerbocker Club in the 1850s, 
the economic upper class has sought to control organized sport, first as players and later as 
management. A decades-long push-and-pull with the economic underclass for control of the 
playing field resulted in a hierarchy between affluent owners and less affluent players, with the 




in Green Bay by the NFL’s Packers, provided a serious challenge to that control—so much so 
that it has been outlawed, either explicitly or implicitly, by each of the four major leagues. Only 
the Packers exist as a grandfathered-in exception to the private ownership rule. It is not the case 
that private ownership has always existed or was an inevitable outcome; it was the result of 
particular efforts to gain or maintain power. 
Social totality (manifestations). Under Mosco (2009)’s typology, a political economic 
analysis must examine the social totality, or the broader contemporary context surrounding the 
institution under examination. The second element of this dissertation’s political economic 
framework is to examine how the private ownership system operates, specifically locating it 
within the broader neoliberal project. How does the privately-owned sports industry serve to 
further neoliberal domination, if at all? How does it interact with other similar oligopolies, such 
as the corporate media? How does it impact the broader society? It will be argued that in its 
current form, the sport industry serves as an exemplar of neoliberal capitalism, with team owners 
seeking to maximize profits by chipping away at labor and depleting public funds, while using 
the considerable resulting profits to drive up franchise values (and swing elections), and multi-
billion-dollar deals with media companies to avoid any serious scrutiny. 
As mentioned previously, there is no shortage of popular and scholarly material 
criticizing individual team owners and their various misdeeds—the racial insensitivity of Donald 
Sterling, the wanderlust of Stan Kroenke, the petulant anger of Dan Gilbert, the incompetence of 
James Dolan. This dissertation seeks to broaden scrutiny of ownership from the individual to the 
systemic level, examining how owners have collectively banded together to make owning a 
franchise so foolproof that the rich can become richer regardless of competency. It is almost 
automatic now that an owner can enter the industry, stay for a decade or two, and come away 
with greater riches than he had before. In some cases, they come away with a greater national 
profile as well. Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban is one example, going from obscurity to 
such fame that he considered mounting a presidential run (Gelles, 2018). 
The success of sports team owners, especially as contrasted with the losses suffered by 




rich get richer, at the expense of everyone else. The rising fortunes of sports team owners are the 
result of specific efforts that have had a far-reaching impact on those who work in sport, those 
who consume it, and those who have no direct relationship to the industry. 
Moral philosophy (consequences). The great advantage critical work has over more 
mainstream, value-free research is its ability to exist on the same ground as that which it 
covers—one that is subjective and bound to a particular set of principles. It is not enough to 
simply provide an observation about how the industry operates, but to examine whether it is 
fundamentally exploitative of its employees and its consumers. In this dissertation’s political 
economic framework, such an evaluation would examine the consequences of the private 
ownership system. The broken bodies—and cities—that are the result of unchecked corporate 
sports ownership are evidence that the current system is not justifiable on moral grounds. 
The disregard, and arguably outright abuse, of players by the NFL owners is perhaps the 
most glaring example of exploitation in the pro sports industry. There has been concern about 
football’s toll on the brain for more than a century, and yet the NFL was as recently as the last 
decade releasing numerous journal articles dismissing long-term effects of head injuries. Based 
on League of Denial by reporters Fainaru-Wada and Fainaru (2013), that was not due to 
ignorance, but to what amounted to a public relations campaign by the league to keep players in 
the dark on an issue that threatened the golden goose. It is of course not news to anyone that 
football is a dangerous sport, but the key grievance for NFL players in their lawsuits against the 
league was that they were kept in the dark about the extent of the possible damage—not the 
damage itself. It was not the game of football that they highlighted as the villain, but the NFL’s 
self-interested obfuscation. 
It is admittedly difficult to argue that ownership has economically exploited its athlete-
employees, especially the likes of LeBron James—who has long made it his (realistic) goal to 
become sports’ first billionaire athlete. Surely, he of all people is not being exploited. Yet James’ 
salary is far lower than it could have been if not for the NBA’s introduction of its anti-free 
market salary cap. Instead of bidding on players’ services with every incentive to send salaries 




1983, arguing that the league was on the verge of going-out-of-business (Lewis, 2012). The cap 
and other restrictions on salary point to the ultimate paradox of the sports industry—that owners 
kneel at the altar of the free market, except when it comes time to pay for players’ services. At 
that point, capitalism poses the existential threat of ruinous competition between teams. Within 
the bounds of basketball, the owners recognize the dangers of excessive, out of control salaries. 
If a Democratic president and Congress ever passed legislation limiting corporate CEO salaries, 
however, there would be apoplexies in boardrooms and Murdoch-owned cable news studios 
across the nation. What is good for LeBron is not so good for his employers. 
There is a common refrain in the sports business, uttered even by the NFL commissioner 
Roger Goodell, that the pro sport is a socialist enterprise (“The NFL,” 2012). That is not exactly 
the case; pro sport is socialist when it benefits the owners to put regulations in place and 
capitalist when it benefits the owners to cling to free market ideals. It is a useful hypocrisy that 
allows for owners to maximize the economic windfall that sport provides—the owners get to 
regulate player salaries and benefit from government welfare (both locally and federally) while 
their own financial intake is subject to few if any limitations. 
It is worth noting that the most exploited pro athlete is still doing pretty well financially 
(if not physically), at least during his playing career. What do the fans and taxpayers get out of 
their lopsided relationship with pro sports? Routine cases of stadium roulette, where cities are 
forced to spend diminishing public funds on pro sports palaces that quickly become obsolete, for 
fear the team could exit for greener pastures. Unlike the publicly owned Packers, who have 
remained in the same city for over a century and the same stadium for nearly a half-century, 
privately owned teams jump to new stadiums, new cities, or both, with regularity. Even the most 
state-of-the-art arena can become out-of-date if it does not have the latest lucrative innovation, 
and it is not unusual now to see teams deem a twenty-year old stadium supposedly out of date. If 
the team owners want a new stadium, they will in many cases seek subsidization from the city or 
simply seek a new city.  
Stadium subsidies “long ago became a preferred method of legalized graft in America,” 




remarkable level of welfare at a time when government spending has been under attack. With 
local governments already cutting back on public offerings such as education, spending several 
million on a new stadium means even less money going to such institutions. The result is that 
struggling cities find their problems exacerbated, a problem that not only affects the exploited 
fan, but the citizen who does not consume sport. As Zirin (2010) wrote, “[w]hether you are a 
sports fan or not, sports affects the national discussion and economy like never before” (p. 3). To 
borrow from Galbraith (1998), the non-fan gets to experience the public squalor that is the price 
of the owners’ private wealth, without enjoying the vicarious thrill of the fan or the material 
compensation of the player. In Ohio’s Hamilton County, home of the Cincinnati Bengals and 
their Paul Brown Stadium—where “one in seven people lives beneath the poverty line and 
budget cuts have left gaps in the schools and sheriffs department” (Albergotti & McWhirter, 
2011, para 1)—the Bengals received anywhere from over $450 million to over $550 million in 
public funds to renovate their stadium.  
The exploitation is primarily economic, but not solely so. One need only look at the slave 
labor being used to build stadiums for the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, where working conditions 
are so dire that “at least 4,000 people in total will die” by the time the event takes place 
(Silverman, 2015, ¶4). That Qatar was awarded the World Cup in the first place, despite the fact 
that it has been characterized frequently as a dictatorship, is only because of the rampant 
corruption within FIFA, the governing body of the world’s most popular sport (Laughland, 
2017). One could further look at the ways in which local populations are displaced by major 
sporting events, such as in South Africa during the 2010 World Cup, or even in Brooklyn, New 
York, when eminent domain uprooted a 14-acre stretch of homeowners and businesses so an 
arena could be built for the NBA’s Nets (Gladwell, 2011). 
Praxis (opposition). The capstone of a political economic analysis is putting the 
theoretical discussion into practice. Returning to Thompson (1978)’s concept of the ‘kangaroo 
effect,’ it is necessary to ground political economic analysis in a real-world context, rather than 
remain stuck in the conceptual clouds. Research that points out structural domination, but has no 




contributes to what Thompson called “the effective passivity before ‘structure’ which holds us 
all prisoners” (p. 251).  
This dissertation seeks to avoid such pitfalls by highlighting the ways in which the 
private ownership model has been contested, and ways it can be contested further. In particular, 
it will propose an alternative to the private ownership model that, when put into practice, would 
empower the players and the fans, protect the municipalities hosting the teams, and turn the 
sports industry from an exploitative profit machine to one that is cooperatively run and focused 
principally on the game. It is not the case that the current system of private ownership is a 
necessary, or even wise, way to organize sports leagues. Private ownership of pro sports teams 
has been portrayed as the natural and inevitable way of doing business, when in actuality it is but 
one method, and perhaps not even the best one.  
As will be described in greater detail later in this text, the first baseball players’ union 
broke away from the dominant National League in 1890 to form a player-run competitor. Their 
effort was successful enough to put the N.L. in some degree of peril. Had the players’ league not 
been dependent on profit-oriented ‘contributors’ for funding—pseudo-owners whose financial 
interests made them vulnerable to outside influence—it may have lasted more than one season. 
More recently, the publicly-owned Green Bay Packers have had enduring success despite 
playing in professional sport’s smallest television market and fourth-oldest stadium. The NFL is 
on record as admitting that the public ownership model works; in a lawsuit challenging the 
legality of the league’s prohibition of public ownership (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994), the rationale 
given for the ban was that publicly owned teams would be at a competitive advantage compared 
to their private counterparts. Publicly owned teams could simply hold a stock sale when in need 
of a cash infusion—as the Packers did when they raised over $24 million toward renovation of 
their stadium in 1997—an advantage that the privately-owned teams could not match. While 
those are but two examples, they demonstrate that alternatives have existed to private ownership, 
to varying degrees of success. 
This dissertation will outline a hybrid model of public-employee ownership that seeks to 




control of the games to the people who are generating the revenue, the players; and give fans and 
communities a real connection to the teams, as in Green Bay. The interests of players and of the 
public are not one in the same, and a system that gives too much control to one side or the other 
could result in new problems. Such a proposal would need to account for potential conflicts 
between the sides. Could a hybrid of public and private ownership be self-sustaining enough to 
avoid the losses that scared investors away from the Players’ League? As important as it is to 
abandon the private ownership model, so too is it important to establish the viability of an 
alternative system. The model proposed in this dissertation is not foolproof by any stretch, but it 
will cut out the unnecessary middleman benefitting from a system to which he contributes 
little—the owner.  
Research sources. To conduct the political economic analysis discussed above, this 
dissertation will rely on a mixture of primary and secondary research. Primary sources will 
primarily include contemporaneous newspaper articles and books, as well as case law. Secondary 
sources, specifically historical accounts of how sport developed from the mid-nineteenth century 
to the mid-twentieth, will provide much of the foundation for the historical analysis. Several of 
these resources are likely to be written by sport historians, rather than political economic, 
critical, and/or communications scholars. Such historical works outline the developments that led 
to private, corporate ownership of the sport in ways that are not yet matched by communications 
scholarship. In sections addressing contemporary issues in sports ownership, particularly the 
relationship between sport and the media, or the use of sport to promote neoliberal ideology, 
critical communications scholarship will be of greater value. Discussions of alternatives to the 
status quo will rely on a mix of the radical, the practical, and even the conservative—ranging 
from Zirin (2010) to Ross and Szymanski (2008).  
Scope. For the sake of feasibility, it is necessary to limit the scope of this dissertation 
project. The primary issue addressed in this project is the system of private ownership in the 
professional sports industry, primarily the four leagues that are based within the United States—
the NFL, NBA, MLB and NHL. As a result, the analysis contained herein will focus primarily on 




the earlier development of sport in Great Britain as well as relevant ownership structures in 
overseas leagues, but the general focus will be on the global West. 
While it can be said that amateur collegiate sport in the U.S. is a professional league in 
everything but name, it is simply the case that college sports does not feature the kind of private 
ownership model that this dissertation seeks to critique. College sports shares many issues with 
the professional leagues—as well as a shared history, as will be demonstrated in the historical 
analysis—but an in-depth analysis of amateurism is beyond the scope of this project. 
The analysis begins, as in Mosco’s framework, with a detailed examination of the history. 
The story of how sport became subject to private ownership spans centuries, and lays bare the 




CHAPTER TWO: EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The first step in this dissertation’s political economic analysis is to examine what caused 
the professional sport industry to develop as a principally private enterprise. To do so requires an 
in-depth historical analysis that will form the basis of this chapter and the next. The following 
chapter examines how organized sport developed out of the fundamental human behavior of 
play, and how class distinctions began to shape notions of who could participate and why. To do 
so, it will focus primarily on Great Britain in the nineteenth century, where much of the Western 
ideology of sport originated. 
The Very Beginning 
To start at the very beginning of how sport became the cultural colossus it is today, it 
seems necessary to first distinguish between organized sport and play. While Gruneau (1980) 
cautioned that play “should not be universalized as some trans-historical human essence or 
abstract form” (p. 83),11 it is not an exaggeration to suggest that play has almost always been part 
of the human experience. Collins (2013) deemed play “as vital to human culture as the desire to 
sing, the urge to draw or the need to tell stories.” In its earliest form, it served to mimic other 
aspects of human life, such as hunting animals. It was “sometimes non-competitive, occasionally 
non-physical and often intertwined with ritual activities … And winning was often not the 
purpose.” Play and games have been “common to almost all societies in almost all periods of 
history” (p. 1). 
Modern organized sport, on the other hand, is a recent phenomenon, and one that was 
slow to achieve dominant cultural status in the West. While sports such as horse racing gained 
immediate acceptability through their association with upper class culture, the dominant sports of 
the modern era—soccer, football and baseball chief among them—were kept to the fringes due 
to an association with the working class. It took concerted effort on the part of advocates, some 
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in it for the money and others truly devoted to the games, before those sports began to take on 
their cultural dominance.  
 The current system of private sports ownership finds its roots in the shift from traditional, 
rural games to organized clubs and leagues. Rising out of the societal changes wrought by 
industrial capitalism, organized sport took on the caste-like structure of the broader economic 
system. For the upper class, leisure was a form of conspicuous consumption, whereby having the 
time and money to engage in play symbolized one’s status. In order to maintain the air of 
privilege, these players sought to limit participation to those with the luxury of free time. Or to 
put it in the words of Arthur Budd circa 1899, if “he cannot afford the leisure to play the game he 
must do without it” (as cited in Collins, 2013, p. 27). To keep sport clear of underclass influence 
required at least some organization, which led to the formations of clubs, and later associations, 
made up of those deemed respectable. Over the course of decades, the effort to keep certain types 
off the playing field gave way to controlling their participation and, finally, making money off 
them. The following dives into this history. 
Play vs. sport. It is a common sentiment among media and fans that sport, in its 
organized, professional form, is a corrupted form of play. In this view, play is a ‘child’s game,’ 
either pure or trivial depending on one’s lament.12 If one is chiding professional athletes for 
making too much money or taking themselves too seriously, then play is either romanticized as 
the pure ideal or diminished as trivial—the millionaire pro player held up as undeserving either 
way. Both perspectives position play as the fundamental core of pro sports, emblematic of its 
true nature. Neither conception of play truly captures its relationship with sport. 
Guttmann (2004) defined play as “any nonutilitarian physical activity pursued for its own 
sake,” with pleasure found “in the doing and not in what has been done” (p. 3). Any number of 
activities could reasonably fit that description. In describing the “extremely broad” range of 
playful activities, Gruneau (1980) mentioned “activities as diverse as kicking a stray can in the 
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street, singing in the shower, daydreaming, children’s games, community recreation and highly 
organized team sports” (p. 69). Surely, any definition that can include singing in the shower and 
team sports is perhaps overly broad.  
One way to narrow down the list is to use Guttman (2004)’s “preliminary model of play, 
games, contests and sports” (p. 3). Briefly, the first level is spontaneous play. Once play becomes 
organized, it can be called a game. Once winning becomes a factor, that game can then be called 
a contest. If that contest seeks to test one’s physical skill, it can be called a sport. Sports can thus 
be defined “as ‘playful’ physical contests, that is, as nonutilitarian contests which include an 
important measure of physical as well as intellectual skill” (p. 9). 
In the West, most of the proto-sport practices prior to the Industrial Revolution fell into 
one of the above four categories: spontaneous play, organized games, competitive contests, or 
physical sports. By the sixteenth century, Collins (2013) noted, such practices included proxies 
for military training, like archery and jousting; traditions tied to religious or ritual events; games 
played at fairs or festivals; and activities undertaken “when people simply had spare time on 
their hands.” It would not be accurate to suggest these events were purely nonutilitarian, but 
“they were not generally codified, organised on a commercial basis nor seen as separate from 
everyday life” (p. 2). With some noted exceptions,13 they “tended to be periodic, and were 
minimally-organized, and many activities were more socially-oriented than competitive” 
(Gruneau, 2006, p. 562).  
Modern pro sport does not fit those descriptions. While today’s sports are indeed playful 
physical contests, they are by no means nonutilitarian. To be sure, that does not mean they are 
purely utilitarian. As Guttmann (2004) noted, the “utilitarian and the nonutilitarian” are not fully 
distinct; “we often experience work and play in their impure forms.” One can turn work into a 
game, or “corrupt pure play by ulterior motives” (p. 13). It can be said that professional athletes 
are at various times engaging in pure play on the court, field or ice, and then at other times are 
playing for any host of ulterior reasons—money, winning, celebrity, among them. “One may find 
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moments of play in big-time sports,” Gruneau (1980) noted, “but is it possible to argue that such 
sports in themselves are inherently playful?” (p. 69).  
Gruneau answered his own question in a later article, arguing that it was inadequate to 
“view sport simply as an expression of some inherent human essence for play, [or] as some 
socially-constructed ‘corruption’ of that essence” (Gruneau, 2006, p. 561). To do so, he implied, 
was to engage in the same kind of reductionism that viewed sport as a merely a mirror of social 
relations. “The more useful view is to see sport as something constituted by a shifting set of 
social practices and socially-produced discourses” (p. 561). In other words, sport not as a 
corrupted form of play, but as a cultural formation of which play is a part. 
It is hard to dispute that modern sport participants are engaging more in work than play, 
from the professionals making a living off of the games, to the minor leagues who are seeking to 
work their way up into the so-called ‘big leagues,’ to the amateurs who spend hours upon hours 
practicing despite no financial compensation. That is a marked difference from the traditional 
games of old. Today’s games are not played because there is free time, or to serve as a low-key 
proxy for real conflict. While traditional games were for the most part leisure activities, taking 
place when “enjoyment could fleetingly take precedence over necessity” (Collins, 2013, p. 1), 
leisure in the modern sports industry is limited to the fans in the stands, and, depending on their 
investment in the team, the owners. For those doing the playing, the game is often a livelihood. 
The transformation from sport-as-play to sport-as-work originated in eighteenth century 
Great Britain, where by midcentury, preexisting sports such as horse racing, boxing and cricket 
had begun a transformation. “Although they had their roots in the rural sports of the past, these 
games began to differ markedly … What now distinguished them from their rural antecedents 
was the emergence of generalized rules of play and their ability to systematically and regularly 
generate revenue” (Collins, 2013, p. 2, emphasis added). That would seem to corroborate the 
idea that money and commercialism corrupted play, turning it into the commodified behemoth 
that is modern sport. Yet while the dawn of commercial sport was undoubtedly significant,14 that 
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was not the sole, or even primary, reason why sporting practices shifted from play-oriented to 
work-oriented. The rise of industrial capitalism brought with it major cultural changes, including 
a reduction in the time and resources available for play. Rural games were tied to a completely 
different way of life and time distribution, one in which harvests and the changing of seasons 
governed the calendar. The economic and social values of the new system, to say nothing of the 
new workweek, turned ‘play for play’s sake’ into a waste of valuable time for the working 
class—and a symbol of status for the economically advantaged. As the next section will argue, 
the dichotomy of who gets to play, and who does not, paved the way for the development of the 
sports industry even more than did the commodification of the games themselves. It was those 
who could afford to ‘play-for-play’s-sake’ who would shape the industry to come.  
Economic and cultural shifts. The all-encompassing term ‘the West’ is misleading 
when discussing the development of sports. The United States tended to lag Europe in taking to 
what would be commonly described as sports, as Collins (2013) noted: “In contrast to Europe, 
American sport was chronically underdeveloped and anaemic until the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, if played at all” (p. 3). With that in mind, if one wants to understand how pro 
sport came to exist in its current form, the proper starting point may be Great Britain a century 
earlier, and “the way that previously rural traditional games were transformed by the economic 
and social changes that were taking place in the British Isles” at the time (p. 3). Guttmann (2004) 
located the dawn of modern sport as breaking in early eighteenth-century England, spreading 
over the course of the next 150 years to “the United States, to Western Europe, and to the world 
beyond” (p. 57). Harrow (2016) set the timeline a bit earlier, during what she called the “long 
eighteenth century”—a period that began as early the mid-seventeenth century in 1660. Over the 
course of that period, sport shifted from a communal affair taking place “mostly at fairs, festivals 
and in local villages” (p. 3) to “a business, a spectacle, and a performance … staged regularly, 
and often in commercialized, specialized sites” (p. 1).  
The traditional communal games of old began to fall out of favor for a variety of reasons, 
some of which will be chronicled here. The most commonly cited by historians was the scorn in 




subject to significant debate. Because “the most brutal and disruptive pastimes … of the working 
classes” were also the “most frequently condemned and most prone to decline,” historians 
largely came to conclude 
that of all the forces hostile to the survival of traditional working-class sporting recreations 
the most influential was the pursuit of higher standards of private and public behavior … 
[S]port historians nowadays are more inclined to emphasise the desire for respectability 
than the concerns of property owners and businessmen for public order and workforce 
discipline. (Tranter, 1998, p. 10)  
Similarly, Harrow (2016) noted that “historians have quietly assumed that industrializing Britain 
witnessed a sharp increase in the volume and intensity of elite criticisms of the sports and 
pastimes of the poor,” (p. 20), a contention she challenged. The upper class, she argued, actually 
displayed a certain “tolerance with respect to the sports and pastimes of the little people,” based 
on the idea that their customs really did no harm and that “the poor should be permitted to enjoy 
their customary diversions” (p. 20). Tranter (1998) also noted the ‘limitations’ of upper-class 
scorn, namely that the working classes tended to either enjoy the same sports as their so-called 
betters, or sports that posed no real threat to respectability.  
The blurred lines of respectability also worked in the other direction, wherein traditional 
games generated scorn not just among the elite, but also among members of the working class 
who “condemned the immorality and turbulence associated with some of the old sports and 
shared the view that, in a more enlightened and humanitarian age, these should yield to more 
acceptable and uplifting recreations” (Tranter, 1998, p. 11). In some cases, the rationale for 
opposing traditional games centered more on keeping the peace than on elitism; as Dunning and 
Sheard (2005) noted, football (soccer) “and other popular games were banned on more than 
thirty occasions” between the fourteenth and seventeenth century, owing to the ‘great disorder’ 
that came from broken windows—and from a slew of injuries that may sound familiar to fans of 
modern American football: “some having their bodies [bruised] and crushed; some their arms, 




Considering that one of the pastimes of pre-industrial Britain was “burning cats alive in baskets” 
(p. 22), it did not necessarily take sneering elitism to oppose some traditional amusements. 
 That some elites tolerated lower class sport, that some in the lower classes disdained 
them, and that some of their reasoning was justified, is not to suggest that class elitism was at all 
irrelevant in those early days of sport. On the contrary, class status had been an important factor 
in determining sport participation for centuries. Guttmann (2004) noted that “jousts and 
tournaments were limited to the nobility” in medieval times, and “the strict inequality of feudal 
sports lingered on” afterward. Servants and laborers were barred from playing tennis as early as 
1388, and even from bowling as early as 1541. Near the start of the long eighteenth century, a 
Virginian tailor who “dared race his horse against a gentleman’s” received a fine for his troubles 
(p. 30). Some organizations had strict regulations barring participation among those who had 
ever had ever competed for compensation. “No person shall be considered as an amateur 
oarsman or sculler,” read one 1879 proclamation, 
1. Who has ever competed in any open competition for a stake, money, or entrance fee. 2. 
Who has ever competed with or against a professional for any prize. 3. Who has ever 
taught, pursued, or assisted in the practice of athlete exercises of any kind as a means of 
gaining a livelihood. 4. Who has been employed in or about boats for money or wages. 5. 
Who is, or has been, by trade or employment for wages, a mechanic, artisan or laborer. 
(The New York Clipper Annual, 1879, p. 26) 
Tolerating lower class sport, yet punishing lower class participation, seems contradictory at first 
glance. It begins to acquire some logic if one argues that class integration was the primary 
concern of middle-and-upper class elites. In an 1895 essay, Casper Whitney—“America’s 
leading sportswriter of the late nineteenth-century” (Collins, 2013, p. 35)—advocated for what 
amounted to a separate-but-equal policy for sport: 
No one rejoices more than I at evidences of the lower classes turning their attention to 
sport. It is a magnificent spectacle, of incalculable value to national manhood … I am 
more than willing to help my laboring brother of lesser refinement; to do all I can for him 




and to encourage in every possible manner his endeavors to make more of a man of 
himself. But I do not care to dine or play football with him. … The laboring class are all 
right in their way; let them go their way in peace, and have their athletics in whatsoever 
manner best suits their inclinations. … Let us have our own sport among the more refined 
elements, and allow no discordant spirits to enter into it” (Whitney, 1895, pp. 166-167) 
Whitney, who viewed blending the classes in much the same way as he did blending the races,15 
managed to espouse latent class elitism while tolerating the games of the lower class, and even 
advocating for their participation in sport activity—so long as they kept their distance. The very 
existence of lower-class sport participation was less a concern than mixed participation.  
It should be noted that some welcomed class intermingling on the playing field. Sheffield 
Football Association president J.C. Shaw marveled in 1877 that his team “was a mixed one of 
gentlemen of the middle classes and working men” and argued that such class integration “broke 
down prejudice and had a beneficial effect in cementing good feeling between all classes” 
(Mason, 1982, p. 252, as cited in Tranter, 1998, p. 37). In cricket, upper class “gentlemen” not 
only played alongside supposedly inferior “paid players,” but shared dressing rooms and would 
on occasion “join them in eating and drinking” (Furst, 2014, p. 26). In an 1866 editorial, cricket 
was said to be one of the last sporting domains in which “the gentle and the simple of the land 
meet together for enjoyment on terms of social equality” (as cited in Tranter, 1998, p. 38). 
Yet as Christesen (2012) wrote, those praising class integration “were the exception rather 
than the rule … many members of the upper class took active steps to ensure that they did not 
play sports with people they saw as their social, if not physical, inferiors” (p. 243). Even those 
exceptions were not as inclusive as one might imagine; the “social intermingling” of English 
cricket was only possible because the lower-class professional players “posed little social risk to 
gentlemen players” who were secure in their class status (Furst, 2014, p. 26). So long as there 
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participation, he added that it was just as “impossible … to bring together two elements in sport that do 




was no threat to upper class status, there was no problem with class integration. As the lower 
classes began to gain ground on their supposed betters, exclusion and control became 
increasingly important.  
Regardless of how the upper classes dealt with the prospect of an integrated playing field, 
respectability concerns would have had limited impact on traditional games. Such elites tended 
to view those games as keeping the lower-class hordes occupied and away from their own 
‘refined’ games, thus posing little to no threat—good taste aside. 
Industrialization and capitalism. If respectability did not deliver the crucial knockout 
blow to the games of old, one might look to the economic developments of capitalism and 
industrialization as a culprit. The industrial revolution wiped away much of the culture that bred 
the traditional games, reducing the importance of fairs and festivals and changing the nature of 
individuals’ leisure time. While there was no “sharp break between the sports of rural and 
industrial society,” with some games even surviving into the twentieth century, the changes 
wrought by industrialization shook the foundation upon which traditional games rested (Collins, 
2013, p. 15). There was less need—and less space—for the customs that had been a lynchpin of 
rural society.  
In Great Britain alone, the “capitalist rationalization of rural life” had transformed 
approximately “one quarter of all cultivated land … from common land into private fields” 
(Collins, 2013, p. 15). The “spaces available for popular recreation” had been “squeezed out” (p. 
17). The reduction of space was accompanied by dwindling free time, with laborers shifting from 
working on their own land to “moving from farm to farm in search of work” and becoming 
“itinerant or pauperized during times of slump or unemployment” (p. 15). Combined with a 
burgeoning ideology that prized efficiency, rendering play for play’s sake inherently wasteful, 
the games of old had become an anachronism—vestiges of a time when laborers were tied to 
their own fields and villages rather than to the exacting needs of the figurative industrial 
machine. “The working practices of rural life,” including their amusements, had become “a 




The decline of rural culture should not be taken as evidence of upper-class domination. 
While those in positions of power occasionally sought to help along the decline of traditional 
games, even outlawing some (Collins, 2013, p.17), the industrial period was marked by a loss of 
power and influence among the richest of the rich. According to Dunning and Sheard (2003), 
industrialization “led to a change in the balance of power between classes, more specifically to 
an increase in the power of the bourgeoisie—the urban-industrial middle classes—relative to the 
aristocracy and gentry” (pp. 49-50). Collins (2013) noted the same, writing of an “increase in the 
size and influence of the middle and working classes” during that period (p. 28). Yet that shift in 
power did not disrupt the overall trend toward a capitalist reorganization of social life, nor did it 
stem the prolonged decline of traditional games. Such a contradictory development can be 
explained in part by the double-edged nature of capitalism. 
Capitalism had been around in some form for more than a century by the final years of 
the long eighteenth century, but at that point was still in what Overman (2011) deemed its first 
stage of development, merchant capitalism focused on capital investment. Industrialization 
moved early capitalism beyond that initial phase and into an “emphasis on production, 
standardization of work, and the supervision and control of workers” (p. 45). Capitalism, when 
“augmented” by industrialization, had contradictory effects on the middle and working classes. 
Its “inherent instability led to a vicious cycle of lower wages and layoffs,” but “in times of 
prosperity, [it] provided a steady income for workers, while creating a sharp distinction between 
work time and leisure time” (pp. 45-46). The freedom of financial stability was accompanied by 
restricted free time. Under what Tranter (1998) called the “new chronology of leisure,” 
capitalism required “regular hours of work and an increasingly common Monday to Friday 
working week” (p. 19).  
The new pattern of work hardly left time for anything resembling play. As a result, most 
sports were “forced to restrict their availability to Saturday afternoons” (Tranter, 1998, p. 19). 
With sport having to adjust to the “constricted time-span” of the capitalist calendar, it 
became noticeably more commercial and professional than before. Grounds were 




professional sportsmen and other paid employees greatly increased and, to meet the costs 
of all this, more and more sporting organisations found it necessary to adopt limited 
liability company status. (p. 20) 
That was a major development in the transformation from play to professional sport—the rise of 
sport as a consumer product. More broadly, it was the “commercialization of leisure, including 
the growth of spectator sports charging admission to the public” (Overman, 2011, p. 46).  
One might ask why workers would not simply use their weekends to play their own 
games rather than to watch others compete. In fact, many did. Tranter (1998) has argued that 
contrary to conventional wisdom among historians, sport participation was much higher in Great 
Britain during the nineteenth century than originally thought. In fact, he wrote of participation 
and consumption (‘playing and watching’) rising in tandem during what he called a “sporting 
revolution.” There was a great expansion of sports available to play, and of people willing to 
participate and watch, occurring at an unprecedented pace. “Sport,” he argued, “in its modern, 
organised, commercialized and extensive form, was truly an ‘invention’ of the Victorian and 
Edwardian age” (p. 16). Yet it would not be accurate to describe this as a resurgence of play. If 
sport participation was restricted by lack of time, so too was it restricted by the ideological shifts 
borne of capitalism. 
 As early capitalist logic gained currency, its attendant values began changing the 
underlying motivation for participating in sport activity. The view of human nature as inherently 
self-interested “became the dominant view of social life,” Collins (2013) noted (p. 4). Sport, "an 
activity that was by its very nature a competitive win-lose binary” changed from “merely a 
recreational pleasure” into “a metaphor for, and a reflection of, everyday life in capitalist 
society.” Such a view of sport was new and “unthinkable in any previous age when games were 
merely diversions from life’s cares” (p. 5).  
In effect, industrialization and capitalism had reduced the available space and time in 
which to play, redefined leisure to conform to the dictates of rationalism and efficiency, and 
transformed sport into a product to be consumed rather than an activity to be played. The shifts 




resembling industry. Not surprisingly, the games ascendant during that time tended to best fit the 
new order: “well suited to the life of the large industrial city, requiring only limited amounts of 
time and space” (Holt, 1990, p. 74).  
The shift from feudalism to pre-industrial capitalism in the eighteenth century 
corresponded with the transformation of sport from informal rural pastime a more structured, 
commodified form. The rise of industrial capitalism a century later cemented these changes and 
introduced to sport a competitive logic that matched that of the burgeoning economic system. 
Yet the impact of industrial capitalism on sport did not stop there. Its rise created a threat to 
upper class dominance that would eventually set the intellectual ground for the enduring battle 
between the administrative and playing classes. 
The Class Battle Over the Playing Field  
In theory, the combination of a growing population of available players, but with less 
time and space in which to play, would provide powerful leverage for those who owned the time, 
space and capital to not only play but to decide who else got to play as well. The economically 
elite would be able to limit participation to their peers and institute rules and regulations that 
would control the participation of others. That did occur, but not immediately. 
As the middle and working classes gained influence in the early 19th century, the result 
was a loosening of upper-class control over sport. Into the resulting power vacuum stepped “a 
fringe of small capitalists … who saw themselves as part of a new mass entertainment industry 
of music halls, penny dreadfuls and titillating Sunday newspapers” (Collins, 2013, p. 29). At the 
same time, the playing field began to take on a decidedly working class look. Rugby and British 
football had “become mass working-class participation and spectator sports,” creating fear that 
the lower classes would not merely intermingle with their supposed betters, but “wrest control … 
either consciously or through sheer weight of numbers” (p. 32). These dual incursions into upper 
class sport posed a grave threat that necessitated change. By the 1870s, “many members of the 
upper class took active steps to ensure that they did not play sports with people they saw as their 




In a social environment where the privileged felt secure in their positions, a ‘well-born’ 
person might well test his prowess in open sporting competition. But, an upper-class 
person’s sense of identity and self-worth was not greatly at risk … occasional instances of 
cross-class sporting competitions offered little threat to the established order. Things were 
simply not the same in an increasingly industrial society, with its undercurrents of liberal 
democratic political ideas, unfettered individualism, social mobility through the market, 
and accompanying class competition and class tension” (p. 566). 
Writing specifically of cricket, the sport in which gentlemen and professionals mingled in the 
previous economic order, Dunning and Sheard (2013) noted that  
industrialization, urbanization and the related process of embourgeoisement began ... to 
erode the foundations on which the dominance of the landed classes rested. As the social 
basis for their power crumbled, particularly as they became subject to a mounting 
bourgeois threat, so they began commensurately to experience class insecurity. And as 
that occurred … the old pattern of free and easy mixing on the cricket field gave way to a 
more class-exclusive pattern. (p. 153, emphasis in original)  
In cricket, the result was to codify the difference between those who did and did not play for 
money, a not-insignificant distinction. Professionals were made to refer to their gentlemen 
betters as “sir” and use separate dressing rooms (Furst, 2014, p. 27). The need to stigmatize 
professionals as inferior also spurred the rise of restricted domains such as associations, clubs, 
and academic institutions where, ala Casper Whitney, the upper classes could have their 
amusements without having to share with the riff-raff. The goal was to reach what Collins 
(2008)—referencing The Last Chronicle of Barset—termed a “perfect level … in which middle-
class men could feel comfortable with those who shared their social sensibilities, unthreatened by 
those they considered not to be gentlemen” (p. 42). 
 At the core of the renewed class segregation was the concept of amateurism. Amateurs 
were the gentlemen participating in a leisurely pastime without concern for pay or even 
competition. Professionals were the rowdies merely paying for a paycheck, their love and 




attribute. ‘Amateur’ and ‘professional’ were proxies for upper and working class respectively, 
and not particularly subtle ones. Keeping sport an amateur domain meant beating back the 
working-class hordes threatening to invade the playing fields, but it was also an increasingly 
difficult task in an era when sport was increasingly popular, increasingly lucrative, and 
increasingly competitive.  
The origins of amateurism. Industrial capitalism had not exactly transformed sport into 
a democratic ideal of equal participation, but it made it increasingly difficult to separate the 
sporting practices of the upper classes from those of the lower. The old system allowed for a 
cleaner break; the lower classes could be suitably occupied by their rural, traditional games. 
Under the new system, the boundaries between respectable sport and rowdy ruffianism were not 
as clear. Beyond sport, the new order had brought into existence a working class with “rising 
power and self-confidence” and concomitantly, a rising fear of said working class. In Britain, 
Gruneau (2006) noted, “the twin spectres of the storming of the Bastille and the terror of the 
guillotine elevated fears about the dangerous irrationality and power of the masses” (p. 565). The 
invention of amateurism was borne of the need to restore order, with the football pitch a proxy 
for society at large. It was a salve for upper class fear (Collins, 2013). 
Amateurism’s core concept was, and remains, the idea that sport should be played for 
non-commercial purposes. On its own, that seems close to the “play-for-play’s-sake” ideal. 
Indeed, as Llewellyn and Gleaves (2016) defined it, the “amateur played the game for the game’s 
sake” (p. 12). There was more to it, however. Amateurism included a moral component that 
prized sobriety and fair play, and devalued rowdiness, greed, even competitive zeal.  
Far from simply playing for the sake of playing, amateurism was laden with deeper 
meaning. It idealized refinement and sobriety, qualities the upper classes liked to associate with 
themselves, while demonizing the uncouth qualities they liked to associate with their supposed 
inferiors. The amateur was to disavow “gambling and professionalism” and compete “in a 
composed dignified manner … modest in victory, gracious in defeat, honorable, courageous, not 
fanatical or too partisan” (Llewellyn & Gleaves, 2016, p. 12). The goal was not just to separate 




battleground on which the elite sought to distinguish themselves from the underclass, as Collins 
(2013) noted:  
The industrial bourgeoisie and the growing army of lawyers, accountants and civil 
servants that the administration of industrial capitalism required … saw themselves as 
representing the new moral core of the British nation, against what they saw as a dissolute 
aristocracy and an uncivilised working class. (p. 29) 
The privilege to not have to play for compensation was a clear signal of one’s economic status, 
but so too was the ‘gentlemanly’ aspect with which one was expected to carry oneself. The 
professionals who rejected those virtues were particularly odious in such a worldview. An 1872 
article in The New York Times allowed that the professional player was “occasionally” honest 
and inoffensive, but on balance “usually a worthless, dissipated gladiator” (“The Professional,” 
1872, ¶3).  
The perceived immorality of the professional player, couched in a criticism of gambling 
and other forms of corruption, marked a thinly-veiled expression of contempt for the lower and 
working classes, who were seen not just as inferior, but as a threat to the bottom line. “The 
drinking, merrymaking, and sometimes disorderly recreations popular among working-class men 
were viewed as activities that disrupted the daily routines of business” (Gruneau, 2006, p. 569). 
The desire to separate from one’s supposed-inferiors was a primary element of amateurism. It 
was, as Collins (2013) noted, “an ideology of control and exclusion, dressed up as a moral 
imperative for sport … a justification for social exclusion” (pp. 31, 36). 
Yet amateurism’s rise was not that simple. Llewellyn and Gleaves (2014) argued that 
“the amateur ethos” was “highly subjective” and “varied widely across (and frequently within) 
sports as well as classifications such as social class, gender, nationality and even regional 
identity” (p. 96). That may seem contradictory to other historical analyses, which identify fairly 
clear boundaries between what-was and what-was-not considered an amateur in the nineteenth 
century, but some sports had less wriggle room on the subject than others—and that was within 
the boundaries of a single nation. In Britain, for example, the question of whether the underclass 




them to be irredeemable advocated for exclusion; those who believed they were redeemable 
sought instead to use sport as a civilizing process (Gruneau, 2006). Once amateurism began to 
cross international borders, its definitions began to take on even greater variability. Returning to 
Llewellyn and Gleaves: 
As it spread and diffused across the globe, amateurism modified and adapted itself to fit 
the divergent national cultures and sporting practices. While prevailing historiography has 
almost exclusively viewed the transmission of amateurism as being a unidirectional 
process, enforced on foreign or indigenous peoples via British subjugation and 
bureaucratic dominance or even being willingly embraced through cultural imitation, the 
diffusions of amateurism can be better understood as a broader, multidirectional, 
globalizing process. … By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, amateurism 
was no longer an exclusively British construct but a multifaceted global sporting 
philosophy stamped with various regional and cultural nuances. (pp. 96-97) 
The amorphous boundaries of amateurism worked both to and against its credit. On one hand, 
the lack of hard and fast criteria for being judged as an amateur seemed to defeat the purpose. 
Especially given its role as a barrier between the upper and lower classes, permeability was not a 
great quality. On the other hand, said permeability allowed the concept to take hold all over the 
world, all while maintaining most of the Victorian British standards that were embedded in the 
concept. No matter the change, amateurism was still fundamentally British. 
With that in mind, the following analysis will focus primarily on amateurism in Britain, 
specifically the forces that contributed to its rise. Amateurism was a “complex phenomenon with 
complex causes,” noted Holt (2006), arising from the “dramatic changes in the conditions as well 
as the culture of mid-Victorian middle-class life.” Holt identified three primary societal shifts 
that gave rise to amateurism, one of which has been previously discussed in this text—the shift 
in middle-class work patterns that occurred with the rise of industrial capitalism. The two others 
were “a shift in attitudes to personal and public health … [and] the emergence of a new aesthetic 




Amateurism came into development “precisely at the moment when a more openly 
competitive work culture took hold of Victorian Britain,” Holt (2006) argued, though the 
competitive ethos did not manifest itself the way as it eventually would in the United States, 
through an emphasis on winning. It was not so much winning that took precedence, but the 
quality of one’s effort. “Few could play well. But that was not important. The thing was to try as 
hard as possible” (pp. 354-355). It is worth noting that putting in a high-quality effort without 
seeking material rewards made one a useful employee in a capitalist system. The lionizing of 
hard work-for-work’s-sake—or “unstinting effort” in Holt’s words (p. 355)—served a unique 
role in British sport. The hard work demanded in the workplace required a sedentary lifestyle 
that “confined the life of the body in ways and on a scale that were unprecedented” (p. 357). 
Workers sat on trains, and then at desks, all under stressful conditions and in offices that were 
“dark and claustrophobic” (p. 359). At the same time, they were expected to “keep their nerve 
and concentration, attend to the details of the job and be healthy enough to be able to do it” (p. 
356). Sport participation allowed workers the ability to engage in much-needed healthful 
physical activity while at the same time modeling the behaviors that were crucial in the 
workplace, effort and perseverance chief among them.  
Such values did not merely benefit the workplace. Sport participation also developed into 
a tool to ensure that the young male population was physically prepared for the challenges posed 
by modern life. The health of society, it was believed, depended on a healthy, active male 
body—an “idealized masculinity” to represent the character of the nation (Holt, 2006, p. 363). 
Such bodies did not belong to “heavily muscled pugilists,” but to “the well-proportioned athletic 
body … a neo-classical norm of human proportion, balancing height, weight, muscle 
development and mobility” (p. 363). As Collins (2009) noted, any aesthetic difference between 
the upper-and-middle class amateur body and its working-class equivalent had more to do with 
the better living conditions experienced by the former than to any physical achievement.  
Given it was the Victorian era and respectability was still a primary concern, such 
idealized conceptions of masculinity were tightly controlled down to the smallest detail. White 




coiffed hair all ensured that the amateur athlete even before taking the field was to represent 
refinement (Holt, 2006). His physical body was to connote not domination, but equilibrium; a 
rational and efficient body to fit a rational and efficient system. The line between aesthetics and 
morality was never particularly thick. 
These shifts formed the crux of amateurism’ moral imperative, that physical competition 
is good for the health of the body, soul, and society. As Holt (2006) noted, this was not the fun 
and festive sport of the pre-Victorian era. Far from ‘play-for-play’s-sake,’ the fate of middle-
and-upper-class society was on the line. Sport, and the sporting body, were ways in which an 
increasingly besieged culture could define and preserve itself. Amateurism was more than a way 
to keep the unwanted out, it was a means by which to prove—or to conspicuously display—that 
one belonged. 
Amateurism and the public school. There were multiple domains in which amateurism 
worked to exclude, or at least control, lower class participation. One was within private clubs 
that “charged membership fees … beyond the reach of men from the working class” (Christesen 
2012, p. 243). An 1885 editorial wryly noted the economic barriers preventing membership in a 
Scottish cricket club: “No doubt the Stirling County Cricket Club is open to anyone. But what 
artisan can afford the heavy annual subscription and … three or four trips to Perth, Dundee, 
Cupar, etcetera, thereby losing a day’s work and wages, not to mention … the cost of the dress?” 
(Christesen, 2012, p. 243, emphasis in original). 
Another more commonly cited domain was within educational institutions, particularly 
public schools. It should first be noted that public schooling was not available to everyone at that 
time, restricted instead to “the narrow strata of upper middle classes who could afford” it 
(Collins, 2009, p. 23). Public schools were as private schools are today, elite domains for those 
of varying privilege. With that understood, the public school was not just a site in which 
amateurism took hold, it was in many ways the source from which the practices and ideologies 




“The most obvious way of ‘explaining’ the rise of amateurism is to link it to the growth 
of the Victorian public school,” Holt (2003) wrote, albeit critically.16 “Those who set up the 
amateur associations were almost entirely drawn from the public schools” (p. 273). Sport 
participation in public schools had experienced a dramatic increase in popularity during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, fueled in part by the 1857 publication of Tom Brown’s 
Schooldays, a fictionalized and idealized portrayal of sport participation written by Thomas 
Hughes, a former pupil at Rugby School17 who sought to pass on his experiences to future 
generations (Collins, 2009). The book chronicled the eponymous schoolboy’s experiences at 
Rugby School, “where, through a series of moral lessons, including the importance of playing 
football and cricket, he matures into a model Victorian gentleman” (p. 3). It became wildly 
popular for its “exciting and attractive” portrayal of Rugby-style football and for giving the sport 
“a ‘meaning,’ above and beyond the intrinsic enjoyment of chasing a ball around a field” (p. 11). 
Moving beyond ‘play-for-play’s-sake’ was a crucial development in sport’s appeal, according to 
Collins. Prior to Hughes, “no one before … had ascribed a set of moral values to a sport.” Doing 
so gave rugby football an “explicit social purpose” and made participation part of a “moral 
tradition” (p. 11). As for why that would be preferable to the carefree nature of ‘play-for-play’s-
sake,’ one could look toward the broader context of the time. 
Tom Brown tapped into the societal shifts taking place in the mid-nineteenth century, 
particularly the ascendancy of the upper-middle class. It “epitomized all the self-confidence that 
the middle classes felt” at the time, an era of unprecedented upward mobility and societal 
influence: 
Industrial capitalism was now accepted, if not necessarily universally embraced, by the 
middle classes as an engine of their prosperity ... all sections of the middle classes—
businessmen, churchmen, military men and country gentry—could feel that they, above 
all other classes, had made the decisive contribution to the success of their nation. 
                                                           
16 Holt did not believe that such an analytical approach was “wrong,” but that “it does not take us very far 
in the wider understanding of amateurism” (p. 273). 
17 The Rugby School is so named because it was based in Rugby, Warwickshire. The sport rugby gets its 




Britain’s position at the apex of world power, they confidently believed, was a result of 
ordinary middle-class families like theirs. (Collins, 2009, pp. 3-4) 
In that context, Tom Brown was both a celebration of idealized middle-class culture and a service 
to the country. It was a form of identity work for the middle class, establishing who they were 
and who they were not. If the middle class was the tentpole holding up society, Tom Brown was 
its instructional manual on how to act and what values to support.  
 Those values, not surprisingly, tended to benefit the existing hierarchy at a time when the 
lower and working classes posed threat. Working class representation in Tom Brown was limited 
to a “mythical Merrie England” in which the upper and lower classes were free to interact in 
harmony, so long as the latter accepted their social inferiority. The Rugby School itself was 
highly exclusive; the cost of attendance equaled a manual laborer’s annual wage, and “less than a 
quarter of one per cent” of boys in England attended (Collins, 2009, pp. 8-9). Tom Brown was 
emblematic of a “rigidly hierarchical world” in which class distinction “was central” (p. 8). 
 The influence of Tom Brown cannot be overstated, having been republished fifty times by 
the end of the nineteenth century (Collins, 2009) and having influenced readers not just in Great 
Britain but, as will be discussed in the next chapter, around the globe. “The success of Hughes’ 
book and the evangelical fervor of the school’s former pupils … meant that Rugby School, its 
methods and its football code achieved prominence far beyond its origins in a small English 
country town” (p. 12). The book was part of a broader moment in British history, a generational 
change wrought by the rising status of the middle classes. Public schooling had blended “the 
sons of the landed gentry and the middle class” into a “new elite,” according to Christensen 
(2012). It behooved the upper-middle class elite to ensure that the next generations would have 
access to the same public schooling, resulting in the creation of more schools modeled after the 
existing ones, particularly the Rugby School so idealized by Hughes (p. 205). In addition to the 
rise in new schools, public school alumni began setting up associations in which to continue 
playing as adults. The overall impact of these developments was a clearinghouse for Tom Brown 




Some scholars have favoured a simple downwards social diffusionist model [to explain 
the spread of “codified, institutionalized sport”]. According to this model, organised forms 
of sport originated in the most prestigious of the elite public schools. From these schools 
they passed first to public schools of more modest status and … to the ancient universities 
and then to the new civic universities, the more ambitious grammar schools and outwards 
into adult upper and middle-class society. From middle-class society, either through the 
influence of emulation or the proselytizing endeavors of former public school-boys and 
university alumni, they eventually spread to the working classes. (p. 26) 
Like Holt, Tranter was critical of relying solely on that explanation, but nonetheless conceded 
that it had some validity, noting the “numerous instances” in which former pupils formed the 
clubs and associations that would eventually form the backbone of modern British sport (p. 27). 
Its problems, however, were several in number. Most notably for the purposes of this analysis, 
the model did not adequately consider the class divide. Or to put it another way, for the 
popularity of Tom Brown, its values were not universally accepted. The working classes had their 
own sporting practices and were not bound to the teachings of the Rugby School. 
 Amateurism and professionalism. One of several problems Tranter (1998) found in the 
social diffusionist model was that it assumed working-class sport took all its cues from the 
upper-class “and had no independent life of its own.” The working classes preferred soccer to the 
rugby played in elite schools, had enjoyed cricket before it became widely popular on an elite 
level, and formed their own teams (p. 28). Moreover, their sport practices operated under 
different cultural assumptions. When working class players and spectators began to filter into 
upper class rugby in the late nineteenth century, the elite gatekeepers saw an “opportunity for 
moral lessons of rugby to be passed onto these new adherents of the game, but it became rapidly 
apparent that the working class had a sporting culture and practices of its own and did not 
necessarily accept the leadership of the middle classes. First and foremost among these practices 
was an expectation of reward for results,” a.k.a. payment (Collins, 2009, p. 26).  
For the denizens of elite public schools, who played for recreation, social prestige, even 




monetary reward, partly because there were very few matches that generated enough gate money 
to pay players but mainly because they had no need to be paid” (p. 31). The idea of payment was 
a taint on an otherwise pure game. “Payment spoiled the fun and defeated the moral purpose of 
games which was to improve the body and the character” (Holt, 2003, p. 283). Playing for pay 
also turned what was a love for the game into a transactional process in which skill took 
precedence over tradition, prestige, heritage. “Physique and stamina above average [the working-
man player] undoubtedly has,” a rugby-and-cricketer once said, “but to say that he knows more 
about the game than one who has been brought up in the best traditions of the public schools and 
the universities is absurd … if he cannot play the game for the game itself, he can have no true 
interest in it, and it were better that he left us” (Collins, 2009, p. 39). Yet contrary their self-
portrayal as playing for qualities other than their own enrichment, some supposed amateurs did 
get paid—and others were able to claim expenses that allowed them “to enjoy meals and 
accommodation … unattainable for most working-class players” (p. 31). 
Perhaps because of this knowledge, there was not full unity of thought within the upper 
classes on how to deal with class integration. Citing the work of Dunning and Sheard, Holt 
(2003) wrote of a split “between the southern public school amateur group with strong links to 
the liberal professions and old money, and the northern industrial grouping who accepted the 
creation of commercially run clubs and payment of players.” The fault line between “northern 
clubs with substantial working class support” and “southern gentlemen” (p. 277) could be 
alternatively described as between those in the upper class who saw some economic benefit—or 
at the very least, no major threat—in tolerating professionalism and those true believers who 
sought to protect amateurism at all cost. That divide persists to this day, particularly in the 
United States, with proponents of amateurism having dominated schools and universities and 
those tolerant of professionalism now in complete control of billions-dollar enterprises. Both 
sides remain exceedingly wealthy; the question is whether the participants get a piece of the pie. 
Summary. It was not necessarily a straightforward line from the amateur-professional 
divide of the nineteenth century to the same in the twenty-first. It required amateurism to fail in 




universities and schools. There was much resistance to professionals, and in many sports a host 
of rules and regulations to weed them out, yet such efforts proved futile. It is in that failure, 
particularly in the United States, that the seeds of modern sports ownership took root. The 
inability of amateurism to take root in club sports required other ways to establish control over 
working class participants. The next chapter offers a case study in the back-and-forth battle over 
control of the playing field, and the triumph of professionals over their amateur foils. In doing 
so, it shifts the analytical lens across the Atlantic to the United States, particularly the game of 
baseball, which transformed from an amateur game to a fully professional league in a manner of 
decades. As this dissertation’s historical analysis continues, it will outline the many obstacles 
faced by advocates of amateurism in controlling participation in club teams, their many attempts 






CHAPTER THREE: A HISTORY OF THE PRO SPORT INDUSTRY 
 
Continuing the examination of the causes that led to the modern ownership structure in 
professional sport, the following chapter shifts the historical analysis from Great Britain to the 
United States. British sporting ideologies, and the class divisions implicit therein, influenced 
ideas of what constituted respectable sporting behavior in the United States. Amateurism and 
muscular Christianity (to be introduced in a forthcoming section) established ideals of athletic 
behavior that were tailored to the interests and resources of the upper-class. In baseball, efforts 
by the upper-class to restrict participation by the lower and working-classes took divergent paths. 
Some committed to amateurism. Others sought instead to control, rather than prevent, underclass 
participation. The latter path led to the modern professional sports industry, albeit circuitously, 
through a minefield of conflicts that will form the bulk of this chapter’s analysis. 
The traveling ideologies of British sport. Many scholarly examinations of amateurism 
have focused on Great Britain, and there is much material with which one can work. For the 
purposes of the current examination, however, the United States is a more useful site for 
analysis. Though the United States is not home to the most popular sport in the world, European 
football (soccer), it is the home of three of the world’s four most lucrative sports leagues, the 
National Football League, National Basketball Association and Major League Baseball (English 
Premier League soccer is consistently in the top four in any measure of economic success). In 
trying to understand how professional sports leagues became private enterprises, the United 
States is a logical starting point. 
The development of sport in Great Britain did not take place in a vacuum. The issues that 
shaped sport within the isle cropped up in other nations, whether organically or passed across 
borders. As in Britain, the industrial revolution and rise of capitalism increased the numbers and 
societal standing of the middle and working classes in the United States. As in Britain, the 
resulting “perceived threat to middle-class control” fed an “impulse toward amateurism” 
(Collins, 2013, p. 35). Yet it is worth noting that the kind of amateurism that developed in other 




“developed alongside modern British sport, and with sport, it had spread to other nations who 
had developed their own versions” (Harris, 2015, p. 123). The amateur ideal espoused by Britain 
sometimes clashed with that of other nations, particularly during international competitions such 
as the Olympics. In an issue of The Sporting Life cited by Harris, British officials were said to 
attribute their “defeat at [the 1908 Olympics] to the laxity of other nations in the manner of 
amateurism” (p. 123). The United States was one of the nations to veer from the British model, 
despite owing much of its conception of amateurism to that British tradition. 
Given the “strong cultural ties” between Great Britain and the United States, it is not 
surprising that amateurism “also become a powerful force” in America (Collins, 2013, p. 35). 
According to Furst (2014), though it is “difficult to pinpoint” the exact genesis of the amateur 
movement in the United States, “it is likely that the idea emerged in America after the English 
had nurtured their own notions of the amateur athlete” (p. 29). Indeed, the emergence of amateur 
sport in American universities was based on the rise of the same in British public schools 
(Collins, 2013). Even so, the American version veered too far away from the amateur ideal for 
some British observers, who in the wake of a dominating U.S. performance at the 1908 Olympics 
cast an aside glance at what they perceived as an American preoccupation with training and 
winning (Harris, 2015)—two violations of amateurism’s emphasis on effortless recreation. 
Though that was not a universal criticism, it is the case that in the United States winning was a 
more crucial factor than in Great Britain, owing to the differences between American and British 
capitalism at that time. As Furst (2014) explained, the “economic competitive striving” in 
America during the latter half of the nineteenth century became embedded in the sporting culture 
such that “[w]inning baseball games became an expression of the deeply-rooted value of 
success” (p. 50). It was just the opposite in Great Britain, where the economic standing of the 
elite sportsman was more stable—though as outlined previously, subject to threat. Under the 
British amateur tradition, “striving to win was supposed … to be kept subordinate to the 
production of pleasure” (Dunning & Sheard, 2013, p. 112).  
Exceptions aside, the American and British amateur traditions shared more in common 




perspective that became popularized in the mid-nineteenth century with the advent of muscular 
Christianity. 
Muscular Christianity and sport’s moral imperative. As previously noted, physical 
health had taken on societal importance during an era of ascendant industrial capitalism, both as 
a means by which to keep sedentary workers active and as a model of the behaviors required of 
the new economic age. It was not long before physical activity began to shift from patriotic duty 
to religious calling. Muscular Christianity was a movement predicated on the belief that physical 
activity and fitness instilled character, and that upkeep of the body and mind were moral 
imperatives. “The muscular Christian … employed his strength for the betterment of self and 
society” (Overman, 2011, p. 160). The concept grew out of British amateur tradition, particularly 
literature such as Tom Brown. In Tom Brown, one finds a succinct summation of the muscular 
Christian creed: “fear God, and walk 1000 miles in 1000 hours” (Hughes, 1883, p. 112).  
Like other aspects of British amateur culture, Muscular Christianity crossed borders into 
the United States, where its impact on the then-dormant sports scene was dramatic. As in Britain, 
America under industrial capitalism was susceptible to reframing physical activity as a moral 
imperative. Sport provided necessary recreation in a nation that had shifted from an agrarian 
society to one dominated by sedentary factory work and, moreover, could easily map onto a 
broader recasting of hard work as moral ideal. As Moore (1994) noted: “The cause of Christian 
sports benefited in the long run from plausible associations made between them and work. Both 
encouraged the same virtues and left the body too exhausted to cause trouble for the soul” (p. 
114). Yet well into the nineteenth century, sport had failed to reach mainstream status in the 
United States and was “considered vulgar and disreputable among a large portion of the U.S. 
reading public” (McChesney, 2008, p. 215) who deemed it “a waste of time, immoral, illegal and 
debilitating” (Schiff, 2008, p. 42). The rise of muscular Christianity began to change those 
perceptions. 
Muscular Christianity was introduced to American culture through Tom Brown and 
likeminded literature, wherein athletics was emphasized “as a means of inculcating moral, 




of sport and middle-class values was influential among “moralists and educators” ranging from 
preacher Dwight Moody to Amos Alonzo Stagg and James Naismith. Whether “from the pulpit” 
or “at YMCAs and in schools,” the proselytizing of muscular Christianity found an eager 
audience in the United States, appealing “to a generation who embraced social Darwinism … 
Those individuals who survived and prospered were seen not only as biologically fit but also 
morally fit” (Overman, 2011, p. 160). Such an appeal was indicative of the cultural differences 
between Britain and U.S. amateurism, with the former’s reticence to compete supplanted by the 
latter’s emphasis on winning. 
That was not the only difference between British and U.S. muscular Christianity. “As the 
American version … evolved over the decades, it revealed less and less of the British legacy and 
became increasingly evangelical—essentially a campaign for bringing young men to Christ” 
(Overman, 2011, p. 161). The British conception of sporting morality focused more on societal 
benefits than on religious recruitment, though religion was a major factor. In the United States, 
sport and religion were for a time inextricable. Seen as instilling values such as obedience, 
discipline, and sacrifice, sport began to serve as “a useful surrogate for church attendance” 
(Furst, 2014, p. 15).  
Not surprisingly, the perception of sport as a virtuous activity burnished its flagging 
public image. The major newspapers, once embarrassed to cover sport to any significant extent, 
became endorsers. By 1872, a New York Times editorial noted that efforts to “promote athletic 
sports in America” had resulted in “the increased vigor and robust health of our youth” 
(“Neglected pastimes,” 1872, ¶1). An earlier article in Spirit of the Times described sport as 
beneficial to one’s spirit in ways unmatched by mere physical activity:  
We do not want simple ‘physical exercise,’ we want ‘athletic sports.’ Not only a 
development of muscle but a development of spirit as well. Heaving coal may be as good 




less inspiriting, and therefore infinitely less healthful. (“The Athletic,” 1860, ¶8, emphasis 
in original)18 
As time went on, Muscular Christianity would play “an increasingly marginal role” in sport, 
supplanted in influence by consumer capitalism (Overman, 2011, p. 162). Even so, its role in the 
infancy of American sport cannot be overstated. By legitimizing athletic activity as healthful and 
beneficial, it played the initial role in turning organized sport into a mainstream activity. So too 
did it exacerbate the conflict between professional and amateur sport, further stigmatizing the 
decision to play for money, and imbuing upper-class leisure with a veneer of moral superiority. 
The idealized, upper-class vision of sport—an incongruous mixture of leisure and sacred duty 
that one might call ‘respectability’—necessitated keeping out those who did not comply. That 
vision would routinely clash with the reality of sport participation in the U.S.: the impossibility 
of restricting access. 
The following sections detail the efforts to restrict sporting participation in the U.S. to 
those deemed economically or morally acceptable—invariably those who were, or at least 
perceived themselves as, upper-class gentlemen—and how those efforts eventually led to the 
formation of the professional sports industry. Failed attempts at excluding working-class sport 
participants gave way to controlling their behaviors, salaries, and agency in ways that persist to 
the present day. To understand how and why the sports industry became the private property of 
billionaires in the twenty-first century, one must first understand how and why the upper classes 
took control in the mid-nineteenth century. In the beginning, there was elitism, and the desire to 
restrict membership in sporting clubs to those deemed respectable. 
  
                                                           
18 The distinctions espoused in the article were not markedly different than those outlined in Tom Brown. 
At one point, the book distinguished between ‘musclemen’ and muscular Christians, the former having 
“no belief whatever as to the purposes for which his body has been given him,” and the latter committed 
to “the old chivalrous and Christian belief, that a man’s body is given him to be trained and brought into 
subjection, and then used for the protection of the weak, the advancement of all righteous causes, and the 




Baseball and the Infancy of American Pro Sport 
It is generally agreed that baseball’s roots trace back well before the nineteenth century 
and to Great Britain, though its specific ancestor is a source of some dispute.19 According to 
Ross (2016), baseball arrived in the United States by way of “Puritan settlers” in New England, 
serving both as “a means by which Puritan culture could be retained and reinforced” and as “a 
defense against other, encroaching ways of life” (pp. 2-3). The game would serve those same 
roles for various American subcultures in the following centuries, most notably for the purposes 
of this analysis, the upper-class of the mid-nineteenth century. The following analysis charts the 
course of baseball from “an amateur game played by middle-class gentlemen for fun to a 
professional contest played by members of the working class for pay” (Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 83). 
That journey lay the groundwork for the system of organized pro sport that exists in the United 
States today. 
The Knickerbocker Club. The progenitor of baseball is considered the Knickerbocker 
Club of the 1840s. As recounted by star nineteenth century pitcher John Montgomery Ward, a 
key figure in baseball’s history who will be referenced throughout this chapter: “In 1845 a 
number of gentlemen who had been in the habit, for several years, of playing base-ball for 
recreation, determined to form themselves into a permanent organization” (Ward, 1888, p. 24). 
There was no intention at the outset that the club would develop into something more, with rules 
pulled from childhood memory and games played intramurally. While the Knickerbockers’ 
impact on the development of the on-field game is a worthwhile topic,20 for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the make-up of the club is of greater interest. 
Historians are in general agreement that the Knickerbockers consisted of well-off men, 
though there is considerable debate as to just how well off. Zoss and Bowman (2004) noted that 
some historians have labeled the Knickerbockers as “upper class and a ‘social aristocracy,’” a 
                                                           
19 Some have said baseball derives from British rounders (Gelzheiser, 2006), but “references to baseball, 
often with a hyphen or space between the two works … predate those to rounders” (Collins, 2009, p. 41). 
20 Though there were other baseball clubs at the time, the Knickerbockers are considered to have 
established the rules of the game (Burk, 1994). Despite some debate over whether it truly pioneered 
modern baseball, even skeptical historians acknowledge that the club was “the most important in shaping 




characterization with which they disagreed. “Some of the Knickerbockers in the first years were, 
to be sure, lawyers, physicians, stockbrokers, and merchants, but many more were mere clerks 
… the Knickerbocker Base Ball Club should not be confused with the Social Register” (pp. 117-
118). Though the Knickerbockers considered themselves gentlemen—a distinction that some 
historians have taken to connote upper-class status—Goldstein (2009) argued that it had less to 
do with economic achievement than a desire for respectability. “The cult of respectability among 
artisans, clerks, and petty proprietors gave them just as much dread of ‘the poor’ and the ‘roughs’ 
as was expressed by those much farther up the class ladder” (p. 172). Regardless of the 
motivation, the Knickerbockers tended toward exclusion of those who did not meet the 
‘gentleman’ standard.  
The Knickerbockers had a certain idea of what kind of people made acceptable members 
and put rules in place to dissuade participation among undesirables. Though Furst (2014) argued 
that the Knickerbockers did not “attempt to restrict the game to members of their class as a form 
of elitism” (p. 51), that was the overall effect of the club’s policies. Economic fines for a host of 
infractions—among them profanity, tardiness, and insubordination (Seymour & Mills, 1989)—   
weeded out those of low decorum, those of little means, or both. “Certain gents, men from 
certain types of backgrounds, simply weren’t going to be admitted” (Simkus, 2014, p. 17). There 
was no specific prohibition on pay in the Knickerbocker Club, but there did not have to be. As 
amateurism naturally catered to those who could afford to play for free, so too did club 
membership naturally cater to those “privileged young men of some substance and leisure” able 
to devote the time and money the club required (Seymour & Seymour-Mills, 1989, p. 16). As 
The New York Times noted in 1854, clubs like the Knickerbockers conducted their business in 
“such a manner as to enable all persons who can give the necessary time for the purpose, to 
enjoy all the advantages of the game” (“Base-Ball Clubs,” 1854, ¶1, emphasis added). An 1860 
Spirit of the Times article provides an indication of just who could afford that necessary time. 
“All of the professions are represented among [baseball club] members,” the article noted, before 




was the exclusion of those who could not give the necessary time, those for whom leisure was a 
luxury they could not afford.  
Further, competition was—if not completely frowned upon—not the purpose of play. The 
game served as a “vehicle for genteel amateur recreation and polite social intercourse rather than 
a hard-fought contest for victory” (p. 15). Or as Simkus (2014) noted, club members 
took ferries over to the Elysian Fields in New Jersey for the same reason business folks 
knock off early on a Friday these days and hit the golf links. They wanted to get out of the 
office, feel the warmth of other suns, talk about business and politics, or lie about their 
latest sexual conquests in a relaxed environment. (p. 17) 
The spirit of well-mannered leisure had clear economic underpinnings. Just as not everyone can 
get onto a modern golf course, or country club, so too could only a select few make the 
Knickerbockers. As was the case in Great Britain, class identity was a crucial element in the 
club’s appeal, particularly the formation and protection thereof. Club members did not simply 
want the company of peers, they sought to define themselves through participation. Club 
membership was a way of reinforcing—or establishing—one’s status as a gentleman. On the 
other side of that coin, denying club membership was a way of defining who was not, and could 
not be, a gentleman. 
 Through such exclusion, the Knickerbockers, and baseball more broadly, “served as a 
social forum with which a certain identity could be expressed and maintained” (Ross, 2016, p. 
4). Membership was an indication of one’s class status, and also served to guard against threats 
to said status. “Participation in the club allowed men to fend off increasing outside pressures  
that threatened the solidarity of their ethnic-, class-, and gender-based identity” (p. 4). In this 
way, the Knickerbockers shared much in common with their British counterparts, with the 
exception that they put more emphasis on winning and success—the result both of class 
insecurity and of a American economic culture that prioritized striving (Furst, 2014, p. 50).  
Both formally and informally restricted, Knickerbockers were well-suited to retain an 




Atlantic. There was little threat that the working classes could intrude into the Knickerbocker or 
similarly aligned clubs. Yet the working classes would soon find that they did not have to. 
 Baseball begins to diversify. As America’s population grew, and new immigrants began 
seeking ways to successfully assimilate, baseball began to diversify. The game was too cheap to 
play and too adaptable to the urban setting to remain exclusive (Burk, 1994). Those unable to 
meet the strict standards of the Knickerbocker and other similar clubs could form their own, and 
it was not long before the game began to grow too large for the traditional clubs to retain control. 
The working class began to dominate not by entering clubs in which they were not wanted, but 
creating their own, and in large enough numbers that the influence of upper-class clubs became 
significantly diluted. “A veiled class and culture war of sorts thus arose between the people who 
wished to secure baseball’s traditional ideals and those who sought to undermine them … 
increasingly of non-English descent and of the skilled working class” (Ross, 2016, p. 4). 
 The same occurrence had taken place in Great Britain, where for all the lessons of Tom 
Brown and elite public schooling, the working classes developed their own sporting traditions 
that did not require upper-class permission or guidance. Just as the customs of working-class 
sport created a culture shock for the Tom Brown crowd, so too did working-class baseball clubs 
provide a problem for the Knickerbockers and their ilk. This was a critical juncture in sports’ 
journey to private ownership. How could the stewards of the game protect its reputation if they 
could no longer restrict club membership?  
The first solution was to create an overarching association that would not stop at 
restricting lower class participation, but would restrict and regulate the clubs themselves. The 
National Association of Base Ball Players (NABBP), an organization that would task itself with 
overseeing several of the largest clubs in the New York City area, launched in 1857. “Anybody 
could start a baseball team, but not everybody could be a member” of the association, Simkus 
(2014) noted. The NABBP was more explicitly exclusionary than its club ancestors, eliminating 
teams based on economic and other factors, including race: “Teams with black players were out” 
(p. 18). The launch of the NABBP represented the beginning of a pro league structure in the 




membership, intended to keep out undesirable clubs, has persisted into present day and forms the 
primary divide between the U.S. pro sports system and the promotion/relegation model seen in 
English soccer21 and other international leagues. 
 In the span of two decades, the well-off leisure class had gone from playing the game to 
running it. As Gelzheiser (2006) described it: “The game had originally been played by the 
middle class for the middle class. As it became a business, the players became workers, and 
members of the middle class now owned the teams and watched the contests” (p. 23). Those left 
playing the game, immigrants and the lower classes, “found their control of the clubs eroding in 
favor of nonplaying, usually wealthier, members, investors, officers, and delegates” (Burk, 1994, 
p. 21). So it was that the modern structure of well-off owners and lower-class players began to 
take shape.   
The goal of the NABBP was to regulate the new population of working-class players, but 
there was not complete agreement on how that should be done. Some proponents wanted to 
“[return] to an ethnocentrically purer, decentralized, and amateurish fraternity of sportsmen” 
(Burk, 1994, p. 17). Others did not mind the democratization of the sport so much as the lack of 
control over its participants. If the more refined classes could no longer keep out unwanted 
elements, they could at least force them to abide by certain expectations of respectability. This 
debate, between what Burk characterized as ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists,’ would come to 
shape the face of the game. It was, for all intents and purposes, the same debate that was playing 
out in Great Britain around the same time—between proponents of public-school amateurism 
and the more business-minded industrial types who did not mind lower-class participation so 
long as they could profit from it (Holt, 2003). In Great Britain, that divide led to a split within 
rugby between professionals and amateurs. In the United States, it would have the same effect. 
                                                           
21 In what can be called a system of merit-based entry, franchises are not guaranteed membership under a 
promotion-relegation model. Instead, they must perform at a certain level each season or risk relegation to 
a lower league, akin to baseball’s minor leagues. In turn, franchises that are not yet part of the primary 
league can gain entry if they play well enough in their secondary leagues. Under a model where league 




Baseball and professionalism. The next critical juncture in sports’ transformation to 
private ownership was the beginning of professionalism. By midcentury, shortly before the Civil 
War, baseball had already begun staking its claim as the national pastime. It was also around that 
same time that the sport began taking on a more professional orientation.  
Though the NABBP expressly forbade player compensation, an olive branch to 
traditionalists as the game continued moving away from its Knickerbocker origins, paying 
players had been a regular practice for years. The most successful clubs paid “top dollar, albeit 
under the table, for the game’s premium talent” (Guschov, 1998, p. 14) and players bounced 
from team to team depending on which made the best offer (Reiss, 1999). Some players even 
accepted compensation in exchange for throwing games. As the number of NABBP teams 
skyrocketed to “more than two thousand member clubs spread across the country” (Ross, 2016, 
p. 8), it was becoming increasingly impossible, and increasingly untenable, to ban payment of 
players. There was no way to regulate that many clubs, and the longer compensation was against 
the rules, the more creative players and their benefactors would become. “Gambling surrounded 
and infiltrated the game to such an extent that many fans lost interest in what they perceived to 
be fixed contests … [a]nd players were paid by deceptive and even criminal means” (p. 7). As 
player John Montgomery Ward noted in an 1888 history, perception mattered more than reality: 
“Doubtless there were more of these things existing in the public imagination than in actual fact, 
but distrust once aroused, there was no faith left for anything or anybody” (Ward, 1888, p. 27). 
The NABBP’s ban on paid players was dropped in 1869, the new rules merely codifying 
the distinction between professionals and amateurs (Tootle, 2011). By that point, “the prevailing 
sentiment” began to support paying players. Spalding, according to Overman (2011), “suggested 
baseball franchise owners ‘should abandon the vestiges of the Knickerbocker club and recognize 
themselves as business organizations employing ballplayers, and trying to make a profit’” (p. 
293). Legitimizing professional play meant that what “was being done slyly could be done 
publicly, and anyone who wanted to make baseball his business could do so honestly and 




Paying players was just one component of baseball’s growing commercialism in the 
1860s (Zimbalist, 1994). Not only were the first players paid during that decade, but “fields were 
enclosed so that promoters could charge admission fees to spectators” (Reiss, 1999, p. 4). The 
first of those was built in 1862, when Brooklyn entrepreneur William H. Cammeyer erected a 
seven-foot tall fence around an ice-skating pond that he had converted into a baseball-playing 
surface (Bennett, 2012). Cammeyer allowed the New York Mutuals to play in his stadium rent-
free, so long as they agreed to let him to charge fans ten cents admission and split the profits. 
Prior to that point, interested onlookers could walk up to the field and watch the action for free. 
Fencing in the ballpark was an acknowledgment that the game in and of itself had value as a 
moneymaking enterprise, and it quickly became commonplace.  
Following Cammeyer’s lead, “dozens of entrepreneurs … enclosed grounds, sponsored 
special games, and offered money to participating teams” (Rader, 2008, p. 20). Clubs also 
bought and enclosed their own stadiums. Not all were on board; the Knickerbockers went as far 
as to refuse to play teams that collected gate revenue (Burk, 1994), though the sheer number of 
teams doing so eventually required that they drop their stand. Gate revenue had become so 
crucial that teams began adding games to maximize their earning potential; by the end of the 
decade, some teams “were playing fifty or more games per season” (Rader, 2008, p. 20). The 
game’s amateur leanings, meanwhile, had eroded even further. 
The rationale behind baseball had been turned upside down. From a ‘gentleman’s game’ 
played as a leisurely pastime, baseball was now a game played by the lower classes for monetary 
compensation. For the proponents of amateurism, the state of the game was untenable. As 
Gelzheiser (2006) noted:  
The old order, which consisted of middle-class players on middle-class clubs who were 
out to prove their manliness, get some exercise, and socialize, could not compete on the 
field or at the gate with the paid teams. It is unlikely many wanted to. Professional teams 
were often dominated by working-class youths out to improve their social and economic 
lot, and most amateur gentlemen would not have wanted to play with or compete against 




As the 1870s dawned, the professional and amateur sides went their separate ways. Around the 
time of the 1871 NABBP convention, the ten clubs with professional players split off to form the 
National Association of Professional Base Ball Players, while the amateur clubs formed the 
National Association of Amateur Base Ball Players (Tootle, 2011). The former evolved into the 
National League, the latter died off after one season. Professionalism won. 
The ‘old order’ did not adjust immediately to the new reality. According to Gelzheiser 
(2006): “The elite disliked the idea of sport as business and still clung to Victorian ideas about 
the purity of amateur sport and the corruptive influences of money. For most, owning a 
professional team was unthinkable.” That left stewardship of the NAPBBP to a lower economic 
class, made up of “liquor dealers, attorneys, clerks, livery stable keepers, sportswriters, players 
and even political machines” (p. 16). Just as in Great Britain (Collins, 2013), upper-class flight 
created a decidedly working-class playing field. The players had great influence under the new 
arrangement, not only “[making] more money than team owners” (p. 17) but taking high-ranking 
leadership roles—including that of president (Ginsburg, 2004). The league was, for all in intents 
and purposes, “organized and run by the players, at a time when American workers were viewed 
(as they still are today) as incompetent” (Elias, 2010, p. 17). 
Latent disdain for the working class contributed to the perception of lawlessness that 
soon settled around the game. With control having shifted from the elites to the lower classes, the 
same desire for respectability that fueled baseball’s early amateurism became a cudgel with 
which to lament the state of the game and management’s inability to control player behavior. 
Drunkenness was a regular occurrence on the field and in the stands, and the gambling problems 
that had plagued the old NABBP had not abated, even with players now openly receiving 
compensation. “At one point,” Gelzheiser (2006) noted, “gambling was so rampant and the 
outcome of games so controlled that the police installed signs outside of N.A.P.B.B.P parks 
stating: ‘No Game Played Between These Two Teams Is To Be Trusted” (p. 18). It was during 
this period that The New York Times published its previously-mentioned “worthless, dissipated 





If those who really enjoy base-ball as a sport desire to retain it for the interest of the 
respectable classes, they must sternly set their faces against the professional player. In 
every point of view he is an eminently undesirable person, and he out to be peremptorily 
and completely suppressed. … To employ professional players to perspire in public for the 
benefit of gamblers [is] a benefit to no one, and furnishes to dyspeptic moralists a strong 
argument against any form of muscular Christianity. (“The Professional,” 1872, ¶3) 
While some of the corruption was overstated (Ginsburg, 2004), perception was not far off from 
reality—and the game quickly gained a reputation for disreputability. Player conduct had 
become “so shameful,” early baseball historian George Moreland once wrote, “that the highly 
respectable element of patrons began to drop out of attendance, until the crowds that came to the 
games were composed exclusively of men who went to the grounds to bet money on the results” 
(as cited in Ginsburg, 2004, p. 17). Franchises began to fold, with only four of the original still in 
existence by 1875 (Duquette, 1999). The NAPBBP was in “shambles” (Gietschier, 2011, p. 18).  
When sport in Great Britain faced a similar power vacuum, as may be recalled from the 
previous chapter, the elite response was to draw harsher lines between the classes by making 
participation more exclusive and, in those cases where there was intermingling, more explicitly 
hierarchical. The response was similar in the U.S., where elite interests saw baseball’s decline as 
an opportunity to restore what had been the status quo. It was at that point that the next 
ingredient in baseball’s transition into commercialism took place—a grab for control by 
management of labor and consumers. 
Regaining control. By the middle of the seventies, the business interests ostensibly in 
control of the NAPBBP had grown restless. The league’s poor reputation and financial instability 
had caused many of them to “believe that a new order was necessary in professional baseball that 
would control player movement, keep salaries down, profits up, and stabilize the industry” 
(Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 19). Most important in this ‘new order’ was a drastic reduction in player 
power. “Players, it was believed, had to be kept out of the decision-making process and become 




Among the disgruntled capitalists was Chicago businessman and Chicago White 
Stockings president William Hulbert. Like his colleagues, he was “concerned with the instability 
of his industry caused by rising wages, low profits, alcohol, gambling, and a difficult-to-control 
labor force” (Gelzheiser 2006, p. 20). His first season as White Stockings president, 1875, was 
successful in some respects. The White Stockings were the second-most profitable team during 
the season, and Hulbert had secured commitments for the following year from some of the most 
talented players in the league. In doing so, however, he had incurred the wrath of rival team 
owners and violated rules against signing players while the season was in progress. As a result, 
both he and the players risked expulsion (Cook, 2005). Given the White Stockings’ financial 
stability, the team’s stacked roster, and Hulbert’s dissatisfaction with the state of the sport, it 
should not be surprising that his solution to that potential problem was to start his own league. 
With the other NAPBBP owners set to eject the White Stockings, Hulbert sought to take 
“preemptive action” before the annual league meeting in March of 1876 (Cook, 2005, p. 27). He 
arranged a meeting with star player Albert Spalding to “plan a counterattack” (Frommer, 2016, 
p. 51) and in the process changed the history of professional sport. “I have a new scheme,” he 
told Spalding, “Let us anticipate the Eastern cusses [the other teams in the league] and organize a 
new association before the March meeting, and then see who does the expelling” (Spalding, 
1911, p. 208). Out of their conversation was born the National League.   
A common thread in the history of baseball, and sport, and society, is that when those on 
the lower end of the economic scale begin to make inroads, there is a backlash from those who 
have historically held control. Recall from chapter two that greater economic parity in Great 
Britain was followed by increasingly stringent policies against lower-class sporting participation. 
Moreover, recall from chapter one that gains by union and radical movements were followed by 
neoliberalism. The ruling classes do not tend to go quietly. That was also the case in baseball, 
where the looser controls of the NAPBBP were followed by especially stringent policies in the 
National League. 
The National League. Hulbert would recruit like-minded owners to his new league, 




(Frommer, 2016 p. 52). If his vision was initially borne of fear of expulsion, it had become an 
opportunity to remake the game and give it a clean slate. Speaking to a group of owners at a 
closed-door meeting in 1876, Hulbert outlined baseball’s perceived problems, identifying as the 
primary culprit insufficient management control. As paraphrased by Frommer, Hulbert’s 
National League “would be a league of clubs—not players. For the first time, baseball would 
become a management-labor situation, with club owners and administrators running the show 
and players now cast in the role of employees.” Both Hulbert and Spalding, the latter of whom 
was as much a businessman as an athlete, “looked upon the formation of the new league as a way 
to give management the upper hand” (p. 53). More to the point, it was a way for ‘gentlemen’ to 
take back control, as admitted by Spalding himself: 
When players were gentlemen they could control the game, but when players lacked 
gentlemanly qualities they could not be expected to control the game. The problem with 
the N.A.P.B.B.P. was too much labor control … the gentlemen owners were taken 
advantage of. (as cited in Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 26) 
One could be forgiven for wondering what exactly constituted a gentleman in the professional 
game. With all involved now pursuing the almighty dollar, the days had passed wherein 
‘gentleman’ simply meant not having to play for money. Spalding himself said he could not 
understand “how it could be right to pay [a performer] for entertaining the public, and wrong to 
pay a ballplayer for doing exactly the same thing” (Abrams, 2000, p. 2), so his definition of 
gentleman was clearly not based in amateur tradition. If gentleman status no longer required 
abstaining from compensation or competition (as “gentlemen owners” pursued both profits and 
pennants), then what if anything qualified as “gentlemanly qualities”? Based on the priorities of 
the nascent National League, upper or middle-class status was the primary, if not only, criteria. 
For the N.L., making baseball a gentleman’s game again meant taking aim squarely at working 




The announcement of the N.L. was received as a corrective to the excesses of the 
NAPBBP.22 “At last base-ball has a prospect of being lifted from the unfavorable and destructive 
surroundings that during the last few years have steadily been dragging it down towards the level 
of the dog and cock-pit,” read a piece in the Chicago Tribune (“Sporting Notes,” 1876, ¶2). A 
separate Tribune article said the new league was “destined to elevate base-ball to the rank of a 
legitimate amusement” (“The Diamond,” 1876, ¶2). Spalding echoed that sentiment. The N.L., 
he told the Tribune, “will have a wonderfully beneficent effect upon the whole business. It will 
have a tendency to raise the game in the estimation of the public, and base-ball will be looked 
upon in the right light: as an honest, manly spot” (“Spalding’s Opinion,” 1876, ¶2). That the 
National League continues to exist more than 100 years later is a validation of those high 
expectations. The launch of the N.L. was a significant event in the history of the professional 
sports industry, not only marking the formation of the oldest still-active major league, but also 
setting the precedent for the hard line against labor that would permeate pro sport for the next 
hundred years.  
The N.L. was formed with the NAPBBP in mind, not as a model but as a cautionary tale. 
The old league was everything business was not supposed to be during the pre-Progressive era—
collaborative with labor and in ruinous competition with other teams and leagues in its market. 
The new league sought to avoid the pitfalls of disorganization and player control that plagued the 
NAPBBP and instead emulate the dominant firms of its day, “huge corporations run by skilled 
managers that reduced competition and controlled markets and labor” (Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 21). 
Hulbert and his collaborators believed that baseball should be run with a business ethos, with the 
corollary being that employees would have little-to-no authority. For the players, this meant 
drastically reduced influence. Taming the labor force was one of Hulbert’s top priorities, an 
effort that resulted in several rules meant to constrict players’ economic and behavioral freedom. 
According to Burk (1994), “Hulbert and his associates aimed at nothing less than a form of 
baseball indentured servitude” (p. 55). 
                                                           
22 There was of course some opposition. An article in Forest and Stream criticized the N.L.’s reforms as 
weak and the formation of a new league unnecessary: “All the legitimate reform necessary could have 




The N.L. excluded players from management positions, denying them any control over 
how the league was run. Contracts became increasingly difficult to break, culminating in the 
eventual institution of the reserve clause—a rule that prevented players from switching teams 
even after their contract had expired. Player behavior became stringently regulated, including 
requirements to obey team captains, remain sober, and consent to medical examination. Illness, 
injury and insubordination were cause for release (Burk, 1994), and being cut from the team, for 
any reason, was a career-killer; the N.L. constitution specified that any player released from his 
team without an ‘honorable discharge’ would be considered “dismissed, discharged, or expelled” 
and thus barred from signing with another club (Cash, 2002, p. 31). Essentially, the players had 
no say, no freedom, and no job security. The owners viewed them as “socially no better than 
common laborers” and feared that they would “succumb to the same temptations” that doomed 
the NAPBBP (Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 27). Though the game was still far removed from the days of 
amateurism, the N.L. had successfully pulled the reins on unrestrained professionalism.  
The N.L.’s bid for respectability did not stop at the players, though they felt the brunt of 
the new league’s reforms. Fans were also subject to increased controls, as the league sought to 
weed out what Spalding referred to as “the hoodlum element” (as cited in Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 
23). Some reforms, such as bans on alcohol and gambling at ballparks, were understandable 
reactions to the problems of the NAPBBP. Others, however, were indicative of a push by 
ownership to make baseball as exclusive in the stands as it once was on the field. ‘Hoodlum’ 
came to represent economic status more than behavior, and the N.L. set about making attendance 
as difficult as possible for the working class. The league standardized ticket-prices at 50 cents 
per game, about half a day’s salary for the average factory worker, even against the objections of 
some franchises. Ballparks were built in areas easily accessible to the middle class, but difficult 
to reach for those further down the class ladder. Sunday games were banned, far from a trivial 
measure considering the six-day, twelve-hour workweek that was commonplace at the time 
(Gelzheiser, 2006). 
N.L. leaders clearly believed behavior and social class were intertwined. Hulbert himself 




purpose” was to make baseball “worthy of the patronage, support, and respect of the best class of 
people” (as cited in Zimbalist, 2011, p. 202). With that said, disdain for the working class was 
not the only motivator. The N.L. also believed that increased upper-class attendance would 
eventually “enable teams to charge higher prices” (p. 23). Indeed, for as much as N.L. leaders 
cloaked themselves in the language of moral rectitude, financial concerns were never far from 
the surface. Spalding considered baseball’s indulgence of “the hoodlum class … a great financial 
mistake” (Gelzheiser, 2006, p. 24). 
By disempowering players and fans, the N.L. would have an easier time controlling its 
image and gaining respectability. The league had essentially operated under the same mindset 
that guided the National Association during its final years—if baseball could not exclude so-
called undesirables, strong management could at least force those undesirables to behave in a 
respectable way. There was an element of futility to that effort; just as the Knickerbocker Club 
failed to keep the working class from creating their own clubs, the N.L. could not prevent rival 
leagues from pursuing the clientele Hulbert so thoroughly rejected.  
In 1882, “[d]issatisfied team owners and prospective owners” joined to form the 
American Association, which had a lighter touch on player and fan conduct and was derisively 
referred to by N.L. detractors as “the Beer and Whiskey League” (Kerr, 2010, p. 61). In 1884, 
“[p]layer dissatisfaction with Hulbert’s rules led to the formation of the Union League,” a short-
lived league whose millionaire founder had a more player-friendly approach (p. 61). Six years 
later came the serious challenge of all. John Montgomery Ward, the “Brotherhood,” and the 
Players League insurrection of 1890 provided a material threat to the N.L. and an ideological 
threat to the burgeoning pro sports system. If not for some key strategic missteps, it could have 
changed the course of professional sports history. 
The Players’ League 
The hard line of the National League engendered a backlash among players and led to the 
first and most-successful player-run effort in the history of U.S. professional sport. The Players’ 
League of 1890 lives in the history books as a footnote confined primarily to the discussion of 




however, cannot be understated. The following section examines a unique front in the battle for 
the playing field. 
Background. National League owners focused more on player behavior than on wages at 
the outset (Gelzheiser, 2006). That changed in 1879 when the N.L. instituted the reserve clause 
system, binding players to teams for as long as the team wanted their services. If a player wanted 
to leave his employer, he could not sign with others in the league, making retirement the only 
other option. The initial rationale was that the reserve clause would introduce stability into the 
league at a time when teams tended to break up at the end of every season.23 In practice, it spared 
the owners from having to compete for talent and entering costly bidding wars. Rival leagues 
were brought under the auspices of the reserve system, closing off any possible alternatives for 
the players. In 1883, the N.L. joined forces with the nascent American Association to form a 
‘National Agreement’ wherein each league would “respect the reservation of players by the club 
members of every other party, in the same manner as though they were all of the same league” 
(Ward, 1887, p. 312). 
Far from simply preserving one’s roster at the end of each season, as was the stated 
rationale, teams engaged in what Ward described as serial abuses of the reserve clause system. 
Teams could cheat their players out of their last month’s salary, releasing them on October 1 
(instead of November 1) and then reclaiming rights to them the following year. Leagues could 
reserve players even after teams folded and then assign them at will to other teams. Further, 
teams could sell contracts to other franchises, earning compensation not only for the remaining 
portion of the player’s deal, but also for the new team’s ability to reserve that player in future 
years. “To this rule, more than any one thing, does base-ball as a business owe its presence 
substantial standing,” New York Giants pitcher John Ward wrote in 1888. “By preserving intact 
                                                           
23 As player John Ward, who led the players’ eventual rebellion against ownership, noted: “At the close of 
each season there was always a scramble for players for the following year: the well-balanced and 
successful team was especially subject to inroads, so that the particularly strong nine of one season was 




the strength of a team from year to year, it places the business of base-ball on a permanent basis 
and thus offers security to the investment of capital” (Ward, 1888, p. 30).24  
There were few alternatives to the N.L. and its allies. The previously noted Union 
Association took the bold step of refusing to join the National Agreement, for all intents and 
purposes defanging the reserve clause system,25 but quickly went out of business due to 
insufficient financial backing (Pietruza, 1991). The lack of competition emboldened the owners 
and exacerbated the players’ weak position. “Players were now more than ever mere chattels and 
were treated as such. The blacklist was freely employed. Fines and arbitrary treatment increased” 
(p. 99). In 1885, the N.L. and A.A. jointly instituted a series of new regulations on player salary 
and movement, including the expansion of the reserve rule and the introduction of a $2,000 
salary cap, that taken together “with the [A.A.’s] agreement to respect the [N.L.’s] player and 
consumer markets … firmly solidified the league’s ability to control the price of labor” (Ross, 
2016, p. 51).  
Management’s increasingly restrictive dictates did not exist in a vacuum. Baseball 
players were just one part of “an ever expanding and thoroughly exploited working class” 
seeking better working conditions during the industrial era (Ross, 2016, p. xviii). Like many of 
their working brethren, the players found organizing to be a crucial tool in the class battle. After 
the N.L. and A.A. closed off any competition for player services, Ward and teammates secretly 
formed the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players, sports’ first labor union. The players 
were motivated by a sense of having been exploited, as Ward (1888) outlined: 
As long as a player continued valuable (sic) he had little difficulty, but when, for any 
reason, his period of usefulness to a club had passed, he was likely to find, by sad 
experience, that base-ball laws were not construed for his protection; he discovered that in 
                                                           
24 In an 1887 editorial, Ward noted the inherent unfairness of the system: “What did the Chicago Club 
ever give [King] Kelly in return for the right to control his future services? Absolutely nothing; and yet 
that club sells that right, so cheaply acquired, for ten thousand dollars!” (Ward, 1887, p. 318). 
25 The Union Association constitution held that “while we recognize the validity of all contracts made by 
the [National] League and the American Association, we cannot recognize any agreement whereby any 
number of ballplayers may be reserved for any club for any time beyond the terms of their contract for 




base-ball, as in other affairs, might often makes right, and it is not to be wondered at that 
he turned to combination as a means of protection. (p. 32) 
Within a year, the Brotherhood and expanded to every N.L. city and boasted a membership of 
“more than one hundred players, close to 90 percent of the league” (Ross, 2016, p. 53). Its 
popularity obscured the fact that not all players had the same needs. The Brotherhood was guided 
mostly by the interests of the upper-echelon players most affected by artificial limits on salary, 
with Ward—a prominent player on the field as well as off—serving as president. Lesser players 
“were not adversely affected by the league’s salary caps and, in fact, benefitted from the $1,000 
minimum salary” (p. 53). Binding the players together were social class ties. The players by and 
large considered themselves working-class; many came from working class backgrounds and 
some had working class occupations in the offseason—not to mention similarities in race and 
national origin (Ross, 2016). Economic class identity helped paper over the very real athletic 
class differences within the union. The average player did not necessarily share the same 
concerns as did the stars, but when all was said and done, “most league players did join the 
brotherhood, despite the differences among them” (p. 53).  
The Brotherhood did not receive recognition from the National League until 1888, and 
only then under the threat of strike, but that did not stop Ward from advocating on the players’ 
behalf. At one point, he proposed changes to the reserve rule that closely resemble the current 
free agent model in Major League Baseball (Ross, 2016). To say his ideas failed to gain traction 
is an understatement. Instead, the owners’ economic proposals became even more radical.  
The straw that broke the camel’s back was a new classification plan proposed by 
Indianapolis owner John T. Brush in 1888, which sought to place players “into one of five 
classes based upon their ability and—most troubling to the players—their personal behavior” 
(Sullivan, 1995, p. 171). Instituted while many of the most prominent players were out of the 
country on an international tour, the plan called for a tiered salary system that would range from 
$1,500 (‘Class E’) to $2,500 (‘Class A’). The rationale was to protect small market franchises 
that could otherwise not compete, a paean to competitive balance that would be repeated by 




simple,” Gelzheiser (2006) wrote, “If baseball owners wanted to make their teams immune to 
market forces, then the owners, and not the players, should bear the cost of this immunity” (p. 
118). Those costs were significant. The classification plan would have resulted in some players 
making less than in the previous year, as the “top players of the era received salaries twice as 
much as the maximum $2,500 permitted” (Cash, 2002, p. 185). Though some teams were willing 
to circumvent the new salary cap by offering players compensation in other ways,26 the plan 
“would have drastically reduced salaries across the board” if enforced (Rader, 2008, p. 66). The 
players were incensed and sought to strike, but Ward convinced them to drop those plans (Ross, 
2016). He had other ideas in mind. 
Ward had been pondering the prospect of a player-run league for years, dropping less-
than-subtle hints during previous conflicts with management. When the Brotherhood was 
seeking recognition from the N.L. in 1887—and threatening to strike if they did not receive it—
Ward told a reporter that the players had “plenty of money” at their disposal “to organize any 
association or league.” He also claimed that the players would have access to the numerous 
capitalists looking to invest their money in baseball, not to mention the support of the masses, 
while brushing off concerns about paying for ballparks—which in his words would be paid off 
“[b]efore the season was half over” (Ross, 2016, p. 76). After the classification plan surfaced the 
following year, he began giving it more serious consideration.  
Ward and a handful of colleagues began planning for a new league throughout 1889. The 
core concept was simple enough: to eliminate the ownership middle man and distribute the 
proceeds from each game among the players. There was confidence on the players’ side that 
baseball’s growing popularity was principally their doing and that “they could and should fight 
to take a greater share for themselves” (Ross, 2016, p. 84). With most of the Brotherhood 
expected to join the new league, there was also confidence that the on-field product would be 
better than anything the remnants of the National League could muster. Expectations high, it 
took only “four months of backroom planning, whispered meetings in clubhouses and on the 
base paths, frantic searches for contributors and supporters, and rampant rumors in the press” to 
                                                           




turn the league from a threat into a reality (p. 86). Despite frequent public denials from the 
parties involved, it was clear by September 1889 that a player-run league was imminent. 
“Indeed, it would appear that the Brotherhood had everything cocked and primed to begin 
business in 1890 in a way that will make it extremely uncomfortable to the National League” 
(“Baseball: Prospects,” 1889, ¶1). An unnamed player projected confidence in an October 1889 
interview: 
These men [National League owners] will be astonished at the magnitude of the scheme, 
or ‘conspiracy,’ as the League magnates choose to call it, at the work that has been done, 
and at the small chance of the League breaking into the Brotherhood ranks. … There is 
not, and never was, since the League refused to confer over grievances during the last 
season, a chance for compromise. (“Brotherhood Plans,” 1889, ¶4) 
N.L. executives were not pleased by the developments. “[T]here will be war,” Spalding said in a 
September 1889 interview published by the Cincinnati Enquirer. “I was not prepared for such a 
ponderous plot. The League has taken a fatherly interest in the Brotherhood, recognized it upon 
the declaration by President Ward that it was a benevolent order, and aimed to improve the 
morals of its members. It can have no grievance that cannot be done away with by the league” 
(“The Players,” 1889, ¶3). Spalding dismissed the players’ complaints, saying the issues Ward 
brought up to him in a meeting earlier that year—the classification system among them—“were 
not great grievances” (¶4). The Players’ League, he argued, would set back all the hard work the 
National League had done cleaning up the game. “The [N.L.] has existed for fifteen years, and 
the game is clean and on a healthy basis. Now all the purifying work is forgot by the players … 
Certainly base-ball can gain no immediate benefit if the plot thickens and out of it springs the 
Brotherhood’s League” (¶5). The N.L. tried to dissuade the players from joining the new league 
“by insisting that they are legally ‘reserved’ by the old organization for next year,” a threat that 
was widely regarded as a bluff (“Brotherhood Plans,” 1889, ¶1). 
The Players’ League was officially announced in a November 1889 Brotherhood 
meeting, in a lengthy statement published that was published in multiple media outlets. After a 




There was a time when the League stood for integrity and fair dealings. To-day it stands 
for dollars and cents. Once it looked to the elevation of the game and an honest exhibition 
of the sport. To-day its eyes are upon the turnstyle. Men have come into the business with 
no other motivate than to exploit it for every dollar in sight. Measures originally intended 
for the good of the game have been perverted into instruments for wrong” (“Declare 
Themselves,” 1889, ¶14) 
The players had turned the tables on the National League, which used the language of player 
excess and immorality to justify breaking away from the National Association years earlier. 
Instead of baseball being corrupted by disreputable players, as was the argument underlying the 
formation of the N.L., it was now being corrupted by exploitative owners. The N.L. owners were 
“a combination among themselves stronger than the strongest trust,” the statement read, and as a 
result “they were able to enforce the most arbitrary measures, and the player had either to submit 
or get out of the profession” (¶14). It is worth noting that little has changed on that front, short of 
those arbitrary measures now being negotiated in collective bargaining. 
Pledging to eliminate the “arbitrary and un-American” policies of the N.L., the new league 
positioned itself as the steward of “the National game” (“Declare Themselves,” 1889, ¶14). 
Unlike the National League, which sought to marginalize the players in every way possible, the 
Players’ League would have a difficult time culling the influence of ownership. 
Financing a player-run league. As sport became professionalized in the mid-nineteenth 
century, playing the games began to take on some new requirements. First among these were 
cities and ballparks in which to play. The players, whose desire for a new league sprung in large 
part to the financial squeeze put on them by ownership, simply did not have the resources to 
accommodate those needs. Nor did they have the resources to play for what-amounted-to free 
until a new league began to generate enough revenue to split. The nascent league’s wobbly 
financial footing was its biggest problem at the outset, and the solution to that problem would be 
its biggest liability—the pursuit of capitalist benefactors to shore up the foundation. As skeptical 




If men could be secured in each of the cities included in the plan who would back each 
club financially there might be a chance for success. But this would be a mere transfer of 
managers … men who would find the money for such an enterprise would also be apt to 
look for a chance of some profit. (Sullivan, 1995, p. 185, emphasis added) 
Or as another writer put it, “[t]he movement is really but little more than a change of employers 
with more privileges and liberties accorded to the players” (“The Players,” 1889, ¶3). In a 
Cincinnati Enquirer article, still another writer noted that the Players’ League as announced did 
not quite match the heady reporting of the prior months. 
The Brotherhood Players’ League does not now impress one was being such a formidable 
and dangerous rival to the other Big Leagues as it did several days ago. … For weeks, yes 
months, the newspapers have been burdened with sensational articles that fairly bristled 
with glittering generalities, but were sadly deficient as far as real details and responsible 
names were concerned. A casual reader would be carried away with these rosy and gilt-
tinged reports. He was led to believe that capitalists with hogs-heads of money at their 
command stood ready to cast themselves into the breach and put up part of their many 
bushels of shining dollars just as soon as word was given by the leaders in the movement. 
The meeting … did not develop an army of these moneyed good Samaritans. On the 
contrary, the capitalists were rather conspicuous by their absence. (“Will it,” 1889, ¶1-2) 
The article’s skepticism was scarcely contained—the author forecast “disaster and a rocky road 
to travel, rather than $5,000 salaries, special trains and immense profits” (¶3)27—but it did 
identify some weaknesses in the P.L. structure. Even at the initial meeting, the “half dozen or so” 
capitalists in attendance seemed more interested in “what chance they had of getting their money 
back before they put any of it into the new scheme” (¶2). The Brotherhood’s high hopes and 
                                                           
27 There was sufficient skepticism of the Players’ League in some newspapers that Ward felt compelled to 
respond: “We don’t expect every one (sic) to agree with us, and we do not object to fair criticism, but 
when a few subsidized agents and correspondents start to flood the country with misrepresentations 
concerning our plans and movements, it is time to hit back. … [T]hey are daily sending out stuff without 
any foundation in fact, and intended solely to destroy public confidence in the new league” (“Ward 




swaggering confidence28 belied the fact that it was dependent on the same kind of men the 
players had sought to escape. 
The Brotherhood had begun secretly recruiting investors while still organizing the 
Players League in 1889 (Rader, 2008). Pitching investors on an arrangement in which the 
“workers would receive the bulk share of the revenue” was not an easy task (Ross, 2016, p. 88). 
The P.L. still managed to find backers for all eight of its franchises, some of whom had affinity 
for the players and their cause, but all of whom were fueled by self-interest. Emblematic of the 
group was Cleveland streetcar businessman Albert Johnson, the first and most important backer 
of the league. A “mix of Gilded Age businessman, social reformer, and barroom card player and 
drinker” (Rader, 2008 p. 120), Johnson opposed the reserve clause on free market grounds and 
“couched his support [of the players] as, first and foremost, a philanthropic endeavor” (Ross, 
2016, p. 92). He spoke in almost radical terms about the players’ cause, describing them as trying 
to “liberate themselves from the tyrannical rule of the League,” and pledging “all the assistance 
within my power to help them accomplish their aim” (“On their,” 1889, ¶2-3). His primary 
motivation, however, was profit. He saw the P.L. as an opportunity to boost ridership on his 
trolley line, with visions of “millions of dollars of profits” in his head (Ross, 2016, p. 92).29 
Friendliness to the players’ and their interests may have separated the Players’ League capitalists 
from the ones running the National League, but these were businessmen all the same.  
Johnson was a critical presence for the Players’ League, not only providing financial 
resources of his own, but recruiting others to the league as well. Additional backers included 
stockbrokers, executives and even the mayor of New York City. They were capitalists who 
“already owned a lot of money elsewhere, in a business that could be further enhanced by linking 
it—geographically or discursively—to a particular form of cultural production” (Ross, 2016, p. 
                                                           
28 In assuring reporters that “there will be a players’ league in existence next April,” Ward added that 
there would also be one “for the nine succeeding Aprils” (“The Brotherhood,” 1889, ¶1). 
29 In an 1890 meeting to determine whether the Players League would continue to exist, Johnson laid out 
his reasons for backing the players’ efforts: “I had seen the cars on the opposition street road loaded down 
with people going to [baseball] games, and it occurred to me that here was a chance to make a good 
investment, as I could get grounds on the street car line owned by my brother and myself. Visions of 




91). In other words, they sought the cross-promotional opportunities baseball could provide. 
These backers had little issue allowing players more autonomy on contracts and behavior, as 
their concerns were not the future of the league but principally financial. They were to a large 
extent opportunists30 with few if any ties to the cause of labor (Gelzheiser, 2006), though that 
was not an across-the-board rule. There was no confusion about the backers’ intentions from the 
leaders of the Players’ League, just hope that this new set of owners would engage in the kind of 
relationship with labor that was common prior to rise of corporate capitalism. The backers were 
to “share the profits of the league with the players,” several of whom in turn bought stock in the 
teams (Abrams, 1998, p. 19). It was to be “a democratic alliance” between labor and capital 
(Leifer, 2009, p. 75). 
The players may have owned stock, but the financial backers had significant sway in the 
new league. Contributors would make up half of each team’s eight-person board of directors, as 
well as half the seats of the league’s 16-person senate (Abrams, 1998). The senate elected both 
the president and vice president of the league, with both coming from its own ranks. In the initial 
December 1889 vote, both roles were filled by contributors—New York’s Edwin A. McAlpin 
was elected president and Chicago’s John Addison the vice president. In an ostensibly player-run 
league, businessmen had as much influence as the players in the management of each individual 
team and of the league generally. As Koszarek (2006) noted, there was “some illogic in this part 
of the plan … this would invariably result in two cliques when differences arose” (p. 43). 
Considering the role of money in the conflict that led to the Players’ League, one of the 
most important positions in the new league was secretary treasurer. Presumably to avoid a bias 
toward backers or players, the parties were required to seek an outsider for the position. They 
elected Frank Brunell, the same Chicago Tribune writer who noted the potential pitfalls the 
league would face. Brunell was “not a man of business, nor was he experienced as a baseball 
player,” and though he was “[n]ever distant,” he was also “never involved” (Koszarek, 2006, p. 
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“because they saw the game’s popularity growing and believed that money could be made in the baseball 




43). Considering that he was not particularly qualified, it is notable that the players chose an 
outsider for that position instead of someone aligned with their cause.  
The Players’ League would of course do away with the reserve clause and the 
classification system, but its economic structure was not particularly well thought out. The 
league’s “semi-utopian profit-sharing scheme” established a $40,000 fund guaranteeing payrolls, 
with the backers and players splitting the remaining revenue from gate receipts once non-salary 
expenses were accounted for. The owners would get $10,000 after the players received their 
guaranteed salaries, and then the players would get the next $10,000. “If any club earned more 
than $20,000 in single season, the additional profits would be evenly distributed among all the 
teams” (Cash, 2002, p. 185). Koszarek (2006) argued that the P.L.’s financial operations rested 
on “a great many presumptions” that were neither wise nor commonplace (p. 44). One 
presumption was that profits could be anticipated in the first place. Just one team, Boston, turned 
a profit during the first and only Players’ League season. New York lost $10,000 (p. 352). “The 
total deficit of the Players’ League, counting the construction costs of new ballparks,” Cash 
(2002) wrote, “reached $340,000” (p. 187). 
The financial losses could not be blamed on the on-field product. With most of the 
Brotherhood players moving to the Players League, the P.L. had a distinct advantage over the 
N.L. both in quality of play and in fan enthusiasm (Ross, 2016). It was as if all the NBA’s 
biggest stars moved to a new league in the offseason. The N.L. entered the 1890 season with 
most players from its defending champions in the Players League. Nearly three-fourths of N.L. 
players in 1890 were in the minor leagues or the American Association the previous year (Ross, 
2016). The P.L. had reduced its rival to the equivalent of replacement players. 
The P.L. had the returning stars, newer and more aesthetically pleasing stadiums, and 
higher attendance (Ross, 2016). At one point, a group of P.L. officials, including Johnson, Ward 
and Brunell, purchased the N.L. club in Cincinnati, as sure an indication of the P.L.’s success 
over its rival as any. Yet the above advantages could not get the P.L. past 1890, while the N.L. 
continues to exist with no end in sight nearly 130 years later. The P.L. had proven itself capable 




the N.L. going out of its way to make sure its schedule conflicted with that of the new league, 
there simply were not enough fans to go around. The leagues cannibalized each other, and while 
the P.L. outdrew the N.L., the new and financially rickety league could less withstand a difficult 
season. More to the point, the players’ financial backers were less willing to take a financial hit, 
even for just once year, than were the National League’s capitalists.  
The players’ fortunes were far too tied to the profit-motives of their financial backers, 
and in many cases the backers were not able to receive the promised return on their investment. 
The competing National League “shrewdly perceived” the “fault line between players and 
capitalists in the Players League” and exploited it mercilessly (Leifer, 2009, p. 76). Though 
severely wounded by the competition, the N.L. found success in pressuring on the P.L.’s 
contributors. “Successful in hiding its true weaknesses,” Leifer noted, “the National League 
succeeded in getting its fellow-capitalists in the Players’ League to bypass the players and sell 
out” (p. 75). Even though the N.L. was on the verge of collapse, it managed to “dupe” the P.L. 
backers, who were concerned about their own financial state after losing money in year one. The 
backers “failed to grasp the desperate condition of the [N.L. and A.A.]” and believed the N.L.’s 
bluff that it was prepared to continue into another season (Cash, 2002, p. 188). Early in what was 
to be the 1890 offseason, a group of backers that included Johnson met with members of the N.L. 
and the American Association to plot a consolidation plan that would have merged all three 
existing leagues into “a single, two-division association” and the competing teams in each city 
into one club (Ross, 2016, p. 183). While there had long been rumors of a “peace settlement” 
between the N.L. and its former players (p. 185), and while the backers had permission from 
Ward to negotiate with the other leagues, the players were still stunned when they heard of the 
plan. Consolidation was further than many of them wanted or expected to go, and it would place 
them right back in the circumstances from which they had escaped. In addition, the negotiations 
had completely shifted the competitive landscape, as New York pitcher Tim Keefe noted: 
The National League is very shrewd. The various club presidents sit back in the chairs and 




Why, the Players League had the old organization ‘killed’ three weeks ago. Now 
everything has changed.” (p. 192) 
Negotiations moved quickly, with the capitalists of the P.L., N.L. and A.A. in discussions that 
rarely involved any players. The N.L. refused to negotiate with players in the room, and when 
the P.L. backers introduced a motion to include players in the talks, they were voted down by 
their N.L. and A.A. counterparts (Ross, 2016). The N.L.’s Spalding rationalized locking the 
players out of talks by saying a compromise “should be settled between the moneyed men of 
both organizations on a purely business basis” (p. 190). Yet many of the players had invested 
their own money in the Players League. Ward had all his money invested in his club, telling 
reporters in 1889: “I am fighting for a principle and I am spending my own money. If the new 
organization winds up in smoke I will have to eat snow-ball lunch next winter” (“Ward was,” 
1889, ¶16). Further, it was clearly not ‘purely business.’ N.L. Brooklyn co-owner Charles Byrne 
let his bitterness toward the players slip after one meeting, complementing the Players League 
backers for realizing “at last the ingratitude of the players” (Ross, 2016, p. 192). 
 Gradually, the N.L. and A.A. began to peel away teams from the Players League. First 
New York, then Pittsburgh, then Chicago. The backers had become owners in everything-but-
name, selling the franchises that rhetorically, but not materially, belonged to the players. By late 
December, there were no teams left. Most had sold, some folded. The N.L.’s Spalding gloated: 
In about two weeks we will strew immortelles upon [the P.L.’s] grave and build a nice 
new monument sacred to the memory of the revolution of 1890. Then when the spring 
comes and the grass is green upon the last resting place of anarchy, the National 
Agreement will rise again in all its might and restore to America in all its purity the 
national pastime—the great game of base ball. (Ross, 2016, p. 195) 
Spalding’s ebullience about the P.L.’s demise—“we will never hear of it again,” he said in an 
1891 interview with the Cincinnati Enquirer—was exceeded only by his bullishness on the 
future of the National League. “Baseball has been placed on a solid, substantial foundation, a 
new era has come upon us, and I look forward to sunshine and unclouded skies hereafter” 




A missed opportunity. In short, the P.L. did not provide the kind of departure from the 
private ownership system that the times demanded. Even so, it was a successful on-field product 
despite its lack of financial success and dependence on business interests. The general consensus 
among historians is that the Players’ League not only succeeded acquiring many of the highest-
profile National League players, it also had higher attendance. As much as the N.L. tried to 
downplay the competition, it was clear to observers at the time that the P.L. had posed a major 
threat. Looking back at the conflict a year later, the Chicago Tribune suggested the odds had 
been in favor of the P.L., which had initially looked like “a promising and thrifty organization” 
(“Strength of,” 1891, ¶1). That was also the view of an 1890 editorial in The New York Times, 
which argued that the P.L. could have survived if not for the outsized influence of its 
‘contributors.’ Had John Ward’s “ideas had been carried out the chances are that the Players’ 
league would be in a prosperous condition to-day. But the financial men stepped in, and their 
ignorance of baseball, coupled with their desire for notoriety, has caused the ruin” (as cited in 
Sullivan, 1995, p. 206). Others in the media were not as charitable. Returning to the Chicago 
Tribune, one writer crowed about the P.L. failing to meet its lofty expectations: 
Just a year ago the papers throughout the country were devoting columns to the 
brotherhood and its prospects, and the faces of National League magnates were as long as 
the proverbial Alderman’s pocketbook. The players seemed to hold the winning cards … 
The lapse of twelve months finds many changes. The league magnates, with shorter bank 
accounts and longer experience, are quietly resting on their oars watching with no end of 
amusement the frantic efforts of the players to get under cover. The National League now 
has the winning hand, and promises to play it with a deal more judgement than did the 
players last winter and summer. (“Poor President,” 1890, ¶3) 
The National League outlasted the Players’ League largely through means not of its own making, 
but its supporters nonetheless interpreted the outcome as validation.  
After the dust settled, the P.L. players were placed back under the restrictive reserve rule, 
with any player held under contract in 1889 subject to the same contract in 1891. “All Players’ 




(“A League,” 1891, ¶1). After the American Association backed out of the national agreement in 
1891, the reserve rule briefly ended. The A.A.’s almost immediate collapse thereafter, however, 
left the N.L. with zero competition by 1892 and no need for a national agreement. The N.L.’s 
own reserve rule would suffice, slicing player salaries by half from $3,500 in ’91 to $1,700 in 
’93 (Ross, 2016). 
The Players’ League had the on-field ingredients necessary to become the dominant 
major league. While Spalding chided the players for daring to think they could “at the same time 
direct both the business and the playing ends of the game” (Ross, 2016, p. 198), it is the case that 
the players did not have enough control of the business. The financial backers were the weak 
link, and yet there could have been no Players League without the capital they provided. As Ross 
(2016) noted, “building a league—constructing any industry—amid a political economy in which 
property does not come for free, is nearly impossible without an enormous initial sum of money” 
(p. 198). Had that funding come from another source, it is quite possible, and one could argue 
probable, that the Players League would have survived beyond one season. Instead, it lives on in 
as an obscure historical curiosity, an outcome predicted accurately from the moment it went out 
of business: “The [P.L.] is a thing of the past and will in the future be regarded as ancient 
history” (“End of,” 1891, ¶1). 
The Player-Run Concept Since the Players League 
In the century-plus since the fall of the Players League, talk of a player-run league has 
cropped up in all four major North American leagues, typically in the course of bitter collective 
bargaining negotiations, and rarely to any real degree of seriousness. When owners in the NHL-
precursor National Hockey Association (NHA) tried to impose a salary cap after the 1910 
season, the players “looked into” launching a player-run league, stymied by the fact that all of 
the rinks were under contract to the NHA (McKinley 2009, p. 63). Decades later, MLB players 
union leader Marvin Miller threatened a player-run league during labor-management conflict in 
1981 and 1982, though the move was characterized as a “bluff” in a recent biography (Burk 
2015, p. 184). Not all of the threats were idle. Two more serious attempts at a player-run league, 




A Hail Mary PASS. Around the same time Miller was threatening a players’ league in 
baseball, NFL union leader Gene Upshaw was doing the same in the NFL. When CBA 
negotiations between the NFL and NFL players’ association failed in 1982 and the players 
prepared to go on strike,31 the union announced an ambitious plan to form “a league of several 
teams, owned and operated by the players themselves” (Ford, 2001, p. 3). NFL player contracts 
prohibited playing in any game not sanctioned by the league, and the owners pursued legal 
action, with teams winning temporary restraining orders against the players’ venture in five state 
courts (Litsky, 1982). Upon the union’s request, a federal judge assumed jurisdiction over the 
issue, invalidating the state-issued injunctions. The decision, which the league appealed, gave the 
players’ alternative league a temporary green light (Janofsky, 1982). 
The concept would include six all-star teams representing the NFL’s six divisions, 
playing games over the course of nine weeks in stadiums across the country. If the strike lasted 
long enough, the schedule would culminate with a championship game in December (Pomerantz, 
1982). Players would be paid $2,500 or $3,000, depending on whether their team won (Barnes, 
1982a). The union had a key ally in cable entrepreneur Ted Turner, who committed to “televise 
as many contests as could be played” (Ford, 2001, p. 3). His Turner Broadcasting Company 
guaranteed the union a minimum of $500,000, and upwards of $1 million, per game (Attner & 
Barnes, 1982). 
Turner was an avowed supporter of the players’ efforts, filling a role reminiscent to that 
of the old Players’ League contributors. His pro-player comments, in particular, evoked those of 
Albert Johnson nearly a century earlier. “I just wanted to even up the odds between the owners 
and the players,” he said during one of the league’s lone games, “The whole power structure was 
against them, the bigs against the smalls. I like to see myself like the guy who rode into town and 
saw the outlaws trying to take advantage of the farmers and the ranchers and threw in with them. 
I'm willing to be deputized” (Leavy, 1982, ¶6). 
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The union announced plans for the league August 5, went on strike September 20, 
avoided an injunction on October 6, and faced an NFL appeal on October 20 (“Strike 
Chronology, 1982; Ford, 2001). That rushed pace left little time to get the new enterprise—
named the Players’ All-Star Season, or PASS—off the ground. In the time between the initial 
court decision paving the way for the player-run games, and the NFL’s appeal of said decision, 
the union “had less than two weeks to show that it could operate a professional football league” 
(Ford, 2001, p. 4). Despite that limitation, the players were able to stage initial games October 17 
at RFK Stadium in Washington D.C. and October 18 at the Los Angeles Coliseum, both NFL 
stadiums.  
The union wanted the first games to serve as “gala events, with many of the league’s elite 
players participating.” That was not to be, as “many stars dropped out” (Attner, 1982a, para. 10). 
That was not the only way in which the games failed to meet expectations. Promoters expected 
crowds potentially in excess of 30,000 (Attner, 1982a), but the final tally was far less. At RFK, 
fewer than 10,000 showed up (Attner, 1982b). The promoters lost $100,000 for the two games, 
and that paled in comparison to the $800,000 Turner lost (Attner, 1982b). 
Even so, the courts doomed the league more than the economics. The NFL won its appeal 
of the earlier court decision, with the appellate court finding that a single federal judge could not 
assume jurisdiction over the league’s contract claim. That forced the union to potentially defend 
its new league in front of judges all over the country. “The union could not afford to take on 28 
teams in federal courts across the nation, and cancelled the remainder of the schedule” (Ford, 
2001, p. 5). 
Ford (2001) concluded that the exercise ultimately soured labor on the player-owned 
concept due to the expense, while emboldening management to use replacement players. That 
may well have been the case, but it is also true that PASS showed the players’ ability to stage 
games on their own, despite the significant roadblock of having just weeks to develop and launch 
the league. It had much the same vulnerability as the Players’ League, which is dependence on 
mercurial billionaires. Turner was able to “[laugh] off the loss of a mere half million” (p. 5) and 




but one wonders how much longer he would have stuck around as his losses mounted. At the 
same time, PASS was also the most successful player-run effort since the PL. “Turner, the 
NFLPA, and the players had proven that a reasonable facsimile of a professional league could be 
assembled without the owners” (Ford, 2001, p. 5). 
Two swings, two misses, in baseball. The player-run concept soon resurfaced in 
baseball, in the form of a new league proposed by union-counsel-turned-player-agent Richard 
Moss. As will be addressed further in a later chapter, MLB owners began colluding against 
players in the late 1980s, engaging in coordinated action to stop bidding on free agents. In the 
midst of the scandal, which left free agents with no choice but to sit out or sign contracts far 
below market value, former players union counsel-turned-player agent named Richard Moss 
began developing a proposal for a new league.  
Moss had the support of the union and other agents for the concept, which would have 
included 10-12 teams and drawn players from the annual pool of MLB free agents. Thanks to the 
owners’ collusion, most players were on shorter contracts and thus would be available for the 
new league (Martzke, 1989a). He also had the support of several potential investors, including 
Donald Trump,32 and the interest of television networks ABC, NBC, TNT and SportsChannel 
America (Martzke, 1989b). Yet the league never got off the ground. Once the dust settled from 
the collusion scandal, the free agents it would have depended on eventually re-signed with their 
MLB teams. In its first iteration, Moss’ concept did not carve out a role for the players beyond 
the creation of a “players-owners trust through which players and owners would share profits” 
from television and licensing revenue (Chass, 1989, ¶20). 
It was not until the 1994 players’ strike, when Moss revived the concept, that the players 
took on a bigger role. His idea in 1994 was not too dissimilar from the Players’ League concept 
104 years earlier. The new league would split control between players and investors. Both sides 
would fund the franchises in exchange for ownership stakes, with all profits (or losses) to be 
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divided equally (Zipay, 1994). The players, perhaps emboldened by the lengthy strike and 
cancellation of the World Series, were gung-ho: 
Philadelphia Phillies catcher Darren Daulton says he thinks players could run a league 
better than the owners. Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Orel Hershiser believes the concept 
of a players’ league should be seriously considered. Dodgers outfielder Brett Butler says 
he would play in a new league. (¶2) 
The players, Moss said, wanted the player-run league “badly” (Blair 1994, ¶24). That may have 
been the case in the heat of the strike, but if the (sparse) media coverage is any indication, the 
idea fizzled quickly. 
Perceived feasibility of a player-run league. Just as in the other leagues, talk of a 
player-run league in the NBA has typically cropped up during tense labor-management 
negotiations. During the 2011 NBA owners’ lockout, as players competed in charity games and 
unsanctioned tournaments around the country or signed contracts overseas, New York Knicks 
player Amare Stoudemire broached the possibility: “If we don’t go to Europe, we’re going to 
start our own league … If [the lockout] goes one or two years, we’ve got to start our own league” 
(Stephenson, 2011, ¶2). While at least one NBA-level arena was publicly open to the prospect,33 
Stoudemire’s suggestion was met with derision by members of the media. One sportswriter 
sarcastically thanked him for “continuing the players’ fine tradition of making really stupid 
comments during NBA lockouts” (Robinson, 2011, ¶3, emphasis in original). Going further, and 
invoking as many stereotypes as possible, the writer called the players too stupid to manage their 
own finances, much less those of a team: 
Most players didn't finish college — or even start college. They don't know anything 
except basketball, especially when it comes to money, which is why 60 percent of NBA 
players reportedly go broke within five years after retirement. They can't even handle their 
own finances, so why do they think they can run a billion-dollar business? … Stoudemire 
not only won't make more money, he'll probably make less. He might have to take a pay 
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cut or work without pay for a time while getting the league off the ground, using some of 
his own cash to finance this venture. … He couldn't spend his free time playing video 
games and rolling with his homies. He would have to have a real grown-up job. He would 
have to sacrifice and work and use his tiny, previously unused brain. (¶7-14) 
To be sure, not all writers engaged in such obvious racial dog-whistles. However, the issues 
raised by Robinson were echoed by other sports personalities. ESPN writer Michael Wilbon said 
the players had “expenditures and lifestyles” that were not conducive to “ponying up money to 
start a league” (Zirin, 2011, ¶12). Sports humorist Norman Chad posed several rhetorical 
questions: “Who pays the players? Where are the games? Do you have a lucrative TV deal? 
(Don’t forget health insurance!!!)” (¶17-21). Then-New York Daily News writer Frank Isola, 
while more diplomatic, hit the same points: “Finding financial backing to support a start-up 
league as well as finding proper venues and a television partner will not be easy.” The players’ 
best option, if they were “serious about getting back on the court,” would be to “reach an 
agreement with their current bosses” (Isola, 2011, ¶3). Then-ESPN writer Henry Abbott, noting 
that NBA owners had a “$20 billion head start” thanks to public subsidies for stadiums, wrote 
that there was “simply no way for a player-run league to close that gap. Any league they'd start 
would be, by comparison, $20 billion or so behind, and therefore incredibly unlikely to ever pay 
them anything like what they can make in the NBA” (Abbott, 2011b, ¶9).  
Clearly, the idea of a player-run league was widely thought unrealistic and impractical, 
despite two relatively successful implementations in the Players’ League and the NFLPA’s 
PASS. The PL was doomed by a lack of commitment from its investors, PASS by the courts. 
Neither failed for any economic reason, with the PL even posing a serious threat to the NL. Yet 
discussion of a player-run league in the media has traditionally been negative, with one more 
likely to see discussion of all the reasons why it would not work than any consideration of the 
concept as legitimate. Fair enough; the media’s job is not to serve as player public relations. One 
does wonder why the idea of a player-run league generates reactions from skepticism to out-and-
out mockery, while the practicality of a system in which owners receive billions in public funds, 




hundreds of millions per year is comparably unexplored. Yes, the private ownership system 
generates media criticism, as noted in the opening chapter, but it is rarely described in the same 
belittling terms. The skepticism of a player-run league, as compared to one run by owners, may 
help explain why the initial Moss concept of a league run by the likes of Donald Trump 
generated significantly more media attention—and was at times treated as a fait accompli—while 
the player-run league he proposed five years later was comparably ignored and described as 
“fantasy” and “folly” (Zipay 1994, ¶11). 
The player-run model of ownership has rarely been tried, and when it has, the life-span 
has been short. Yet there are indications that, given the opportunity to grow, a player-run league 
could sustain itself. It is unlikely that PASS was ever intended as anything other than a 
negotiating ploy, but in a month’s time, NFL players scheduled and played two games in NFL 
stadiums, with Ted Turner’s money backing the enterprise. What could the players have 
accomplished with a year of preparation? As for the PL, who knows what the future would have 
held had its backers been committed to the league long-term? 
 Such hypotheticals will be addressed later in this text. In the meantime, there is precedent 
for a sports enterprise surviving and thriving on funds that were not generated by profit-driven 
capitalists. One can watch them play on most fall Sundays. 
The Packers and the Public-Ownership Model 
 Within four decades of the collapse of the Players’ League, another alternative ownership 
model came to the fore, albeit on a smaller scale. From the sport of football came the longest-
lasting alternative ownership model U.S. sport has yet seen.  
A brief history of football. Football had been around for nearly a century by the time the 
Packers were founded in 1919. The game was born in the 1820s on university campuses such as 
Yale, Harvard, and Princeton. In its earliest incarnation, it was “a series of controlled riots … 
designed to visit harm upon incoming [freshmen]” (Almond 2014). Or to put it another way, 
hazing.34 At that time, the game most closely resembled English soccer, and its brutality led to 
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bans by faculty (Smith, 2016). The first organized football game, between Rutgers and what is 
now known as Princeton in 1869, was played under the soccer format employed by most schools. 
Harvard was an exception, playing a version of the game that included running with the ball. 
Nicknamed the “Boston Game,” Harvard’s version closely resembled, but was not a direct copy 
of, British rugby. In either case, the game’s roots traced directly back to Great Britain, whether to 
the “Eton public school type of soccer football” or to the “Rugby public school game of rugby 
football” (p. 110). That can be attributed to the parallel class dynamics of the United States and 
Great Britain; it was no coincidence that both sports took off among young students of elite 
schools.  
While the soccer format was dominant in the early decades of American football, it was 
soon eclipsed by the rugby style favored by Harvard.35 After a series of rule changes, the game 
began to take on its modern orientation by the end of the century. Despite the changes, the sport 
stayed the same at its core, a crucible meant to test participants’ mettle. “Football’s roughness,” 
Oriard (2011) noted, “was what made it a test and training ground for a generation in danger of 
losing its ‘manliness’” (p. 83). Toughening up the next generation had always been part of the 
game, but originally as hazing and bullying. As the calendar turned toward the 20th century, the 
rationale began to change to something more defensible. The societal changes brought on by 
industrialization had weakened the American physical constitution, resulting in “an effete 
population physically and mentally unprepared to defend themselves or take their place on the 
world stage” (Watterson, 2006, p. 65). Football was a necessary corrective. 
Football’s violence was its calling card from the very beginning, and thus the sport was 
besieged by crisis from the very beginning. By the early 1900s, newspapers routinely highlighted 
the injuries—and deaths—incurred on the playing field (Oriard, 2011). One college professor 
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described the game as a “boy-killing, man-mutilating, money-making, education-prostituting, 
gladiatorial sport” (Telander, 1996, p. 32). Another, the scholar Thorstein Veblen, termed it the 
“arrested development of man’s moral nature” (Oriard, 2011, pp. 95-96). 
On the other hand, the game had garnered wide acceptance due to its make-up. College 
football players were students at the most prestigious schools in the country, and thereby almost 
exclusively upper-class. For that reason, the sport was afforded a level of respect not given to 
lower-class sports, a fact that drew considerable derision from boxing professionals. Prizefighter 
Jim Jeffries called college football “ten times as dangerous as fighting, even if the rules were 
followed,” and noted the hypocrisy at heart in the differing perceptions of the two sports. “The 
fight crowd, whom some people like to describe as ruffians, won’t stand for rough work that fine 
society people applaud and cheer for all they’re worth” (as cited in Oriard, 2011, p. 95). 
College ties also provided a useful distraction from the violence. The brutality of the 
college game was for something: “the honor of alma mater, draped in the rituals and pageantry of 
mascots and fight songs, bands and cheerleaders” (Oriard, 2011, p. 101). The upper class, the 
denizens of polite society, thus had a vested reason for overlooking the violence. Not only was 
the game saving the next generation of Americans from meek futility, it was providing bragging 
rights in the process. 
Once college football was reformed for the 1906 season, still violent but less dangerous, 
there was little standing in the way of its continued popularity. However, the game of football in 
and of itself remained problematic. Without upper-class participation, without bragging rights at 
stake, what was football but violence? That was the unanswered question facing professional 
football as it stumbled out of the gate in the first half of the century. 
Early struggles. Compared to baseball and college football, pro football was the 
equivalent of a minor league as late as the early 1950s (McChesney, 2008). While its competitors 
had ascended into the mainstream, pro football was deemed “a ragtag affair closer to the grunt-
and-groan pro wrestling circuit than to big-time college football, an employment opportunity for 




football had the grandeur of the university tradition to provide respectability. The pro game had 
no such fig leaf.  
That was the environment into which the Green Bay Packers were born. In the 
ramshackle world of early century pro football, launching a team was as simple as one man 
asking a friend for help and his boss for funding.  
In the summer of 1919, a 21-year-old former Notre Dame football player named Curly 
Lambeau found himself restless in his native Green Bay, looking for a way back into football 
after leaving the Fighting Irish due to an illness. He set about organizing a local team with the 
help of a friend, Green Bay Press-Gazette sports editor George Calhoun, and his boss at the 
Indian Packing Company—who agreed to foot $500 to equip the team for a season. The 
company paid for jerseys, equipment, and even a practice field (Povleitch, 2012). Due to various 
factors, not the least of which was an inability to charge for attendance,36 the team made very 
little that first season. “At the end of the season we split the pot,” Lambeau said. “We each got 
sixteen dollars and fifty cents” (Whittingham, 1984, p. 14). Those were the origins of a franchise 
that now approaches a century of existence.  
 After that inauspicious beginning, the Indian Packing Company merged with Acme 
Packing Company. Lambeau had a new boss and the Packers a new sponsor. The Packers had 
been successful as local “town team,” but Lambeau had “aspirations of joining the upstart 
American Professional Football Association,” the precursor to the National Football League 
(Povleitch, 2012, p. 8). He convinced his boss at Acme Packing to apply for a franchise, and in 
1921, Green Bay became a part of the league. Its early tenure was tumultuous. After one year in 
the league, the team was kicked out for violating rules on the use of college players (Christl, 
2015).37 Lambeau worked to get the team reinstated, and in the process became owner of the 
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franchise—but between reinstatement fees, other expenses, and simple bad luck,38 the team was 
in dire financial shape. Desperate times called for a desperate measure.  
Public ownership. The Packers teetered on the edge of bankruptcy throughout 1922, 
raising funds by selling stock and through generous loans. After the team was forced to scrap a 
game with the Bears because it was unable to come up with the required $4,000 visitor’s 
guarantee, Lambeau and Calhoun turned to Press-Gazette executive Andrew Turnbull for aid. 
The team was desperate to avoid having to cancel games, and Turnbull pledged to help by 
funding the team for the remainder of the season (Povleitch, 2012).  
In the offseason, Turnbull began recruiting a group of local businessmen to “form a 
nonprofit corporation for the team” (Rand, 2008, p. 26). At a December 1922 meeting featuring 
well over 100 businessmen, the first plans were made to turn the Packers into a community run 
nonprofit (Willis, 2010). From that meeting was born The Green Bay Football Corporation and 
the so-called Hungry Five, a group featuring Turnbull, Lambeau, and three others who sought to 
“rally the community behind the Packers and put the team on solid financial footing” 
(Gulbrandsen, 2011, p. 23).  
The Hungry Five, so named because they were “always hungry for money” (Maraniss, 
1999, p. 197), convinced members of the community to keep the franchise solvent. At a 1923 
public meeting, the group “urged a crowd of 400 to get behind the team financially,” taking 
pledges from those in attendance to purchase shares of the team for five dollars each 
(Gulbrandsen, 2011 p. 23). Between that event and another stock sale later in the year, the five 
generated “enough capital—$5,000—to guarantee a third season of professional football in 
Green Bay” (Povleitch, 2012, p. 15). Each share paid no dividend and required the purchase of 
six season tickets (Rand, 2008), but the reward of franchise stability was evidently worth it.  
The Green Bay Football Corporation was officially incorporated in August 1923. A 
nonprofit, it would include a 15-member board of directors and a five-member executive 
committee, and a requirement that any profit from sale or relocation be donated to the American 
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Legion. Less than a year after almost going out of business, the Packers found themselves on 
solid financial ground. The public had bailed out the team, an all-too-common result in sports 
business. Unlike the private ownership model, however, Packers’ fans would actually get 
something out of their generosity—a virtual guarantee that their team would never move and 
never put profits above winning. “This quirky ownership structure gave Green Bay the ability to 
keep its team,” Gulbrandsen (2011) noted, “even after football had long abandoned Canton, 
Hammond, Rock Island, and the other Midwestern factory towns whose names graced the NFL 
standings in the league’s early years” (p. 23). 
The Packers’ ownership structure was unique in North American pro sports at the time. 
Other U.S.-based teams were “sponsored by companies in industrial towns,” as the Packers had 
been previously (O’Brien, 2005, p. 197). North of the border, it was commonplace for Canadian 
football teams to be formed and owned by clubs, a la the Knickerbocker Club in baseball.39 It 
was close to a century before another North American pro team would utilize the Packers’ 
community-stockholder model. 
The arrangement would face challenges, including the NFL’s antipathy toward small-
town franchises and the impact of the Great Depression (Povleitch, 2012). Despite winning 
championships, the Packers found themselves in serious debt in the early 1930s, and by 1935 
were “more than $19,000 in debt with less than $6,000 in cash reserves” (p. 39). The financial 
situation was so dire that, whether forced by the courts or the league, the team seemed destined 
to fold or leave Green Bay. To save the team, Turnbull and others staged what amounted to an 
emergency stock sale, raising enough money in just ten days to reorganize the franchise and 
stave off elimination (Povleitch, 2012). 
Another threat came prior to the 1950 season, when the Packers needed another infusion 
of funding in order to stay afloat. The team’s executive committee sought to hold another stock 
sale, but there was not consensus within the organization. Lambeau, by that point the team’s 
coach and general manager, “believed pro football had outgrown Green Bay” and that the team 
                                                           





should relocate to Milwaukee or another major market. He proposed a for-profit stock sale—as 
opposed to the nonprofit, non-dividend offerings that had sustained the team for years—to “out-
of-town individuals and big businesses with the objective of moving the franchise” (Coenen, 
2005, p. 149). He told the executive committee that he knew of four potential investors if the 
team decided to go private (Povleitch, 2012, p. 75). Lambeau was opposed by the team’s board 
of directors and lost the brief power struggle that ensued, leaving the organization the following 
year. The Packers had withstood the last major challenge to its community-owned status. 
Long-term success. Unlike the player-owned model of The Players’ League, the 
Packers’ public ownership model has had staying power. The team will have been publicly 
owned for a century in 2023, and for most of that time it has been successful both on and off the 
field. The Packers’ on-field pedigree is well known by now. The team has won four Super 
Bowls, the last coming in 2011, and from Vince Lombardi to Brett Favre to Aaron Rodgers has 
featured some of the most famous names in NFL history. Off the field, Green Bay has sold out 
every home game since 1959 (Weinstein, 2017). That interest is not just local. Despite playing in 
the smallest television market in all of sports, the team also routinely attracts some of the largest 
national television audiences in the league. In addition, for as much as the Packers are steeped in 
the community of Green Bay, the team’s shareholders “hail from all fifty states, US territories, 
and now Canada” (Mulder, 2015, p. 103). 
The success of the Packers’ ownership model cannot be measured only in the typical 
metrics of wins, attendance and television ratings. Zirin (2013) outlined the “peculiar 
advantages” the Packers have that “no other NFL team shares” (p. 12): 
The Packers can never be moved to another city. Their stadium, Lambeau Field, will never 
be torn down and replaced with a 1.5-billion-dollar monument to corporate welfare. … 
When they need a cash infusion, they sell more stock instead of passing on the tax burden 
wholesale onto the entire populace. (Zirin, 2013, pp. 12-13) 
To understand the magnitude of these advantages, one need only look at the statistics of the 




moved a total of nine times.40 That does not include teams who were threatened with relocation. 
At a mid-1990s national mayors’ summit, Hruby (2011) noted, “then-Green Bay major Paul 
Jadin reportedly was mobbed by admiring, envious colleagues. The reason? His city’s team was 
neither leaving nor threatening to do so” (¶20, emphasis in original). 
The Packers have not been immune to the exploitative impulses of the pro sports 
industry. The public funded most of the team’s $295 million renovation of Lambeau Field in 
2003, and much of the private funding came from fans purchasing $1,400 personal seat licenses 
(“Ralph Nader,” 2003). Even in that circumstance, Green Bay still fared far better than other pro 
sport cities. As Hruby (2011) noted, the Packers “didn’t ask for a new stadium” nor did the team 
“soak the fans with exorbitant ticket prices” (¶31), solutions favored by other teams. In addition, 
since the Packers are not a profit-oriented enterprise, the financial benefit of the renovation 
accrued to the team and not to an owner. 
It should be noted that the Packers’ public ownership model does not give fans direct 
representation over how the team is run. “The relationship between the shareholders and the 
board of directors is much like that in most other public enterprises,” Mulder (2015) noted, “the 
shareholders elect the board members but do not have control over the operation of the team” 
(pp. 112-113). Often, new board members are informally chosen by the existing members of the 
board ahead of shareholders meetings, and then run unopposed for the position (Mulder). Nor 
does the Packers’ public ownership model make the team operate any differently during 
collective bargaining negotiations; despite the fact that many Packers shareholders are union 
members. The team’s president and CEO, Mark Murphy since 2007, acts in the same capacity as 
the league’s 31 owners, and broadly shares their interests. Speaking to Mulder, Packers’ public 
relations director Aaron Popkey said Murphy “would do what was best for the NFL because 
what is good for the NFL is also good for the Green Bay Packers” (p. 120). 
                                                           
40 The Colts from Indianapolis to Baltimore in 1984, Cardinals from St. Louis to Phoenix in 1988, Raiders 
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Los Angeles in 2016, Chargers from San Diego to Los Angeles in 2017, and Raiders from Oakland to Las 




The above is not to downplay the significance of the Packers’ ownership model, but to 
underscore that the team, for the merits of its ownership system, is still part of an exploitative 
capitalist colossus. Or as Mulder (2015) put it, “the Green Bay Packers are unambiguously a 
capitalist institution” (p. 118). The team may not share the profit-motives of its privately-owned 
rivals, but it does not exist in opposition to them either. 
Even so, the Packers’ public-ownership model serves as evidence that owners are 
“superfluous and outdated” (Zirin, 2013, p. 13). Green Bay’s continued success renders moot 
most of the reasons why one would want a billionaire benefactor. The team is able to compete 
for big free agents, despite playing in a small market. It plays in a stadium that may not be state-
of-the-art but is considered one of the cathedrals of its sport. More than anything, the Packers 
win. They may not win the Super Bowl every year, but they are typically a contender—while 
plenty of privately-owned teams go years without making the playoffs. 
Control of organized sport has rested in the hands of upper-class entrepreneurs for 150 
years. The Packers are the only team in one of the world’s five richest sports leagues—the NFL, 
MLB, English Premier League, NBA and NHL, in that order—using a public ownership model. 
Green Bay represents a rare triumph for the working class in a sports industry that has been 
dominated by the rich. At the risk of oversimplification, the other teams can trace their lineage 
back to the members of the Knickerbocker club who strained to keep their sport pure from 
working class influence. The Packers can trace their lineage back to those the upper classes 
worked so hard to exclude.  
Green Bay’s public ownership model serves as a source of pride among some fans in 
Wisconsin, particularly those who are members of labor unions. “Wisconsin is a grassroots kind 
of state and the Packers are a grassroots team, owned by the fans,” a member of a teacher’s union 
told Zirin in 2011, “Standing for workers’ rights is about being a Packers fan. They’re one in the 
same” (Zirin 2013, p. 15).   
Other Community-Owned Structures 
Perhaps the Packers are a mere outlier, their success the result of Green Bay’s unusual 




or in the NBA or NHL, would be more difficult. It is worth noting at this point that while the 
Packers are unique among “Big Four” pro sports teams, they are not alone in using a public 
ownership model.  
Canadian football. While it does not rank among the richest major leagues, the 
Canadian Football League has three community-owned franchises—the Winnipeg Blue 
Bombers, Edmonton Eskimos, and Saskatchewan Roughriders—and a history of non-private 
ownership. Throughout the history of the CFL a total of eight teams have, at one time, been 
community-owned or otherwise widely held, including Toronto (1873-1956), Ottawa (1897-
1950), Saskatchewan (1911-present), Winnipeg (1930-present), Calgary (1948-1991), Edmonton 
(1949-present), Hamilton (1950-1960), and British Columbia (1953-1989).  
The above comes with a caveat. Community ownership in the CFL does not necessarily 
mean that the team is owned by the community, merely that shares in the team are “held by so 
many individuals that no one owns controlling interest” (Morris, 1991, ¶18). Whatever 
similarities the ownership structures may share—like the Packers, community-owned CFL clubs 
have raised money “through fund-raising dinners and other public drives” (Hunter, 1984, ¶26)—
the differences can be significant. The Calgary Stampeders, for example, had 1,100 shareholders 
at the time of their 1991 sale, far fewer than the hundreds of thousands who own a piece of the 
Packers. Of those shares, many were held by figures outside of Calgary, including a judge of the 
Canadian Supreme Court who owned 600 alone (Green Bay does not allow any one shareholder 
to own more than 200 shares). “It's a community-owned club where the community doesn't own 
it anymore,” a team VP lamented in 1985 (“Stamps in,” 1985, ¶3).  
Of the teams that still utilize a community ownership model, neither Winnipeg nor 
Edmonton sells its shares publicly. One writer described Winnipeg’s arrangement as a nice-
sounding sham. “Contrary to popular belief, the Winnipeg Blue Bombers are not a community-
owned football club,” but instead a “non-profit organization without any form of public 
ownership whatsoever” (Kives, 2013, ¶2). He continued: 
No public entity owns the club. The City of Winnipeg doesn’t own the team. Neither does 




ownership … [T]he club is a corporation without share capital. What that means is no 
individual owns any piece of the team, which is run by a board of directors. In this way, 
the Winnipeg Football Club is no different than hundreds if not thousands of other non-
profit organizations in Manitoba. Bombers fans have no more of an ownership stake in the 
football club than, say, Winnipeg Folk Festival patrons have in the annual summer shindig 
… Which is to say, no stake whatsoever. (¶5-9) 
A team with no one owner still has its benefits over the traditional private ownership model, but 
it cannot be said to be ‘community-owned’ in the same way as the Packers. Or to return to the 
above article, “the club is already a private entity, even if it does not exist to maximize a profit 
for any owner” (¶16). 
There is only one CFL team that follows the Packers model, and it took until 2004 before 
it did so—Saskatchewan. The Roughriders (not to be confused with the defunct Ottawa Rough 
Riders) began selling shares of the team in 2004, becoming the first CFL team to sell shares to 
fans (Cook, 2004). The team’s share plan was “almost identical to the one run by the Green Bay 
Packers” (¶19), down to the price—$250. Like the Packers, the Roughriders would limit the 
number of shares any one individual could own; their shares would not provide any monetary 
value; and the day-to-day operations would be handled by a board of directors (Bender 2013).  
Whether community-owned-in-name-only like Winnipeg, or a true community-owned 
team like Saskatchewan, the deviation from private ownership has largely been a benefit. Several 
CFL teams have shifted from community to private ownership and the results have been telling. 
The Montreal Alouettes and B.C. Lions each faced financial troubles and the Ottawa Rough 
Riders collapsed and folded, “all in the span of a decade” (Seskus, 2007, ¶17-19). In Calgary, 
sale to a private owner suddenly meant that losing the team was a possibility, as outlined in a 
1992 Calgary Herald piece: 
Before, they could stumble and bumble around under community ownership, then hold a 
lottery to help pay the bills. If all else failed, Calgary Stampeders and their volunteer 
board of directors could go begging to different levels of government for a bailout. They 




but they could never move. The Stampeders belonged to Calgary. But the Stampeders 
always belonged to Calgary. … The club now belongs to Larry Ryckman, who isn't 
eligible for a government handout. But he has an ace of his own to play. … He can take 
his players, his equipment and his franchise and play in the city offering the best deal. 
(Rauw, 1992, ¶1-5) 
The Stampeders remain in Calgary to this day, but the kind of security that Packers fans enjoy is 
no more. Meanwhile, Saskatchewan, Edmonton and Winnipeg have remained community-
owned, reaping the benefits that such a model provides. “[I]f you look back,” the president of the 
Winnipeg Blue Bombers said in a 2007 article, “you’ll see there are three teams that have been 
there through thick and thin, through every franchise that has changed hands … three groups of 
ownership that have been consistent … That’s Winnipeg, Saskatchewan and Edmonton” 
(Seskus, 2007, ¶22-24) 
European soccer. Outside of North America, soccer clubs around the globe are publicly 
owned, including two of the world’s most prominent teams—Real Madrid and F.C. Barcelona—
and the entire German Bundesliga.  
Real Madrid and Barcelona are two of four teams in Spain’s La Liga that are owned and 
operated by socios, or “members of the supporters’ club who pay about $240 a year to own a 
share of the team” (deMause, 2014a, ¶2). Fans under the socio structure “control all aspects of 
the club,” with the 100,000 members41 voting for the president and board of directors 
(Srivastava, 2015, ¶12). Any question regarding the effectiveness of the socio format can be 
answered with the following: per Forbes’ 2018 estimates, Real Madrid was the third-most 
valuable sports team in the world and Barcelona fourth, each worth in excess of $4 billion 
(Badenhausen, 2018b).  
The Bundesliga, meanwhile, utilizes a league-wide “50+1” rule ensuring public 
ownership. As explained on the league’s official website: 
In short, it means that clubs—and, by extension, the fans—hold a majority of their own 
voting rights. Under German Football League [DFL] rules, football clubs will not be 
                                                           




allowed to play in the Bundesliga if commercial investors have more than a 49 percent 
stake. In essence, this means that private investors cannot take over clubs and potentially 
push through measures that [prioritize] profit over the wishes of supporters. The ruling 
simultaneously protects against reckless owners and safeguards the democratic customs of 
German clubs. (“German soccer,” n.d., ¶2-3). 
The 50+1 rule actually represents a less stringent policy for the Bundesliga, which until 1998 
banned all private ownership. It faces opposition from some club executives, who have argued 
that a shift to private ownership could help Bundesliga compete with the bigger leagues. Some 
teams have found loopholes, with RB Leipzig “bypassing the rule despite effectively being 
owned by Austrian energy drink manufacturer Red Bull” (Uersfeld, 2017, ¶6). 
 Despite concerns about competing with bigger leagues, Bundesliga generated the sixth-
highest revenue of any league in 2016, behind the five mentioned previously, the NFL, MLB, 
EPL, NBA and NHL. Its $2.8 billion in revenue was barely more than half of the $5.3 billion 
made by the EPL that same year, and perhaps a more traditional private model could help close 
that gap. Yet one wonders the significance. In a league generating billions in revenue, with 34 of 
36 clubs profitable and teams like Dortmund selling out 80,000 seat stadiums (“Bundesliga’s 
economic,” 2017), one imagines the fans have few complaints. The current system appears to be 
serving their interests quite well, which is more than can be said for the private ownership model. 
As Zirin (2013) noted, there are “more than a few fans in more than a few cities who would pony 
up for some shares if it meant that they wouldn’t be held up for a publicly funded stadium, 
wouldn’t have to worry about the team leaving town, or were assured that their team owner 
would be sent packing” (p. 13). If the price to pay is a league with merely massive, rather than 
astronomical, revenue, so be it. 
 Neither the socio nor 50+1 formats are perfect. Socio ownership is effectively outlawed 
in Spain, the result of a 1990 law intended to regulate the “transparently unsustainable” financial 
losses and debts suffered by some clubs (Hamil, Walters & Watson, 2013, p. 137). In a step that 
would be considered too far even in the capitalist-friendly United States, the law required that 




other clubs grandfathered-in exceptions (Srivastava, 2015).42 As for the 50+1 format, teams with 
greater fan support than their rivals have a distinct advantage, resulting in “the cannibalization of 
what used to be the most competitive major league in Europe, with Bayern Munich seemingly on 
a procession to the title every year” (¶23). 
 Whatever imperfections may exist, the socio and 50+1 formats demonstrate the viability 
of the community-owned structure at the highest levels of organized sport. Real Madrid, F.C. 
Barcelona and the Bundesliga are prominent, lucrative entities with worldwide fanbases—and 
virtually no billionaires in control.  
The Packers, Roughriders, Barcelona, and Real Madrid have shown that the publicly 
owned model can work on a franchise level, and the Bundesliga is evidence that it can work on a 
league-wide level. So why are there so few other examples of public ownership in professional 
sport? Why would the Packers, a storied NFL franchise, not be emulated in this most basic of 
ways? “The nonprofit team is financially solvent, competitive, and deeply connected to the 
community,” Zirin (2010) noted. In the next sentence, he outlined the key conflict. “So, of 
course, the NFL has it written into the rulebook that no way, nohow, can any community 
replicate the Green Bay model” (p. 183). 
The NFL Ban on Public Ownership 
In 1960, just ten years after the Packers fended off the last real challenge to their public 
ownership model, the NFL moved to ban charitable and non-profit organizations from holding 
membership (Zirin, 2010). The ban excluded teams who were current members of the league, 
meaning the Packers were grandfathered in. 
The NFL ban did not prohibit all forms of public ownership, with public corporations 
allowed to own a franchise so long as they were for-profit (Hartel, 1998). Even so, the provisions 
of membership had the effect “of being so burdensome that it is a practical impossibility for a 
public corporation to own a franchise” (p. 604). Several provisions require that each individual 
stockholder provide information to and receive approval from the league. Considering that the 
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Packers have over 300,000 stockholders, such requirements would be onerous for a franchise 
seeking public ownership. 
Though many accounts have noted the league’s ban on public ownership, few have 
examined why it was put into place. Morris (2012) placed the ban in the context of the league’s 
desire to institute revenue sharing. The league’s revenue sharing plan gave the Packers stability 
and “the financial resources to compete effectively” (Mitten, 2011, p. 65). As a result, it 
eliminated one of the biggest problems associated with the public ownership model, how to keep 
the team financially solvent. Together, the revenue sharing system and the occasional stock sale 
allowed the Packers to remain competitive both on and off the field, raising funds only for 
projects such as stadium renovations. Revenue sharing would cement the Packers’ public 
ownership model as a success. It should be no surprise, then, that NFL owners feared that 
revenue sharing would lead to “other communities opting for the Green Bay model” (Morris, 
2012, ¶8). The ban on public ownership thus served to erect an official barrier in front of a public 
ownership model that looked increasingly attractive. Of course, this still does not explain why 
the league feared public ownership in the first place. 
An explanation might be found in the general antipathy toward public spending on the 
part of corporate capitalist interests. Around the same time the NFL instituted its ban on public 
ownership, Baran and Sweezy (1966) wrote in Monopoly Capital of an “oligarchy of wealth 
which fights tooth and nail against every extension of those public services which would benefit 
the great body of their fellow citizens” (p. 175). Writing in 1958, Galbraith (1998) similarly 
noted the “atmosphere of private opulence and public squalor” in which “the private goods have 
full sway” (p. 191). Capitalist interests loathed the prospect of public spending on ideological 
grounds, but also for more practical reasons. Under monopoly capitalism, any form of public 
spending was considered competition with private industry. “Real competition with private 
enterprise cannot be tolerated,” Baran and Sweezy (1966) noted. Public spending was only 
acceptable when it could benefit private enterprise, for example through additional highways for 
the automobile industry, increased military spending for manufacturers, or increased funding of 




In the above context, it is plausible to imagine that the NFL banned public ownership 
because it did not want competition from the public sector. Though stated in different terms, 
league owners have said as much in justifying the rule over the succeeding decades. Concerns 
about competition have been couched in ‘competitive imbalance.’ As will be noted in greater 
detail in the following section, one of the league’s concerns43 in banning public ownership was 
that the public sector would serve as a potential threat to the privately-owned teams. The ability 
for a publicly owned team to raise funds via selling stock would put privately owned teams at an 
economic advantage (Birren, 2011). If the league were to allow public ownership, the economic 
benefits of such a system would be too tantalizing for privately owned teams to resist. Further, 
for the teams that remained privately owned, public ownership would weaken their bargaining 
position with cities. According to Bennett (2012), the league did not want to lose its ability to 
threaten host cities with relocation: “If a significant number of franchises are tied to their host 
cities because the shareholders are local fans, the assumed stability of those franchises bodes ill 
for the other subsidy-seeking owners” (p. 205). None of those supposed drawbacks to the public 
model are negative for anyone but the owners. 
Sullivan v. NFL. Though the Packers have been the only publicly-owned franchise in the 
major North American pro sports, several other teams have had minority public ownership. The 
most notable was the New England Patriots of the American Football League and later the NFL. 
Founded in 1959 by William Sullivan, the Patriots began selling non-voting shares to the public 
just one year into their existence (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994). Though the AFL did not have a ban on 
public ownership, the 1970 AFL-NFL merger made AFL teams subject to NFL rules prohibiting 
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only power was in electing members of the board, who then elected the executive committee and 
president. Moreover, the prospect of exponential growth in the number of stockholders was mitigated by 





the public model.44 The Patriots, like the Packers before them, were ‘grandfathered in’ and 
retained minority public ownership after the merger. When Sullivan bought the public shares of 
the Patriots in 1976, making the team a “fully privately owned club” (p. 1095), the grandfather 
clause no longer applied.  
That became problematic after Sullivan, in an effort to raise funds, sought to sell back 
49% of the team to the public in 1987. Had the grandfather clause still applied, he could have 
authorized a stock sale without NFL permission, as the Packers had done to raise funds for years. 
Instead, Sullivan took his case to his fellow owners, seeking either a waiver from the league’s 
public ownership policy or to amend the rule that would “allow for certain controlled sales of 
minority interests in NFL clubs” (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994, p. 1096). He found insufficient support 
from the owners and eventually had to sell the team “to a private buyer at a fire sale price” (p. 
1096). Sullivan would file a lawsuit against the NFL alleging that the policy violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act as an illegal restraint of trade (p. 1096). 
In a 1993 civil trial, a jury ruled in favor of Sullivan that the public ownership policy 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and he was awarded $114 million in treble damages (later 
reduced to $51 million). The NFL appealed, and the appellate court opinion offered a crucial 
insight into the weaknesses of the league’s public ownership ban.  
NFL owners argued that publicly owned teams “would have access to more money than 
privately owned teams,” presumably affecting competitive balance (Birren, 2011, p. 27). Steelers 
owner Art Rooney said outright that he did not believe “individually or family owned teams will 
be able to compete with the consolidated groups” (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994, p. 1100). 
“Theoretically,” Birren (2011) summarized, “the publicly owned teams would gain such an 
economic advantage from their stock sales that private owners would have to sell their ownership 
interests to the public in order to compete” (p. 27). The argument from the NFL ownership, then, 
was that the public model would generate more money and thus be more conducive to putting a 
competitive team on the field, which would seem to be the best of both worlds for the league and 
                                                           
44 Sullivan, it should be noted, was part of the committee that “established the policies, including the 
ownership policies, that were to govern the new expanded NFL,” though he denied that he had any part to 




its fans. From that perspective, the ban on public ownership allowed the NFL to avoid putting 
forth its best possible product, an issue the appellate court picked up on. The record, the court 
noted, “contains sufficient evidence of the normal incidents of injury to competition from the 
NFL's policy—reduced output, increased prices, and reduced efficiency—to support the jury's 
verdict” (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994, p. 1100, emphasis added). Further, the court argued, the ban on 
public ownership 
completely wipes out a certain type of ownership interest—public ownership of stock. By 
restricting output in one form of ownership, the NFL is thereby reducing the output of 
ownership interests overall. In other words, the NFL is literally restricting the output of a 
product – a share in an NFL team. (p. 1101) 
In previous instances when fans had been given the opportunity to purchase shares of their local 
team, they showed interest doing so. Sullivan’s side used as an example the Celtics’ successful 
1986 sale of a 40 percent stake in the team. With that in mind, the court argued that the NFL’s 
policy could be interpreted as injuring competition by being “unresponsive to consumer 
preference” (p. 1101). 
The court also found that the public ownership ban could not be justified under the rule of 
reason,45 as there was evidence of a “less restrictive alternative” to the ownership ban that “may 
yield the same benefits as the current policy” (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994, p. 1103). Sullivan’s 
suggestion that the league amend the policy to allow for minority public ownership was cited as 
one potential alternative. 
Though the appellate court poked numerous holes in the NFL’s argument, “several 
prejudicial errors” in the initial case caused them to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and 
send the case back to the lower court. “The retrial,” Mitten (2011) noted, “resulted in a hung 
jury, and the parties settled before it was tried for the third time” (p. 59). What is most notable 
about the Sullivan v. NFL case is that even though Sullivan’s initial victory was invalidated, the 
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NFL’s counterclaims never held water with the courts. It was only through a technicality that the 
league was not found guilty of violating the Sherman Act and made subject to treble damages.  
The Sullivan case demonstrated that the NFL had little legal justification for its ban on 
public ownership. The league could have loosened the ban without affecting the way it did 
business. Furthermore, testimony from NFL owners and from Sullivan’s witnesses—to say 
nothing of the court’s own conclusions—indicated that public ownership was superior to the 
existing private ownership model. League Commissioner Pete Rozelle conceded that the ban on 
public ownership made franchises less valuable because it was “eliminating a very broad 
market” (Sullivan v. NFL, 1994, p. 1101). The largest point in favor of the public model was the 
elephant in the room—the previously mentioned success of the Packers. That the NFL would go 
against what some would argue were its own interests in banning public ownership, especially 
given the example of the Packers, indicates just how important it is to the league to maintain 
private control, a motivation that has guided how professional sport has been run since pro sport 
was in its infancy. 
Of course, Sullivan v. NFL was not about establishing another public oasis in the private 
desert. It was about an NFL owner seeking to boost the value of his team through an infusion of 
public funds.46 The Patriots and other teams with minority public ownership were not offering 
the public control or even much of a say in how the team was run. The teams were still owned by 
businessmen more interested in profit than anything else. Minority public ownership, therefore, 
is not a fair compromise or sufficient solution for the problems of private ownership. By 
comparison, even though individual Packers shareholders also had little influence in the team’s 
operations, community control of the franchise eliminated the profit-motive associated with 
private ownership. The stockholders were not investing to help increase the value of a 
businessman’s property, but for the benefit of a community institution. The private-public hybrid 
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Sullivan fought for would have been a step in the right direction, but barely. That the NFL would 
be so unwilling to take even that step indicates the barriers in the way of an alternative model. 
Though the other leagues were more open than the NFL to limited public ownership, 
majority public ownership remained a definitive red line. After MLB San Diego Padres owner 
Ray Kroc died in 1984, his wife Joan “offered to donate the Padres to San Diego along with 
$100 million to cover operating expenses,” according to Morris (1998). Despite MLB having no 
specific prohibition on public ownership in its bylaws, “the owners nixed the idea.” By the 
1990s, then-commissioner Bud Selig had “vowed to kill any community ownership proposal 
because it would be an ‘awkward’ arrangement for the league” (¶24).  
Despite numerous indications that the public ownership model would be superior to the 
dominant private ownership structure, the public option remains very much on the margins for 
the major pro sports leagues. “Though clearly successful where implemented,” Morris (1998) 
wrote, “community ownership remains illegal in most professional leagues” (¶24).  
The preceding chapter examined two alternative models of professional team ownership 
with varying results. The Players League of 1890 fell by the wayside after one season because it 
could not fully divorce itself from the influence of private enterprise. Yet even in its sole season 
of existence, it did serious damage to the National League and, with better management, could 
have come out ahead of its rival. The community-owned model of the Packers, and the 
Bundesliga, have shown that private ownership is not necessary to maintain a successful and 
long-running franchise. Yet the private ownership model persists. It is a model that does not 
serve fans or players nearly as well as the alternatives. To understand why it continues to exist, 





CHAPTER FOUR: WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES 
 
  Having examined the causes that led to the private ownership structure in the professional 
sports industry, the next step in this dissertation’s political economic framework is to examine 
how that structure operates in practice. The previous chapter provides some indication, with the 
National League’s severe limitations on player salary and behavior an example of how badly 
circumscribed lower-class sporting participation has often been. This chapter examines the 
manifestations and consequences of the private ownership structure, focusing on the 
relationships between team owners and the many stakeholders in their orbit—corporations, 
politicians, the player-employees, and the public.  
The preceding chapters have argued that the current state of sports team ownership was 
neither inevitable nor naturally occurring. Any number of other outcomes were possible and only 
prevented from taking place through specific actions taken by profit-minded capitalists. There is 
nothing necessarily wrong with acting in one’s self-interest, and one should not be surprised that 
capitalists have fought to maintain a structure that benefits them handsomely. On the other hand, 
one should take issue with the revisionist history that the way things are today is the way they 
have always been and the only way they could possibly be.  
In a short amount of time, sport transformed from a traditional, rural activity into a means 
by which to maintain and perform class differences, into a profitable business that replicated the 
labor-management dynamics seen in other industries. The defining thread over the 200-odd year 
timeline was a steady wresting of control by upper class entrepreneurs. Whether their interest 
was in preventing the lower classes from participating, closely governing the way in which said 
classes could participate, or determining how much said classes could earn through their 
participation, the goal—if not stated outright—was to stake a claim over organized sport. As 
outlined in the prior analysis, that meant establishing a class hierarchy ensuring that no matter 
the result on the field, the elite would remain the gatekeepers, running amateur sport at the 
university and organizational levels, owning nearly all of the professional teams, and in either 




 There has been much economic value to absorb. In North America alone, the size of the 
sports industry—pro sports and its ‘amateur’ counterpart—is expected to exceed $70 billion by 
2019 (Heitner, 2015). That may pale in comparison to the broader entertainment industry, which 
is valued in the hundreds of billions (Spangler, 2017), but it is enough to ensure that any 
businessman who enters the industry will exit richer, even in the case of extreme 
mismanagement. Increasingly restrictive collective bargaining agreements have artificially 
lowered player salaries and made owning a team all-but-foolproof. Even Donald Sterling, the 
longtime owner of the NBA’s Los Angeles Clippers who was ousted after making racist remarks 
in 2014, was able to profit off of a perennially losing franchise. These owners, who in most cases 
enter the sporting arena already in the most privileged class of a new Gilded Age, are able to use 
the playing field as a tool by which to achieve celebrity, political status, or simply greater and 
greater profits. 
The Rich Get Richer 
Sports owners represent a fraternity of the so-called ‘one percent.’ As of 2018, 43 of the 
400 richest people in the world, as determined by Forbes, owned a majority stake in a North 
American professional sports team. Those 43 men had a combined net worth of $251 billion and 
control of 57 teams. Each was a billionaire, ranging from NBA Clippers owner Steve Ballmer at 
a net worth of $42.3 billion to NFL Philadelphia Eagles owner Jeffrey Lurie and NBA Atlanta 
Hawks owner Anthony Ressler at a comparably modest $2.1 billion. Forbes list did not include 
family-owned teams such as baseball’s New York Yankees or the NFL’s Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers, nor did it include the dozen or so billionaires who owned minority stakes in teams, 
making that $251 billion just the tip of the iceberg (Badenhausen, 2018c). Nor did it include the 
dozens of other owners who were mere millionaires. Purchasing a franchise means “joining the 
most exclusive of rich guy clubs,” sportswriter Bill Simmons once wrote, “you can sit courtside, 
puff out your chest and feel super, duper, duper, duper rich” (Simmons 2014, ¶8-9). 
 For fun and profit. Beyond such glamorous perks, sports ownership has an even simpler 
appeal. As Brower (1977) noted, the “men who own professional athletic teams originally go 




superfans rather than merely prudent financial investors” (p. 80). For multi-millionaires and 
billionaires who have accomplished all they have wanted to in other aspects of life, pro team 
ownership provides a new challenge with little risk. “Owners don’t go into the business for the 
money,” an unnamed NBA owner told Brower. “Sure,” he conceded, “once they get into it they 
want to make profits. But the original impetus is just a sports buff’s desire to be in on the 
workings of a pro team. Wouldn’t you like to own a team if you could?” (p. 81). In most cases, 
Schiavone (2015) noted, pro sports teams are not the owner’s primary source of income. 
Prospective owners purchase teams “more for prestige than as a money-making operation” (p. 5). 
Over time, the luxury of owning a pro team primarily for fun has accrued to an ever-richer strata 
of the rich. “Hobby franchises used to be within the compass of every self-respecting millionaire; 
these days one would need to be closer to being a billionaire” (Szymanski & Ross, 2008, p. 135).  
 Sports ownership as its own form of recreation—or to stretch Guttmann’s definition, of 
play—may seem an odd concept given all that is on the line in the sports industry. The fates of 
television networks, whole industries, even entire cities, can be determined by the ups and downs 
of professional sports. NFL ratings drop? Good luck running a pizza chain or selling hot wings.  
For the owners, however, comparably little is on the line. They enter the leagues rich and know 
they will exit with everything they had, and more. 
Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer retired in 2014 and promptly spent $2 billion to purchase the 
NBA’s Los Angeles Clippers, a then-record price-tag (since surpassed by Tilman Fertitta’s $2.2 
billion purchase of the Houston Rockets in 2016). Explaining his decision on CBS News later 
that year, he cited his love of basketball: “There’s just no sport as great as basketball. There’s 
poetry, the speed, the decision-making. I just love it. I love it. And for me to be involved is a 
heck of a lot of fun” (“Former Microsoft,” 2014, ¶4). That is not to discount financial 
considerations, which make owning a team for fun and leisure a bit more palatable. Ballmer 
himself noted that the nature of owning a pro team was advantageous compared to some of the 
tech firms he had been interested in: “when you're used to looking at tech companies with huge 
risk, no earnings and huge multiples, this doesn't look like the craziest thing I've ever acquired. 




So compared to the things I looked at in tech, this was a reasonable purchase” (Shelburne, 2014, 
¶1). Ballmer, with a net worth of $39.2 billion, is worth 20 times more than the Clippers ($2.0B). 
Even if his ownership tenure turned cataclysmic, it would have very little impact on his massive 
wealth—and it is likely that, given the nearly exponential rise in NBA franchise values that has 
accompanied the league’s increasingly owner-friendly collective bargaining agreements, that he 
would be able to sell for a profit no matter what. Indeed, as Badenhausen (2018c) noted, it did 
not take long for Ballmer’s investment to seem like a bargain. “The $2 billion price tag for the 
Clippers was deemed a significant overpay by many at the time, when the average NBA 
franchise, according to Forbes, was worth $634 million. … Ballmer’s Clippers purchase doesn’t 
look so crazy now that NBA franchise values have tripled since 2014 due to a new $24 billion 
TV contract with ESPN and TNT, along with the best international prospects of any U.S. sports 
league” (¶1-2). 
None of the above is to suggest all owners have adopted such a carefree approach to 
spending. For one, Ballmer is uniquely rich among pro sports owners. Other owners, either by 
necessity or simply personal preference, have embraced the joys of penny-pinching. Ballmer’s 
predecessor Donald Sterling ran the Clippers with little concern for fielding a competitive team. 
Former NHL Chicago Blackhawks owner “Dollar” Bill Wirtz was loathed for stinginess that 
ranged from letting star players walk for nothing to failing to televise home games on local 
television. Some fans openly celebrated Wirtz’ 2007 death (“Blog Hound,” 2007). Crass as that 
may have been, it was no coincidence that the Blackhawks reeled off a decade of success with 
three championships in six years afterward. Jeffrey Loria spent so little on payroll as owner of 
the Marlins that the MLB players union was forced to file a grievance (Brown, 2018). 
Whether big spenders or hated misers, all team owners can count on a massive return on 
investment. After the NBA ordered Sterling to relinquish his team after tape leaked of him 
making racist comments, he sold the Clippers to Ballmer for the previously mentioned record 
price of $2 billion. When NFL Carolina Panthers owner Jerry Richardson decided to sell his 




hedge fund manager David Tepper (Maske, 2018). As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Loria was 
able to double his investment when he sold the Marlins despite years of incompetence.  
Owning a pro team has become a markedly foolproof endeavor, thanks to collective 
bargaining routs, stadium subsidies, and enormous media rights deals that have sent franchise 
values skyward. Writing of Loria, Miller (2017) noted: 
Every economic and competitive force in the game exists to keep teams like Loria's from 
ruin. By buying into Major League Baseball, an owner joins one of the country's last legal 
monopolies. He owns a 1/30th share in a resource that never loses its scarcity. His territory 
is protected from competition within the industry. It's protected from outside competition 
by the impossible infrastructural disadvantage any upstart competing league would face. 
The average major league team, according to Forbes, is worth 59 percent more than it was 
two years ago. In the 15 years since Loria bought the Marlins, the average team's value 
has increased 500 percent. (¶8) 
Owning a team, Schiavone (2015) noted, “is quite often the same as owning a proverbial gold 
mine” (p. 6). 
Ego trips. Other owners are consumed with another impulse. “I’m in it mainly for my 
ego,” another NBA owner told Brower (1977), “[i]t’s nice to get recognition and notoriety” (p. 
81). Owning a team offers the otherwise aloof class of the super-rich opportunities for fame that 
are virtually unmatched. Since purchasing the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks in 2000, Mark Cuban 
has become a reality show host and pontificator on the issues of the day, which in the late 2010s 
qualified him as a legitimate presidential aspirant. If it was not clear after 1980 that one could 
ride celebrity to the White House, it became indisputable after 2016. Perhaps Cuban would have 
reached such cultural heights on his own, but owning the Mavericks turned a little-known 
internet billionaire into a weekly presence on national television, heckling referees from the 
sidelines, holding impromptu press conferences from his treadmill, and earning the ire of the 
NBA’s commissioner.  
Beyond personal fame, sports ownership can serve the ego in other ways. Some owners 




and coaches (Brower, 1977). The most extreme example, albeit from outside of professional 
team sports, would be the heir John du Pont not only funding U.S. wrestlers in the 1980s and 
1990s, but suiting up to compete in wrestling meets (“The Prince,” 2015). For others, the 
motivation is personal well-being. Patriots owner Robert Kraft told Leibovich (2018) that one of 
the primary reasons he purchased the team was because he had attention deficit disorder and 
needed something challenging to do later in life. As the author noted, “[b]uying an NFL team 
would be one of those attention-deficit remedies only the superrich can consider” (Leibovich 
2018, p. 77). Then there are the more conventional tributes to the self. When he purchased the 
NBA’s expansion Charlotte franchise in 2004, owner Robert Johnson not-too-subtly named the 
team the Bobcats. In 2016, then-Panthers owner Richardson commissioned a 13-foot statue of 
himself—standing commandingly amongst prowling panthers—to stand outside of the team’s 
stadium (Leibovich, 2018). 
The performance of ownership is its own ego boost. Merely sitting in the luxury boxes 
high above the action conveys the image of a master overlooking all he surveys, or “a king on a 
highchair” (Leibovich 2018, p. 76). “Network cameras focus on the bespoke Caligulas in their 
owner’s boxes at least once a game,” Leibovich noted. “We as viewers must always be favored 
with reaction shots from the owner’s box—their awkward high fives and crestfallen stares” (p. 
17). Being addressed as “Mister” by players, and by broadcasters, also conveys the sense of 
importance. Calling it a “comical, time-honored TV ritual,” a Wall Street Journal writer 
observed in 2019 that whenever a game broadcast cuts away to the owners, 
you’ll be able to detect the slightest lift in the announcer’s voice, as if in the presence of a 
god, or royalty. … Suddenly the announcer—who spends the rest of the game talking 
rather nonchalantly about exceptional physical feats performed by exceptional human 
beings—sounds a little deferential, referring to this person in the suite with a universal 
title of respect: ‘Mr.’ (Gay, 2019, ¶7) 
The players receive no such designation. “For as long as we have been alive,” another writer 
observed in 2017, “NFL broadcasters refer to most (not all but many) of the owners as ‘Mister.’ 




The Panthers’ Richardson was “referred to by all [within the organization] simply as 
Mister, no surname required,” Sports Illustrated noted in a 2017 report about sexual harassment 
allegations against him (Wertheim & Bernstein, 2017, ¶10, emphasis in original). “Though the 
antebellum echoes [troubled] some African American employees,” nearly all of Richardson’s 
behavior went unchallenged within the organization: 
When Mister swings by and asks you to lunch, you accept the invitation even if you’ve 
already eaten. When he confuses your name, you don’t correct him. When the Panthers 
hold staff meetings, you know to arrive early—punctuality is a core Richardson virtue—
and sit as close as possible to Mister’s position, a bar stool and high-top in the middle of 
the room. (¶10) 
Such casual expressions of dominance are not unique in sports ownership. The former Clippers 
owner Donald Sterling would routinely subject players to dehumanizing treatment for his own 
amusement and that of his companions. In a lawsuit filed against Sterling in 2011, former team 
executive Elgin Baylor alleged that three players told him that Sterling “would bring women into 
the locker room after games, while the players were showering, and make comments such as, 
‘Look at those beautiful black bodies’” (Adande, 2011, ¶18). Sterling allegedly continued the 
behavior even after Baylor brought the claims to his attention. Baylor, it should be noted, was 
one of the NBA’s greatest players during his career with the Lakers—and yet the league took no 
action addressing his claims, failing to oust Sterling until tape leaked of him making racist 
comments three years later. 
 Political footballs. Fun, profit and ego are certainly motivators, but one would be remiss 
in neglecting the political power sports ownership confers. As mentioned previously, team 
ownership can help build a national profile. One pro sports owner has already been president, 
George W. Bush. Mavericks owner Mark Cuban has flirted with a possible run. For spotlight-
averse billionaires, team ownership can help fund political priorities. Writing about the NBA 
owners’ haul in 2011 collective bargaining negotiations—a wealth transfer of $3 billion from 




additional money was more likely to go to owners’ pet causes than to improving rosters or 
lowering ticket prices: 
Now Donald Sterling, proud owner of the L.A. Clippers47 as well as an archipelago of 
low-income housing, can buy some more slums. Now Phil Anschutz, minority boss of the 
Lakers, can keep funding conservative boutique magazines and underwrite the fight 
against the teaching of evolution in schools. Now Clay Bennett and Aubrey McClendon of 
the Oklahoma City Thunder can propel more anti-gay legislation onto election-year 
ballots. Now Dick DeVos of the Orlando Magic can give even more generously to Focus 
on the Family. (Zirin 2013, p. 28) 
It is probable that pro sports owners would spend money on politics regardless of whether they 
owned teams. Most owners enter the sporting arena already ensconced in the proverbial “one 
percent” and, as mentioned earlier, use their teams as hobbies that make a little extra here and 
there. With that said, even if pro team ownership is a mere drop in the bucket, that extra money 
can still have a significant impact on policy, and on elections.  
“Nearly all” of the owners in the NFL, NBA, NHL and Major League Baseball “were 
active political donors” during the 2016 election cycle, contributing a combined $26.6 million 
according to The Guardian. Nearly all of those funds—$23.4 million—went to Republican 
candidates and causes, though Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump received fewer 
direct donations than his Democratic rival. NFL Houston Texans owner Bob McNair was the 
most generous, donating $7 million alone, including $1.1 million to the Congressional 
Leadership Fund that works to elect Republicans to the House of Representatives (Graham 
2017). McNair, a billionaire who “cashed in [his] Enron stock at exactly the right time,” 
previously donated $10,000 to an organization opposing a Houston equal rights initiative 
(McMurray, 2015). 
 NFL New York Jets owner Woody Johnson is a quintessential example of sports 
ownership translating into political influence. Johnson, heir to the Johnson & Johnson fortune, 
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purchased the Jets in 2000 for $635 million. Most of his $4.2 billion net worth is tied to the 
franchise, which is “conservatively valued” at $2.7 billion (Coffey, 2017, ¶5). Outside of the Jets 
he “probably has more than $1.7 billion in assets … and about $233 million in liabilities” (¶4). In 
2016, Johnson “earned more than $81 million in income … from the team and its ownership 
stake in MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey, which it shares with the NFL’s New 
York Giants” (¶6). All of which is to say that the Jets did not make Johnson rich, but the team 
has played a significant role in the maintenance and expansion of his wealth. 
 Johnson lacked Cuban’s eye for the spotlight. Upon purchasing the Jets in 2000, he was 
“so press-averse that his name was habitually preceded by the adjective ‘reclusive” (Sternberg, 
2010, p. 2). Instead, he has used his wealth and status to become a major Republican donor, 
serving as a “critical fundraiser for virtually every Republican candidate in recent memory, first 
John McCain, then Mitt Romney, then Jeb Bush” (Sherman, 2017, ¶2). Republicans have come 
to covet his largesse, which extends beyond mere donations. He “also urges his network of 
wealthy friends and associates to get behind his favored candidate” (Haberman, 2015, ¶4). His 
favored candidate in 2016, at least at the beginning, was Bush, the former Florida governor. 
Johnson served as Bush’s national finance chairman in the 2016 primaries, donating half a 
million to Bush’s Right to Rise super PAC and the maximum allowable to the Bush campaign. 
After the Bush campaign cratered, Johnson switched his support to the former reality show host 
Donald Trump, donating $100,000 to the nominee’s fundraising committee and serving as an 
adviser to his campaign (Gearan, 2017). Trump’s electoral college victory paid dividends for 
Johnson, who was nominated by the president-elect to serve as the U.S. ambassador to the 
United Kingdom. 
 Perhaps Johnson would have had the same political influence had he purchased 
something else with that $635 million in 2000, perhaps not. Either way, it can hardly be denied 
that Johnson’s wealth, which has been fueled by his ownership of the Jets, has been a bonanza 
for Republican politicians.  
 Johnson is not alone. Former Steelers owner Dan Rooney, who inherited the team from 




the 44th president’s campaign (Sherman, 2017). Rooney, and his extended family, have long 
been donors to mostly Democratic causes (Levinthal, 2009).48 There is the risk of false 
equivalence, so it is worth restating that the overwhelming majority of donations go to 
Republican politicians.  
It is simply the case that owning a sports team can facilitate one’s political goals. As Flint 
and Eitzen (1987) noted, team owners “benefit from sports by having their ideological view of 
the world supported through television, government subsidy, and mass consumption” (p. 24). 
Those media rights, stadium subsidies, and ticket sales have to go somewhere, and typically, that 
is to right wing causes. 
Social and political clout, the thrill of competition, and ostentatious celebrations of the 
self can clearly motivate pro team ownership. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that owners 
are not motivated by profit. According to Szymanski and Ross (2008), most economic studies of 
owner behavior indicate that their actions correspond more with profit-maximization than with 
ego or recreation. Indeed, even as Brower (1977) wrote of other motivations, he acknowledged 
that team owners, “successful businessmen neither accustomed to, nor comfortable with, losing 
money in business ventures, want to succeed financially with their investment even when the 
impetus for entrance is primarily non-pecuniary” (p. 85).  
Given the run of ownership victories over the past forty years, it may be the case that 
profits have become so foolproof as to be taken for granted. One enters into team ownership 
expecting profits, rising franchise values, collective bargaining victories, and an eventual sale 
that dwarfs the purchase price. In a game that easy, the other factors keep things interesting. Or 
to the contrary, it may be the case that as Szymanski and Ross (2008) argued, “these businesses 
are now too big to be treated simply as playthings” (p. 135). Even the richest of the one percent 
would hesitate to treat a billion-dollar enterprise solely as a source of light recreation. Either 
way, owning a team for one’s ego and for one’s bottom line are not mutually-exclusive 
motivations. As Hruby (2011) put it, owners 
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didn’t invest sizable chunks of their personal fortunes in order to create public athletic 
charities, let alone act as selfless custodians of treasured civic institutions. Nope, they 
bought in to get paid. To amp up their investment portfolios and stroke their egos, not 
necessarily in that order. They’re motivated first, foremost and always by personal gain. 
(¶12-13) 
It is apparent what the owners get out of owning teams. The next question becomes, what does 
everyone else get out of the arrangement? 
Filling the Media Trough 
The owners are not the only billionaires benefitting from the current model. In North 
America, the major professional sports leagues are the source of large television audiences and 
even larger advertising revenue. Sporting events have been consistently the most-watched 
programs on television, particularly in hard-to-reach younger demographics such as men 18-34, 
and represent the medium’s most lucrative programming. Even when NFL Nielsen ratings 
experienced a much-publicized and politicized decline in 2016 and 2017, football still 
commanded TV’s most expensive 30-second ad rates (Poggi, 2017). 
One could argue that ratings only matter to advertisers and have no broader significance 
to the public. A counter argument would be that what is good for advertisers is good for the 
networks, and what is good for the networks is not always good for the public. Sports’ popularity 
sustains the current media system, a cartel of ever-merging giants that controls most of the 
television, film, and print content consumed by the public. 
Bagdikian (2004) noted the existence of five massive conglomerates that owned most of 
the media consumed in the United States—Time Warner, The Walt Disney Company, News 
Corporation, Viacom, and the German firm Bertelsmann. The media industry has undergone 
significant changes since. There are technically more competitors today, with 21st Century Fox 
having spun off from News Corporation and CBS splitting from Viacom, but the situation has 
become exponentially direr.  
In late 2017, Disney reached a $52.4 billion deal to acquire most of 21st Century Fox, 




networks FX and FXX (“The Walt,” 2017). After a brief bidding war sparked by rival Comcast, 
which offered a spoiler bid of $65 billion, Disney ended up paying $71.4 billion for the assets 
(Hagey & Schwartzel, 2018). The Disney-Fox deal came just over a year after communications 
giant AT&T reached an agreement to acquire Time Warner for $85 billion, a deal that was later 
approved over Justice Department objections.49 AT&T followed in the footsteps of fellow 
communications giant Comcast, which in 2009 purchased NBC Universal (Arango, 2009). The 
massive mergers involving Disney, AT&T, and Comcast have caused Viacom and CBS to begin 
rethinking their split. Meanwhile, even though Rupert Murdoch’s Fox enterprise appeared 
weakened, the Disney-Fox deal left the Murdoch family as Disney’s largest stakeholder.  
There are threats to the traditional media order, but they are not much better. Facebook, 
Amazon, Netflix, and Google—nicknamed ‘FANG’ in the media parlance—have steadily 
become serious competitors to traditional television. With the exception of Netflix, these 
companies are monopolistic giants in their own right. The five conglomerates Bagdikian wrote 
about in 2003 may well expand to seven or eight within the next decade, but the control those 
companies exert over all aspects of culture has expanded from merely “newspapers, magazines, 
book publishers, motion picture studios, and radio and television stations” (p. 3) to include the 
internet, cable subscriptions, mobile phones, even online purchases. Control of the media was the 
issue in 2003; control of all aspects of one’s daily life is the issue fifteen years later. 
Sports’ role in the creation of the current media system cannot be understated. Owning 
media rights to one or more of the four major sports, particularly the NFL, can make or break a 
company. Murdoch’s News Corporation empire did not truly take off in the United States until 
his Fox broadcast network swiped NFL television rights from CBS in 1994. Fox, at the time, was 
limited mostly to “lesser-watched UHF channels” (La Monica, 2009, p. 55) and considered no 
match for the established CBS, NBC and ABC. A rival network executive referred to it as “the 
coat-hanger network,” as one needed “to have an antenna with tinfoil to find Fox” (Curtis, 2018, 
¶25). Purchasing NFL rights, for a then-unheard of $400 million per year, led to a massive 
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affiliate switch as dozens of affiliates left CBS for Fox. As a result, Fox was able to move up the 
dial to “the more desirable VHF range, channels that were between 2 and 13” (La Monica, 2009, 
p. 55). That paved the way for more sports rights and a huge promotional platform for Fox 
programs. The NFL turned Fox into an equal of the major networks and paved the way for 
Murdoch’s later U.S. successes, such as the Fox News Channel. If not for the NFL, one former 
Fox Sports executive said years after the fact, “Fox would have puttered along, like [the defunct] 
WB or UPN” (Curtis, 2018, ¶90). Another former executive was more explicit: 
If [Murdoch] didn’t make that bet on the NFL and change the character of that weblet 
[Fox] to a major, revolutionary network, I’m sure of one thing: Things like Fox News, FX, 
Nat Geo — the cable empire wouldn’t have been there. I’m not sure that this whole empire 
wouldn’t have been there. … All of that is traced back to this bet-the-farm, multibillion-
dollar Hail Mary to get NFL rights. Because NFL rights were the only thing that was 
going to get him new stations. … Look, he just sold [the studio] for $70 billion. I guess it 
was the best $400 million he ever spent. (¶341, emphasis in original) 
Fox was not an isolated case. ESPN’s acquisition of NFL rights in 1987 cemented the network as 
a legitimate power just eight years after its inauspicious 1979 launch.50 ESPN, which not long 
before was best known for Australian Rules football, soon became “the first cable network to 
surpass 50 million subscribers” (Miller & Shales, 2011, p. 178). When Disney acquired ESPN 
and ABC from Capital Cities in 1995, ESPN, not ABC, was the prize. As reported in The New 
York Times, Disney chairman Michael Eisner “expressed boundless enthusiasm for his newest, 
globally popular attraction, an asset that he called ‘a magic name’ comparable as a brand to 
Coca-Cola and Kodak: ESPN” (Carter & Sandomir, 1995, ¶1). ESPN, said Capital Cities 
chairman Thomas Murphy, was the most important asset in the deal (¶3). 
What is it about ESPN that is so valuable? Cable subsists on fees that are charged to 
every subscriber of the network in question. ESPN, because of its unique and exclusive sports 
rights, has been able to charge the highest subscriber fees in all of cable, rising as high as nearly 
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$8.00 per subscriber in 2017 (Eule, 2018). As a result, ESPN is not just the most valuable cable 
network—and by a wide margin—it is a colossus on par with some of the globe’s largest media 
conglomerates. In a 2014 Wunderlich Securities estimate, ESPN by itself was worth a whopping 
$50.8 billion (Badenhausen, 2014), not far behind Time Warner ($65.4B) and 21st Century Fox 
($74.1B). 
As goes sport, so goes the corporate media. According to a rough estimate, ESPN 
contributes nearly $2 billion each quarter to Disney’s revenue, or 13 percent (Vena 2017, ¶14). 
ESPN’s importance to Disney’s bottom-line is such that the network’s years-long decline in 
subscribers, from 100 million in 2011 to fewer than 90 million in 2018, has frequently dragged 
down Disney’s stock (Draper, 2018).  
The power of sport to make or break a media corporation is well recognized. When 
Murdoch sought to acquire Time Warner in 2014, the company’s slew of sports rights—its 
Turner Sports subsidiary owns rights to the NBA as well as the NCAA Tournament and Major 
League Baseball playoffs—was one of the primary considerations (Stelter, 2014). When Disney 
agreed to acquire most of 21st Century Fox in 2017, the most expensive of those assets were the 
Fox Sports regional networks, which were worth nearly half of the initial price tag—$22.4 of the 
$52 billion (James, 2017). 
Given sports’ outsized impact on the media business, it should be no surprise that media 
companies are willing to spend exorbitantly on sports media rights. Disney pays $1.9 billion per 
year for ESPN to air NFL games, $1.4 billion for the NBA, $700 million for Major League 
Baseball, and $608 million for the college football playoffs, not to mention deals for a slew of 
other properties (Ourand, 2017). 21st Century Fox, CBS Corporation and Comcast are also on the 
hook for $1 billion each to the NFL (Badenhausen, 2011), along with other deals that total in the 
hundreds of millions per year. The FANG outlets have also begun to spend on sports, with 
Amazon paying $50 million to simulcast Thursday Night Football games in 2017 (D’Onfro, 
2017) and Verizon paying $21 million for exclusive streaming rights to a single NFL game, a 





The media-sport relationship is symbiotic. Sport fuels the corporate media machine, and 
in return, the media pay the enormous rights fees that keep salaries, and franchise values, rising. 
In its 2014 television deal with Disney (ESPN) and Time Warner (Turner Sports), the NBA saw 
its annual rights fee triple from a combined $930 million to $2.66 billion. The windfall had a 
dramatic impact on league business, raising the salary cap from $70 million in 2015-16 to $94 
million the following year. Even though the players’ share of basketball-related income was 
lowered in the previous collective bargaining agreement—from 57 percent to 49-51 percent—the 
increase in revenue was so substantial that even marginal players began receiving unusually 
expensive contracts (Tracy, 2016). It was an even bigger bonanza for the owners, who saw their 
franchise values more-than-triple from 2014 to 2018 (Badenhausen, 2018a, 2018c). 
The good times have not extended to employees of major media companies. ESPN has 
gone through three rounds of job cuts since 2014, laying off upwards of 550 employees both in 
front of and behind the camera (Bonesteel & Boren, 2017). Turner Broadcasting cut nearly 1,500 
jobs, or approximately 10 percent of its workforce, in 2014—coincidentally the day after its 
NBA deal was announced (Steel, 2014). The media industry will spend almost indiscriminately 
on sports rights, and when it is time to pay the proverbial price, employees will bear the brunt. 
That will surely be the case for the players, too, if and when the media rights bubble pops 
and the leagues begin to take in less revenue. In the media industry, employees get laid off. In 
pro sports, employees get locked out.  
The Players 
 Professional athletes have struggled in the current ownership environment for more than 
a century. Almost since the very moment organized sport become a profitable enterprise, owners 
have sought to reduce athlete salaries in order to maximize profits and to maintain control of the 
games. Why such resistance? The stigma associated with playing for pay had never really gone 
away. Recall that in the infancy of organized sport, playing for pay was indicative of lower-class 
status; the respectable amateur athlete did not need payment. The split between professionals and 




could tolerate paying the players so long as they maintained the lion’s share of profits. The 
amateurs simply could not abide. Either way, neither side was thrilled by the prospect. 
 Organized sport had to a large extent been defined by the battle for control between the 
upper and working classes. Specifically, it was the elite desire to maintain class boundaries that 
resulted in sport being organized in the first place. The class hierarchy was built in. As a result, it 
should be no surprise that within professional sport, there has been a consistent battle over player 
power and salary. As will be discussed, this was the issue that gave rise to the Players’ League in 
1890, to lawsuits by Curt Flood, Oscar Robertson, and John Mackey throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, and to nineteen lockouts and strikes in the four major leagues (including three since the 
start of the decade).  
$40 Million Dollar Slaves. Through the 1970s, the big three leagues—the NFL, NBA 
and MLB—were each governed by some form of the reserve clause, which allowed teams to 
renew their contract with a player in perpetuity, in effect binding them permanently to the 
franchise. John Ward, leader of the Brotherhood baseball union in the late 1800s, likened the 
condition of players under the reserve clause to that of runaway slaves,51 an especially bold 
comparison considering the Civil War was a fresh memory. Nearly 100 years later, as NBA 
players prepared to sue the league on antitrust grounds in 1970, they considered filing a claim 
that the reserve clause violated the 13th Amendment by constituting “a form of slavery or 
servitude.” The players eventually agreed that such a move would hurt their cause with a jury 
(Smith, 2017, p. 29). 
The slavery comparison has always been controversial, especially in the era of rising 
player salaries. It was most apt during the reserve clause era, a time of major outcry by the 
various players unions. Today, with the reserve clause having fallen out of legal favor and 
players seemingly free to go to any team they so choose—that is, if one ignores the draft, 
franchise tag, and restricted free agency—there is even less appetite for the invocation of slavery. 
                                                           
51 Ward’s full quote was: “Like a fugitive-slave law, the reserve-rule denies [the player] a harbor or 
livelihood, and carries him back, bound and shackled, to the club from which he attempted to escape” 




Yet if one listens to the owners, the ones who have been perhaps overly honest, one gets the 
sense that even they view the player-owner relationship no differently.  
In the leaked audio footage that eventually cost him ownership of his team, former 
Clippers owner Donald Sterling was challenged by his girlfriend to reconcile his racism with his 
ownership of a primarily black team. Sterling responded: “I support them and give them food, 
and clothes, and cars, and houses. Who gives it to them? Does someone else give it to them? … 
Who makes the game? Do I make the game, or do they make the game? Is (sic) there 30 owners 
that created the league?” (Wagner, 2014, ¶7). 
  The players, according to Sterling, were the beneficiaries of his benevolence. They did 
not earn food, clothes, cars and houses; he gave those to them. Their physical labor did not make 
the game, his money made the game. 
Three years later, during an NFL meeting in which owners met to discuss ending player 
protests during the national anthem, Texans owner Bob McNair derailed talks with a disparaging 
reference to the players. As reported by ESPN, McNair, who died in 2018, quipped that the 
league could not “have the inmates running the prison” (Wickersham & Van Natta Jr., 2017, 
¶35). Players were incensed after the comments were reported, with members of the Texans who 
had not previously protested during the anthem doing so the following Sunday (Jones, 2017). It 
was the first case of players protesting a team owner since the Sterling controversy three years 
earlier, when Clippers players took the court wearing their uniform warm-up jackets inside out to 
obscure the team name. 
Both sets of comments were revealing. For Sterling and McNair, the owners were the 
stewards of the game and the players merely a cog in the machine. That mindset is no surprise 
given the origins of the player-owner relationship. Paying players was just a necessary evil for 
the businessmen who entered the professional sporting arena in the 19th century. It was not an 
indication of respect for the players’ efforts, but an acknowledgement that there was more money 
to be had if one held his nose and gave compensation than if one held to the ideal of amateurism. 
“This is our deal, it belongs to us,” Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones told Leibovich 




but the core message was the same. “Owners,” the author noted, “tend to think of themselves as 
the geniuses behind the magic. They are the ones who build the stadiums, lead the committees, 
spend their own money, and then see their egos tossed up and down on a scoreboard every week” 
(p. 151). Who makes the game? Let there be no doubt as to what the owners’ answer would be.  
Gaining and losing ground. It is indicative of the difficulty faced by players unions, and 
unions in general, that the reserve clause not only outlasted the Players League insurrection of 
1890 but lived another 80 years afterward. It was protected in a pair of Supreme Court cases that 
established baseball as exempt from antitrust scrutiny, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. 
National League in 1922 and Toolson v. New York Yankees in 1953 (Abrams, 1999). In Federal, 
which had nothing to do with the reserve clause, the Court ruled that baseball was not in the 
business of interstate commerce because all games started and ended in one location. That flimsy 
reasoning was upheld in Toolson. 
The status quo held until the 1970s, a decade marked by player revolt against pro sports’ 
economic system. In 1970, Major League Baseball player Curt Flood filed suit against MLB 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, the league presidents, and all 24 franchises alleging that the reserve 
clause violated anti-trust law. Flood had been traded months earlier from the Cardinals, where he 
played 12 seasons, to the Phillies. Money was not at issue, as the Phillies were willing to increase 
his salary from $90,000 to $100,000. Flood, like Ward a century before, was aghast at being 
treated like “a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes” (Abrams, 1999, 
p. 311). The same year, NBA players filed their own antitrust suit to block a proposed merger 
between the NBA and the rival American Basketball Association (ABA). Said merger would 
have eliminated the players’ only negotiating leverage. The existence of the ABA allowed 
players to bypass the NBA’s reserve rule by offering them “an alternative place to play” (Smith, 
2017). In pro football, a group of players filed suit in 1972 seeking to outlaw the “Rozelle rule,” 
a clause mandating that any team signing a free agent must provide the player’s previous team 
“acceptable compensation in the form of players and/or draft choices” (Wallace, 1972, ¶16). 




not agree. The requirements severely limited players’ ability to sign as free agents, as teams 
faced the prospect of losing equivalent talent (¶16-17). 
Flood’s case was initially thrown out by the lower courts because of the precedent set in 
Federal and Toolson. He lost his 1972 Supreme Court appeal 5-3, with Justice Harry Blackmun, 
writing for the majority, calling the Federal Baseball decision an “established aberration” that 
rested on a “recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs” 
(Abrams, 1999, p. 311). In essence, the decision would not fly with any other business, but it had 
lasted too long to reverse, and baseball was different anyway—though as Abrams noted, 
Blackmun did not ever specify why. The decision “perplexed the majority of observers” 
(Schiavone, 2015, p. 23). Even in the defeat, the reserve rule was severely weakened; only 
baseball’s flimsy antitrust exemption protected it from scrutiny. 
By the middle of the decade, the players’ decades-long quest to eliminate the reserve rule 
finally bore fruit. In baseball, a series of mishaps eventually led to a December 1975 decision by 
independent arbitrator Peter Seitz to invalidate the reserve rule. Eight days later, a District Court 
judge decided in favor of NFL players in their lawsuit over the Rozelle Rule, ruling that it 
violated antitrust law. In 1976, NBA owners agreed to a settlement with players that eliminated 
the reserve rule and allowed for the NBA-ABA merger. In the span of just a handful of years, the 
economy of professional sports had changed. 
If the battle over the playing field has been characterized by anything, it has been by a 
push-and-pull between those in charge of the games and those who play. The defeats of the 
1970s did not leave owners chastened, but ready to restore the power that had been lost. In 19th 
century baseball, each time that the players achieved a measure of influence over their affairs, it 
was followed by a redoubling of management efforts to restore the old hierarchy. The same has 
taken place in pro sports in the half-century years since the reserve rule fell out of favor. 
  Since the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s, organized labor in general has taken a 
significant step backward. The policies of the Ronald Reagan era began a backslide in union 
membership and influence that continues to this day. The pro sports industry has not been 




management’s steady advance over labor over the past four decades. Schiavone (2015) noted the 
practice of “concession bargaining,” in which “a union is forced by an employer to accept lower 
wages, pensions, and benefits as well as worse working conditions.” Concession bargaining has 
come to define the management-labor relationship in the neoliberal era, having become “the new 
norm, occurring in almost every industry” (p. 5). That includes pro sports, where players have 
continually given up ground in labor-management disputes since the peak years of union 
activism in the 1970s. In the era of concession bargaining, owners have become the aggressors, 
using dubious claims of financial hardship to justify long, bitter collective bargaining 
negotiations with the goal of cutting into players’ share of revenue.  
Writing of the publicly-owned Packers, Hruby (2011) noted that the team is “not driven 
to make money for the sake of making more money, and as such, far less likely to risk a short-
term, franchise- and community-wide financial hit … for the sake of surplus cash in ownership’s 
coffers down the road” (¶16). The inverse is also true. Private owners, driven to make money for 
the sake of making more money, have had no issue taking dramatic, sometimes damaging, steps 
to squeeze more out of the golden goose. 
In the NBA, players acquiesced to an unprecedented salary cap in 1983, believing the 
owners’ claims that the league was on the brink of demise, and that the new restrictions would be 
a temporary corrective (Lewis, 2012). There was some truth to the league’s dire state, zero truth 
to the idea that the cap would be temporary. The NBA rose out of its deathbed throughout the 
remainder of the 1980s, but the cap remained in place. The players repeatedly challenged the cap 
in court, but because they agreed to the provision in the course of collective bargaining 
negotiations, it was exempt from anti-trust scrutiny under the nonstatutory labor exemption. The 
1983 situation would be repeated time and time again; owners would claim financial hardship 
and the players would pay the price. As Schiavone (2015) noted, “under accounting rules and 
regulations it is relatively ‘easy’ to use creative legal techniques to make it seem as if the team is 
worse off financially than is the case,” (p. 6). 
The NBA’s success in getting players to agree to spending limits led to an ongoing push 




Baseball lost the 1994 World Series in a failed attempt to impose a salary cap (the players’ strike 
that year remains the most recent player-initiated work stoppage). The National Hockey League 
lost part of the 1994-95 season and then all of the 2004-05 season in its attempt to impose not 
only a salary cap, but a ‘hard’ cap with no exceptions. The NBA lost a third of the 1998-99 
season in an effort to close as many loopholes in its cap as possible and impose another 
unprecedented restriction—a limit on individual players’ maximum salary. The league then lost 
part of the 2011-12 season to further reduce the amount in salary players received. The NFL got 
its salary cap without having to lose games, but still risked portions of the 2011 season in order 
to reduce the players’ share of revenue (Schiavone, 2015). 
 No restriction, no matter how unprecedented at the time, has been enough for owners, 
who have continually pushed for—and received—ever greater concessions from players. In each 
case, the victories of the previous negotiation have been made to seem like losses. In the lead-up 
to the 2011 NBA lockout, for example, the league complained about the ‘player-friendly’ nature 
of the existing collective bargaining agreement—a CBA that was considered a definitive 
ownership victory when originally agreed to in 1999 (Lewis, 2012).  
 Owners have been willing to break the rules in order to achieve their goal. During the 
latter half of the 1980s, free agency in Major League Baseball slowed to a crawl. After 26 of 46 
free agents changed teams during the 1984 offseason, only five of 62 did the following year 
(Schiavone, 2015). The bearish market was no accident. Under the direction of new 
commissioner Peter Ueberroth,52 baseball owners all-but-stopped bidding on free agents in the 
1985, 1986, and 1987 offseasons, leaving the players no choice but to sign with their previous 
team for far less than they would have gotten on the competitive market. Over the course of the 
three seasons, “the average salary of a player with two years’ service time in the major leagues 
declined 38 percent” (p. 37). While the owners publicly denied charges of collusion, the players 
filed multiple grievances, and won, eventually securing $434 million in lost wages. Yet the 
                                                           
52 In his first year as commissioner, Ueberroth frequently lambasted the owners in person for offering 
players long and expensive contracts. During an October 1985 meeting, he informed the owners that they 
could “talk about not signing free agents as long as they did not make an agreement not to sign them” 




specter of collusion never went away. The owners tied—and failed—to codify collusion into the 
CBA during the 1994-95 negotiations, and the slow offseasons of the late 2010s aroused 
suspicion of collusive behavior (Perry, 2018). 
Despite salaries that are enormous in most contexts, professional athletes have thus been 
subject to the same forces as most American workers, with salaries depressed by management 
policies in the pursuit of greater profits. LeBron James is a multi-millionaire, but the amount he 
has made in salary is millions and millions less than he would have commanded on the open 
market. Three anonymous NBA executives told The Athletic in 2017 that James, whose annual 
salary has never exceeded $36 million, “could command $100 million a year if there were no 
salary cap in the NBA” (Lloyd, 2017, ¶23). To reiterate, these are not teachers or factory workers 
struggling to get by. Even so, very few individuals would be content having tens of millions in 
salary withheld each year, salary that would have been fair compensation based on their 
enormous contribution to employer revenue. 
 The players’ inability to stem the tide of ownership victories points to significant 
shortcomings in the collective bargaining system. Business-friendly legislation and court-
decisions have managed to make the collective bargaining relationship advantageous not to 
labor, but to management. In particular, the non-statutory labor exemption has made it 
impossible for unions to have any policy overturned on anti-trust grounds if it was agreed to in a 
previous negotiation, leaving the NBA’s salary cap, draft, and age limit untouched by the courts. 
The players’ only legal remedy to stop such practices—or more commonly, end an ongoing work 
stoppage—has been to decertify their union, as was done in both the NFL and NBA in 2011 
(Lewis & Proffitt, 2014). If a collective bargaining relationship has been established and is 
ongoing, at least according to the courts, anything goes. 
 Beyond economic issues, players in the NBA and NFL have also expressed discontent 
with ownership dictates related to off-field conduct, specifically a perceived double-standard in 
the ways owners and players are treated for similar crimes (Trotter, 2014). Players have also 
expressed displeasure over the owners making unilateral changes to basic aspects of the 




2006 (Roth, 2017), and NHL players managed to halt a league plan to reorganize the conference 
and division structure, but only after the league officially announced the plan without consulting 
them (Wyshynski, 2017). 
 Unlike most workers, professional athletes are both employee and product. Sports fans 
are interested in LeBron James versus Kevin Durant, not Phil Anschutz versus Joe Lacob. It is 
the athletes that attract the viewers, the viewers that attract the advertisers, the advertisers that 
make the networks pay billions in rights. With that in mind, the lack of control athletes have over 
the leagues they have made popular is striking. The result of athletes’ slashed salaries in recent 
years has been that the money has accrued to the owners (not to the fans in the form of lower 
ticket prices, contradicting the popular myth). After the 2011 NBA lockout, even mediocre 
franchises with a history of losing began selling for hundreds of millions of dollars. That was a 
direct result of the new revenue split. Under the old deal, the 400 players received 57 percent of 
league revenues, while the 30 owners received 43 percent; the new deal was an equitable-
sounding 50-50 split. “Each percentage point in the split was reportedly worth roughly $40 
million per year,” Sports Illustrated reported in 2013, 
so the transfer of wealth from players to owners is enormous. The conclusion at that time 
was that the new split would essentially idiot-proof NBA ownership; almost no matter 
how well the team performed or what size market it played in, an owner could be virtually 
guaranteed profitability given the cut in player expenses. (Golliver, 2013, ¶6) 
For as much money as the NBA’s 2017 television deal brought into the league, it is worth noting 
that the players’ share fell well short of what it would have been under the previous CBA. Or to 
put it another way, the owners’ share was even higher than it would have been. For as many 
eyeballs widened upon seeing enormous salaries for mediocre players, one wonders what the 
reaction would have been to see the enormous profits for mediocre owners. NBA salaries 
increased from about $5 million in the 2010-11 season to $6.4 million by 2018-19, an increase of 
28 percent (“2018-19 NBA,” n.d.). NBA franchise values on the other hand have risen 415 
percent, from $369 million to $1.9 billion, according to Forbes’ annual estimates (Badenhausen 




 Months before the NBA locked out players in 2011, Forbes outlined then-commissioner 
David Stern’s gameplan: 
[I]f NBA commissioner David Stern gets his way, an imbecile would be able to make 
money running a team. Stern wants to lop $750 million off of player costs, lowering the 
portion of basketball-related revenue that goes to players from 57% to around 40%. If 
Stern succeeds, even teams like [New Orleans], who were thought to be headed for 
bankruptcy before the NBA rescued the franchise, would immediately rise at least 30% in 
value because potential buyers would know they don't run the risk of writing checks to 
cover operating losses. (Ozanian, 2011, ¶8, emphasis added) 
While the players’ share of revenue was not reduced quite so severely, the end result was the 
same. The value of the New Orleans franchise has grown from $280 million then to $1 billion in 
2018, exceeding the most valuable franchise prior to the lockout.53 All 30 NBA franchises have 
at least tripled in value from the 2010-11 season through 2018-19, per Forbes data, with the 
Orlando Magic’s 244 percent increase (from $385 million to $1.33 billion) the smallest jump in 
the league. Twenty-six teams have quadrupled in value, thirteen have quintupled, and the 
Warriors—helped along by a mid-decade transformation from doormat into one of the most 
dominant teams in league history—have grown by close to 900 percent (from $363 million to 
$3.5 billion). 
It is all in keeping with an anti-competitive logic. Pro athletes must play their best in order 
to win games, and anything less will be noted quite critically by the press and by the fans. The 
mere suggestion of loafing can ruin an athlete’s reputation. Team owners, on the other hand, can 
win with minimal effort. An owner can buy his way into a league, do a poor job by every 
relevant standard, and exit with a tidy profit. As noted in the magazine Wired: 
Major league athletes are rewarded for talent, toughness, and single-minded dedication. 
Major league team owners, on the other hand, are rewarded for mediocrity. Having bought 
their way into a league, lackadaisical owners can extort hundreds of millions of dollars 
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from their hometowns (and charge exorbitant ticket prices) under threat of decamping for 
another city. They can allow wretched teams to languish year after year and pocket the 
league's revenue-sharing money rather than invest it in talent, knowing that when they're 
ready to sell, a scrum of millionaire suitors will materialize. (“Stefan Szymanski,” 2009, 
¶1) 
To generate guaranteed profits regardless of effort and quality runs counter to the myth of 
capitalism as responsive to the will of consumers, or the so-called ‘invisible hand of the market.’ 
In practice, the logic of neoliberal capitalism guides owners ever-further toward exploitation. 
Under such a system, the players will continue losing. Many of the biggest stars will remain 
millionaires, and that will be enough for most of them. However, the players who have made the 
leagues billion-dollar enterprises will never make the share owed to them for their singular labor. 
What are the stakes? The difference between, to reference a Chris Rock joke, being rich and 
being wealthy. To the layman that may sound like a very trivial complaint. But the rich are able 
to buy houses, and the wealthy are able to buy elections.  
In essence, the current pro sports economic system maintains a wall that has existed since 
the very beginning in the mid-1800s. From the Knickerbocker club to the New York Knicks, the 
upper-class guardians of organized sport have sought to maintain class boundaries—first through 
the failed effort at total exclusion, then through amateurism, and finally through limiting player 
salaries as much as possible. It is true that professional sport allows for greater class mobility 
than the typical industry. Professional athletes can be born into poverty and become multi-
millionaires. However, that class mobility rarely translates into class equality. Even as players 
have made financial strides over the decades, only a select few have made enough earnings 
through salaries and endorsements to cross over into ownership roles. The overwhelming 
majority of pro athletes will never make enough money to enter, or challenge, the exclusive club 
of team ownership. “The average NBA player makes more money in a single season than most 
Americans will earn in a lifetime. The average NBA owner made more money while you were 
reading that first sentence than your children will accrue if they live to be 150 years old” (Levin, 




keep the lower classes off the field, and amateurism is so often breached as to resemble an ideal 
more than an actual policy. Restrictions on athlete salary have been more effective in 
maintaining that last wall between the moneyed elite and the riffraff.  
In evaluating how pro team owners have approached their player-employees over the past 
150 years, whether actual policies or the sentiments of Sterling and McNair, it is fair to suggest 
that there is a general mindset guiding the relationship. The players are not equals in the 
enterprise of pro sports, but a cost of doing business. Owners, who again were never particularly 
enthusiastic about paying players in the first place, will seek to reduce those costs as much as 
possible. Such a mindset is not at all uncommon in the current economic system, though it is 
particularly glaring in sport, where the players are the primary reason fans go to the games or 
watch them on television. It is clear that if not for athletes’ unique value to the leagues, 
ownership would have no trouble engaging in the kind of exploitation of workers common in 
other industries. In amateur sport, that exploitation is total. While players can receive 
scholarships and other stipends, athletes in revenue sports such as football and men’s basketball 
do not make even a fraction of the billions their work brings in. Even in pro sports, owners have 
flirted with the idea that the players are expendable. NFL and MLB owners used replacement 
players during players’ strikes in 1987 and 1995 respectively. Both times, the use of replacement 
players was greeted with reduced attendance and television ratings, to say nothing of poor on-
field play. It was not a sustainable alternative. 
There are limitations to just how much owners can reduce player costs. A prolonged 
work stoppage hurts both sides, though the owners are far better equipped financially to handle 
both the loss of games and the fan backlash. However, the exploitative mindset is not limited to 
economics. What happens when ownership disregard for players extends beyond salaries? When 
the view of players as mere ‘inmates in the prison’ extends to their medical treatment?  
The Concussion Crisis 
 NFL owners, Leibovich (2018) quipped, “keep most of the NFL money and none of the 
brain damage” (p. 17). Indeed, there may be no greater evidence of NFL players’ exploitation 




players about the severity of repeated blows to the head, having gone as far as to establish its 
own research to contradict findings about the long-term effects of playing football.  
For many of its players, the NFL has often meant a short burst of fame and fortune 
followed by a lifetime of physical pain. Leibovich (2018) wrote of the “evergreen genre of 
stories about demolished former NFL players living out their days in pain and fog” (p. 208). The 
physical pain is an expected downside of a sport that requires the ritual sacrifice of the body. 
What is not expected, however, is mental degradation. “When you get into football, you think 
about hurting your knees, your back, even your neck,” former New York Giants defensive back 
Leonard Marshall said in a 2014 New York Times article. “But your brain, man, no. We didn’t 
think about that. I didn’t sign up for that” (Sokolove, 2014, ¶27).  
It has been more than a decade since the first publicized case of chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (CTE) in an NFL player’s brain, touching off the concussion crisis that, until 
Ray Rice assaulted his fiancé and Colin Kaepernick began protesting police brutality, seemed to 
be the most significant crisis facing the league. Concussions have long been a problem in the 
NFL, but the extent of the danger was unknown to the public and to the players until the 
discovery of CTE. That was in large part because the NFL actively tried to undercut any research 
linking concussions to brain damage, going so far as to publish its own studies suggesting that 
blows to the head were a minor problem, in what amounted to a decades-long cover-up.  
Early days. Scientific studies on the impact of violent sports on the brain date all the way 
back to 1928 (in re National Football, 2012, pp. 1-2), though for the first several decades the 
focus was primarily boxing. The first major research on concussions in football came in the 
1980s, when a researcher at the University of Virginia found that players who had suffered a 
concussion tended to still feel the effects more than a week later (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 
2013, p. 34). By the 1990s, there had been increasing interest in the topic of concussions in 
football, but little in the way of major research. What research had been published rarely reached 
the level of public discourse, where concussions were just one of several ills occasionally 




In those early days, the NFL’s response to concussion concerns was defensiveness and 
token public relations. After a string of head injuries in the mid-1990s began to attract media 
attention—so much so that then-Commissioner Paul Tagliabue called concussions a “pack 
journalism issue”—the league established the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (MTBI). 
If the presence of “mild” in the name was not enough evidence that the NFL did not take the 
issue seriously, the MTBI was chaired by a rheumatologist with no background in brain injuries, 
who just happened to be Tagliabue’s personal doctor. Over the next decade the MTBI would 
produce copious research, all of which seemed to benefit the interests of the NFL (Fainaru-Wada 
& Fainaru, 2013). 
The ground began to shift underneath the NFL’s feet in the early 2000s. In 2000 came the 
“first scientific study of head injuries” among pro football players, which found that concussion 
effects not only lingered but were lifelong (“Concussions may,” 2000, ¶1). In 2002, former 
Pittsburgh Steeler Mike Webster died of a heart attack after years of mental and physical decline. 
His autopsy revealed the presence of what would later be called CTE, though it would be three 
more years before that finding was publicized. 
CTE and the MTBI. In the years before the Webster findings were made public, the 
NFL went on the offensive with its own scientific research. Starting in 2003, the MTBI 
Committee began publishing the first of what would be sixteen journal articles in Neurosurgery 
that downplayed the frequency and danger of concussions. The league’s argument was that since 
players were usually cleared to return shortly after suffering concussions, the effects of those 
concussions must have been minimal. There were indications that the MTBI Committee had 
cherry-picked the most benign concussion cases so as to bolster that argument. Even though the 
bulk of scientific research indicated at least some long-term effects from concussions, the league 
succeeded in muddying the waters with its own research (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013). 
In 2005, the Webster CTE findings were published in Neurosurgery, which to that point 
had been closely linked to the NFL and its MTBI Committee. The backlash was immediate. 
Three prominent members of the MTBI sought to have the paper retracted, a particularly bold 




long after the article was published, former Steeler Terry Long became the second deceased 
player whose brain showed signs of CTE. Instead of going through the lengthy process of 
publication before making the news public, researchers “went straight to the media with the 
news” (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013, p. 194). The league called “the conclusions … 
preposterous and a misinterpretation of facts” (p. 195). 
The NFL strategy of denial and misdirection rapidly diminished in effectiveness. In 2006, 
its call for retraction of the Webster article was denied. Later that year, ESPN published an 
article casting doubt on the MTBI, making public the widespread sentiments of the medical 
community—the committee was out of step with the research on concussions, that it omitted data 
that would run counter to their aims, and that it intimidated researchers whose data was 
damaging to the league (Keating, 2006). 
Two weeks after the ESPN article was published, former NFL player Andre Waters 
committed suicide. His brain was examined, and in January 2007 he became the third player 
whose brain showed signs of CTE. The findings were again relayed immediately to the media, 
this time The New York Times. Reporter Alan Schwarz’ report on the findings marked “the day 
the NFL’s concussion problem hit the mainstream” (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013, p. 204). 
Facing the music. The number of deceased former players showing evidence of CTE 
continued to grow—and to make front page news. One new diagnosis was publicized at a press 
conference in the Super Bowl host city days before the game. Though sparsely attended, it 
represented a marked ramping up of the media spectacle surrounding the growing crisis.  
The NFL made repeated efforts to discredit the findings using their own scientists, but 
those backfired; an NFL-funded 2009 study found that former players in middle age had a 19 
times greater risk of Alzheimer’s disease than normal, leaving the league to discredit its own 
work (Fainaru-Wada & Fainaru, 2013). That was no small incident. According to a later lawsuit 
filed against the NFL, it marked the first time that several retired players became aware of a 
league effort to conceal evidence of long-term concussion effects (Easterling v. NFL, 2011). 
Former players began seeking legal remedies. A group of retired players filed a class 




concussions. The lawsuit, Easterling et al. vs. National Football League, claimed that the league 
had access to information indicating the seriousness of concussions dating back to the early 
1970s, but repeatedly denied any link between concussions and brain injuries. Easterling alleged 
that the NFL took “an active role in concealing or actively disputing” those links (pp. 4-5, 
emphasis added), conspiring with its teams to reject any suggestion that continuing to play after 
suffering a concussion would result in long-term negative effects.  
Easterling was followed by numerous other lawsuits centering on the same argument. In 
Pear v. National Football League, plaintiffs accused the league of “[concealing] for decades the 
serious risks of long term effects of traumatic brain injury” (p. 24). Austin et al. v. National 
Football League described the MTBI as “nothing short of a roadblock” to accurate concussion 
information (p. 4). Hager v. National Football League alleged that the league “exposed players 
to dangers that they could have avoided had the NFL provided them with truthful and accurate 
information.” That complaint further described the league’s efforts as a “conspiracy” to deny 
players accurate information about the relationship between concussions and long-term brain 
damage—not just those in the NFL, but “all others who participated in organized football … 
millions of children, high school students, and college students” (pp. 3-4, 22). In all, 242 lawsuits 
were filed, several of which included over a dozen players. 
In 2012, several suits were consolidated into a master complaint accusing the NFL of 
conspiracy to keep players in the dark about concussions, whether through active misinformation 
or by concealment of facts. Through the MTBI Committee, the league used a “campaign of 
misinformation” to “create a falsified body of research which [it] could cite as proof that truthful 
and accepted neuroscience on the subject was inconclusive” (in re: National Football, 2011, p. 
33). The effort, the plaintiffs concluded, was a “scheme of fraud and deceit” (p. 40). In 2017, the 
NFL finalized a settlement with the plaintiffs in excess of $1 billion, though that was far from the 
end of the story. Retired players have had difficulty getting compensation, with the league 
avoiding responsibility for numerous ailments. More than a year after the settlement was 
finalized, the league had paid out just $150 million to fewer than ten percent of those who 




dollar of what they’re owed” after portions of the funds were held back to pay medical bills, 
lawyers and credit card companies. A few have even “received notices that show pending 
payments in the negative” (Murphy & Garcia-Roberts, 2018, ¶3-4). 
Today. Since the concussion crisis hit critical mass in the early 2010s, the NFL has put 
into place policies meant to ensure players who suffer brain injuries do not continue to play. It 
introduced its ‘concussion protocol’ in 2013, mandating among other things that an unaffiliated 
doctor monitor play on-field, that any player showing signs of concussions be removed from 
play immediately, and that no player who has suffered a concussion return to the field until all 
symptoms have dissipated (Flynn, 2016). Those rules are often flouted. In a 2017 game, Seattle 
Seahawks quarterback Russell Wilson appeared to suffer a concussion and, in accordance with 
the concussion protocol, went into a sideline medical tent for an examination. He was in and out 
so quickly that it was clear to the national TV audience that no proper examination had been 
done. The Seahawks were fined $100,000. That same season, Houston Texans quarterback Tom 
Savage suffered an apparent concussion that left him suffering an apparent seizure on the field—
but stayed in the game for another play afterward (Jones, 2017). 
The concussion crisis, and the dangers of football in general, make clear how dangerous 
the current ownership model can be for the players. The economic exploitation of players is 
significant, but most pro athletes still end up making significant amounts of money (albeit for a 
short amount of time before retiring and, in a number of cases, losing what they earned). In 
football and other contact sports, the physical exploitation of athletes has destroyed—or ended—
lives. Owners have had a financial incentive to not just ignore but actively cast doubt on the role 
of routine tackling in the development of brain injuries. This is where the economic limitations 
are most serious. If there was no wall between ownership and the player base, and athletes made 
enough money to cross into ownership positions with ease, would there have ever been such a 
cover up? Alternatively, could such a cover up have existed under a different ownership model? 
The above questions are not as obvious as one might think. It is entirely possible to 
conceive of a circumstance in which former athletes would sell out their contemporaries once 




disregarded player safety. With that said, the current private ownership model is suited to such 
exploitation, focused as it is on reducing costs, driving up franchise values, and maintaining 
control. Anything can happen in any system, but the NFL concussion crisis was an inevitable 
outgrowth of an ownership mindset that is the core of the private ownership model. ‘We make 
the game, we run the prison.’ It may sound galling given the salaries involved, but the players are 
as John Ward argued in the 19th century—mere chattel. 
The Problem of Private Ownership for Fans 
The preceding sections have examined the class dynamics between those in charge of 
organized sport and those who play. To this point, there has not been as much discussion of the 
dynamics between those in charge and those who watch. As noted in the earlier historical 
analysis, the monetization of fan attendance was a crucial element in the professionalization of 
organized sport. In the modern era, attendance and television viewership fuel the billion-dollar 
enterprises that are the major leagues (and the NCAA), to say nothing of the broader sports 
industry. Fan consumption of organized sport built tiny ESPN into a global powerhouse and 
turned beer and buffalo wings into dominant product categories. The simple act of watching 
organized sport, whether in person or on television, is a significant economic driver across 
multiple industries. Yet the relationship between those in charge and those who watch is not 
dramatically different than the relationship between management and the players. Nor is it 
dramatically different than the relationship between management and those who do not watch.   
Given the financial significance of their consumption habits, one can safely argue that 
fans are taken for granted. That is not to suggest that fan grievances are not taken seriously; there 
is an entire genre of populist fan advocacy highlighting all the ways in which the leagues and 
players let them down. “Talk to any sports fan and you will get at least one of the following 
opinions,” Fort (2000) wrote: 
Rising ticket prices threaten to slam the door on the average fan. Growing revenue 
imbalance leaves most teams out of contention before the season even starts. Stratospheric 
player salaries make it impossible to identify with players … And do not even get a fan 




Such complaints are commonplace in sports punditry and talk radio, on message boards and 
comments sections, and even in academic analyses. Recall Ross and Szymanski (2008), the 
economists who penned a ‘capitalist manifesto’ for dissatisfied sports fans. Far from radicals 
seeking to tear down the current system, the authors professed support for “free markets” (p. 5) 
and the idea that sport should be organized as a “purely commercial business” (p. 39). Yet the 
exploitative nature of the pro sports system was clear even to seeming ideological allies: 
Clubs who are guaranteed perpetual membership in a monopoly league, and who then get 
to set the rules for the competition themselves, have every incentive to act in their own 
self-interest and contrary to the interest of fans and taxpayers. The result is billions in tax 
subsidies for stadia, no competition for live gate patronage, inefficient packages of out-of-
market games for the millions of fans who do not live in the immediate area of their 
favorite team, labor battles that disrupt the sport and are designed to cut costs rather than 
make the season as exciting as possible, and tolerance of mismanagement and inefficiency 
in club operations, licensing and sale of merchandise. (p. 23) 
To put it simply, there is no significant debate as to whether sports fans are taken advantage of 
by the leagues. That can scarcely be denied. Yet there is little significant movement on fixing 
any of those issues. It is taken for granted that the sporting audience will either always return, or 
that any departing viewers will be replaced with new reinforcements. 
Why? Consider the ways in which fan dissatisfaction has been channeled over the years. 
Griping and cynicism have tended to dominate the discussion. There is a vague understanding 
that there is something wrong in the core of the sports industry. However, when time comes to 
express dissatisfaction, the critique dissolves into an airing of grievances—one that is primarily 
focused on the players. A common theme in fan dissatisfaction is what Martin (2004) called the 
“venting model of public discourse” (p. 155), in which rational discussion is replaced by mere 
grousing at best and borderline violence at worst. Part of a broader consumerist sentiment in 
which the media approaches its audience as consumers rather than as citizens, the venting model 
has been associated with media coverage of sports labor-management conflict (Martin, 2004; 




any issue in which money in sports takes center stage: the rich players and even richer owners 
are mistreating the aggrieved fan. Far from serving the fan, such a perspective fosters cynicism, 
detachment, and a disincentive to change anything, all while ignoring the real problems. 
A 2014 Washington Times article serves as a representative example. Writing about 
possible blackouts for upcoming NFL playoff games, Pruden (2014) lambasted the greed of the 
NFL’s owners. Considering the conservative bent of the Washington Times, that may seem like a 
surprisingly contrarian stand. Yet the critique targeted not the overarching system—in which a 
‘not-for-profit’ sports league could prevent local fans from watching their home team on TV if 
the publicly-funded stadium did not sell out—but instead the ‘millionaires’ and ‘billionaires’ at 
fault. Owners begged, lied, and “gouged,” and the players received undeserved salaries. 
Meanwhile, the fans, “reading about outlandish salaries paid to players who are often just this 
side of illiterate and owners who would shame Gordon Gekko, get no relief from escalating 
ticket prices” (¶9).54 Money had corrupted the owners and players, and the fans had become the 
innocent victims. 
Venting is no substitute for the actual activism necessary to affect real change, and as 
such is useful to any entitles interested in maintaining the status quo. A few angry words will 
hardly disrupt the doings of men worth billions. Activism, on the other hand, has proven an 
effective tool in countering the worst excesses of the pro sports system. Player activism, 
particularly in the 1970s, reshaped the economics of pro sports—freeing athletes from the 
shackles of the reserve clause and ushering in an era of (comparably) free agency. The players 
have had the benefit of union representation, while the fans have rarely organized in any 
substantive way. 
Consumer movements in general have been on the wane in the United States since the 
resurgence of corporate capitalism in the late 1970s. In the sports world, where the fans have 
supposedly been kicked around by greed and indifference from both players and owners, there 
has been especially little momentum toward fan-based activism. Several organizations have 
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sprung up over the years, but they have tended to operate on the fringes of the sports fan 
community. That is in large part owed to a lack of mainstream media coverage. 
Martin (2004) chronicled the short shrift media outlets gave the fan organization Sports 
Fans United during the 1994 baseball strike. SFU, an obscure group that nonetheless was “the 
most prominent fan organization” at the time, was pushing to remove Major League Baseball’s 
antitrust exemption. Advocating for the removal, which would have paved the way for the end of 
the strike,55 allowed disaffected fans a constructive way to react to the conflict. Instead of 
complaining about millionaires and billionaires, SFU advocated for a realistic—and one could 
argue overdue—policy change that offered real solutions. It should be no surprise that SFU 
received little to no coverage in the mainstream media, which instead fostered the ‘venting 
model’ of discourse that left fans with the option of boycotting games or causing disturbances 
while in attendance. The media are subject to much the same forces as the league, run by 
billionaire interests who are not keen on the idea of an empowered consumer base. Yell and 
scream if one must, but do not get involved in policy. 
 Despite relative obscurity, some notable sports fan organizations remain in operation. 
One is the League of Fans, run by the consumer advocate and former presidential candidate 
Ralph Nader. In a 2008 interview with Dave Zirin, he outlined his motivation for the project: 
[M]y desire was to have fans organize—because after all, they're consumers. They're 
consumers at the service of mammoth sports enterprises that have antitrust exemptions, 
that have all sorts of tax-depreciating rights for their players. I mean, it's almost a mint to 
produce money. They gouged the fans as consumers; parking, food, tickets, and they 
gouged them as taxpayers too. So it was really a composite situation that is replayed 
throughout the economy between large corporations and consumers. (¶8) 
Another is the Sports Fan Coalition (SFC), a group that seeks to fight “against greed in the sports 
we love” (“Priorities,” n.d., ¶2). The group’s advocacy has included protecting fans from ticket 
fraud, speaking out against media mergers like Disney-Fox, protecting players’ health and right 
                                                           
55 “A rarely publicized fact of the [1994 MLB] strike,” Martin (2004) wrote, “was that the Major League 
Baseball Players Association would have called off the strike if Congress passed a bill repealing or limiting 




to speech, and fighting against stadium subsidies. It has taken particular aim at the Washington 
NFL owner Dan Snyder, using him as an avatar of pro sports owners who extort publicly funded 
stadiums from cities eager to land a team. In a so-called “Danifesto,” the SFC laid out its terms 
for new stadium deals. “Taxpayer money should never be used to fund a new stadium unless the 
taxpayers receive” discounted tickets for taxpayers; lotteries for low-income and veteran seating; 
free use of the stadium for public schools and youth leagues in between games and during the off 
season; environmentally-conscious construction and design; free parking for taxpayers; and 
reasonably priced concessions (“The Danifesto,” n.d.). 
Going beyond mere venting, the League of Fans and Sports Fan Coalition have rooted 
complaints about the sports industry within critiques of pro sports’ economic structure. Simply 
complaining about ‘rotten billionaires and millionaires’ will merely ensure that those bad actors 
are replaced by other people who will more effectively do the same thing. A faulty system can be 
changed through activism, but a cabal of rotten individuals is harder to displace. The difference 
between viewing the problems of the sports industry as systemic or as the fault of bad apples 
accounts for much of the difference between proactive activism and impotent cynicism. As the 
SFC noted:  
Professional sports leagues are multi-billion dollar industries with armies of lobbyists in 
Washington, D.C., state capitols, and city halls around the country. The fans who actually 
buy the tickets, watch the games, wear the merchandise, and make the system work, 
however, don’t have such representation. … Fans don’t have a seat at the table when 
decisions are being made and the results have been fabulous for the sports industry. 
(“About,” n.d.) 
Again, such groups are obscure, and the lion’s share of sports fan discussion is focused less on 
solutions than on the problems themselves. On issues like stadium subsidies, which affect sports 
viewers exactly as much as people who never watch a game, the lack of problem-solving is 





The Problem of Private Ownership for the Public 
The use of public money for private profit is not at all limited to sport. It exists as part of 
the broader neoliberal plunder of the public sphere, the accumulation by dispossession described 
by Harvey (2017). Cities, as Silk and Andrews (2012) noted, “have become preoccupied with the 
reconstitution of public space … into multifaceted environments designed for the purpose of 
encouraging consumption-oriented capital accumulation” (p. 127). Particularly in major cities, 
the super-rich have in recent decades reshaped urban spaces into increasingly indistinguishable 
profit centers marked by continuous development and widening inequality. Baker (2018) wrote 
of New York City’s steady transformation into an antiseptic “gated community” that, despite real 
improvements for those living in the highest tax brackets, has eliminated only a “little of its 
social dysfunction” (¶1, 6). The city’s poverty rate is higher than it was in 1975, “during the 
supposed collapse of New York,” and homelessness “has reached a level not seen here in 
decades” (¶7). The widening gulf between the one and ninety-nine percent is indicative of what 
Silk and Andrews (2012) called “a form of American urban apartheid” in which “urban 
populations and indeed spaces become bifurcated between the generative affluent and the 
degenerative poor, the private consumer and the public recipient” (p. 128). As Harvey (2017) 
noted, the recurrent pattern of ruling elites and the general public doing poorly “has been such a 
persistent effect of neoliberal policies over time as to be regarded as a structural component of 
the whole project” (p. 28). 
 Within the bifurcated urban space, private interests and the public good do not co-exist in 
an uneasy détente. Neoliberal capitalism has been marked by an ever-increasing absorption of 
space that leaves less and less room for anything else. It is not a mere displacement of the public 
space, but an outright replacement. Returning to Baker (2018), the author noted “the wholesale 
destruction of the public city” (¶14) plaguing New York: 
Many of the city’s most treasured amenities, essential to its middle-class character and 
built up for decades through the painstaking labors of so many dedicated individuals—




politicians—have now been torn away. Look at almost any public service or space in New 
York, and you will see that it has been diminished, degraded, appropriated. (¶15) 
Sport has played a key role in the dismantling of the public city, with team owners using the 
threat of relocation to siphon public funds for new or renovated stadiums. 
 Extortion cities and relocation threats. 2020 will mark the debut of two new NFL 
stadiums, one in Las Vegas and the other in Los Angeles. They will be the 16th and 17th new 
NFL stadiums since the turn of the century, with those stadiums hosting 19 of the league’s 32 
teams. Neither Las Vegas nor Los Angeles had an NFL team as recently as 2015, but the 
Oakland Raiders, San Diego Chargers, and St. Louis Rams were each looking for new 
stadiums—and pro sports owners are not as sentimental about civic pride as are pro sports fans. 
If an owner can find a better deal or a better situation in another market, there is plenty of history 
indicating that they will not hesitate. Relocation has been part of sport from infancy, but the use 
of relocation as a cudgel with which to extract concessions from cities is a recent phenomenon. 
Since the Baltimore Colts packed up 31 years of history and drove out of town under the cover of 
darkness in 1983, there has been precedent for relocation as the ultimate answer to stadium 
difficulties. If a team is in an old stadium—and ‘old’ in many cases simply means insufficiently 
suited to monetization—cities have a stark choice: build a new stadium under the owner’s terms 
(with the league almost always backing them up) or prepare for life without the team. As Seifert 
(2017) noted, “the NFL doesn’t bluff” (¶13). The same goes for its rivals. The NBA Supersonics 
leaving Seattle after 41 years and a championship seemed unthinkable until it was not.  
Cities that have lost their teams will, in some cases, then be used as ‘extortion cities’ that 
other owners can use to threaten relocation. Seattle has been an NBA extortion city since the 
SuperSonics left town, with billionaires such as Steve Ballmer and entrepreneur Chris Hansen 
showing interest in bringing the league back to the city. When the Sacramento Kings nearly 
moved to Seattle in 2013 (after flirting with Anaheim, Virginia Beach, and other interested 
cities), the end result was Sacramento paying $273 million of the $507 million price tag for a 
new stadium—more than half—and the team staying put (Kasler, 2015). Los Angeles was the 




the Rams and Chargers arriving. Whether markets that have lost a team, or markets that have 
never had a team, extortion cities are the key to owners’ public subsidy strategy. “So long as 
there's one city willing to pay for an arena to poach a team … the scheme will continue” (Ziller, 
2015, ¶13). 
The extortion city could only exist in a professional sports model that restricts entry in all 
but the rarest occasions.56 If franchises could gain admittance to the major leagues through their 
play, as in the promotion/relegation model common in European leagues, the extortion threat 
would no longer exist. In a city like Seattle, it is conceivable that interested investors could 
create a team and apply for membership in a lower-level league, rising up the ranks until getting 
promoted to the NBA. That would not exactly be a simple process, but neither is securing arena 
funding or poaching a vulnerable team from another city. Absent the threat of the Kings moving 
to Seattle, it is unlikely Sacramento would have paid hundreds of millions to build the team’s 
new stadium. As Szymanski and Ross (2008) noted, “public [stadium] subsidies are virtually 
unheard of in English soccer’s Premier League,” which operates under a promotion/relegation 
model. Recall from an earlier chapter that the closed system of membership in American pro 
sports dates back to mid-19th century efforts to restrict membership in baseball leagues, including 
the early National League. There is a straight line from the exclusionary ethos of those times to 
the present-day gouging of cities. 
“[W]hat other way is there to describe it but blackmail?” one sportswriter asked after the 
NBA Milwaukee Bucks leveraged relocation threats to win $500 million in public funding for a 
new arena. “When it happens repeatedly—in San Antonio, in Sacramento, in New Orleans, in 
Orlando—it’s laid bare as an institutional strategy” (Ziller, 2015, para. 3). As city after city has 
discovered, owners and leagues will either get what they want or leave. What they typically want 
is generous taxpayer funding. 
Depleting public resources. When the Oakland Raiders begin play in their third 
different home—Las Vegas—in 2020, they will take the field in a $1.9 billion stadium funded in 
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large part by taxpayers. In 2016, before the Raiders had come to a decision on relocation, the 
Nevada legislature approved the use of $750 million in public funds to build an NFL stadium 
(“To Entice,” 2016), a new record. Other cities had picked up a larger percentage of the stadium 
check, but no other market had ever ponied up a quarter of a billion dollars. Indianapolis came 
the closest, paying $619 million in 2008 to replace the stadium that the Colts eagerly left 
Baltimore for just 25 years earlier (“Taxpayers have,” 2016). ESPN reporter Kevin Seifert 
(2017) estimated that between new stadiums and renovations of existing stadiums, a whopping 
$6.7 billion in public funds will have gone to pay for NFL stadium construction just in the past 
20 years. Examining the 45 total sports stadiums built or renovated between 2000 and 2014, 
Brookings Institution found that state and local governments had issued a whopping $13 billion 
in tax-exempt municipal bonds, costing the federal government nearly $4 billion in tax revenue 
(Gayer, Drukker & Gold, 2016, p. 14). 
What do cities get in return? In baseball, the city of Miami agreed in 2009 to pay three-
fourths of the bill for the team’s new $650 million stadium (Belson, 2017), “saddling the public 
with more than $2 billion in debt” (Smiley, 2015, ¶7). The new stadium came with promises of 
“economic revitalization” and on-field contention, but the neighborhood surrounding the stadium 
still included vacant buildings and empty lots as recently as 2015 (¶4), and team owner Loria 
dismantled the team’s roster after just one year of the stadium’s existence (Keri, 2012). 
Sportswriter Jonah Keri gave Loria sarcastic praise: “I’m just impressed by how well he worked 
everything to his advantage, taking advantage of elected officials, short-sighted businessmen, 
and a system that rewards the kind of behavior that might seem despicable but is impossibly 
profitable” (¶15). Loria is now out of the picture, having collected his profits, while the city of 
Miami still has a mostly empty boondoggle featuring a substandard on-field product. 
Billions in public money is no small figure considering the austerity that has marked the 
first two decades of the 21st century. In an era in which all manner of publicly-funded program 
has been either put under threat or actively eliminated, a few hundred million here and a few 
hundred million there would make a dramatic difference on schools, healthcare, and other 




its parent county Clark to hire 7,500 teachers with full benefits, or repair all broken school 
equipment (and build six new schools), or give every teacher $500 to spend on school supplies 
every year for 83 years (Whitaker, 2016). Instead, that money is going to a football team on its 
fourth relocation—while the Clark County School board voted to approve $43.3 million in cuts, 
including to special education and summer school (Pak-Harvey, 2017). “[N]ever mind the city’s 
crumbling roads and swelling class sizes,” Leibovich (2018) wrote wryly (p. 267). Sometimes 
the impact on public resources is more direct. The new Yankee Stadium in New York, which 
soaked up $1.2 billion of public funds, was “erected on the site of what had been two beloved 
public parks” (Baker, 2018, ¶27). It is common practice for cities to seize, and raze, properties 
via eminent domain in order to make room for new stadiums (“Foul Ball,” 2015). 
The absorption of public funds and spaces can, at times, leave private enterprise in charge 
of functions usually associated with government. In one infamous circumstance, the Louisiana 
Superdome served as shelter for New Orleans locals during Hurricane Katrina, hosting 30,000 
evacuees over the course of five days marked by “limited power, no plumbing … and not nearly 
enough supplies” (Scott 2015, ¶3). The nightmarish scenario was a catch-22 borne of neoliberal 
capitalism. As Giardina and Cole (2012) noted, “the sort of taxing and finance priorities that 
build and maintain stadiums like the Superdome, rather than using resources for the entire 
public’s good, are at least partially responsible for the continued poverty of evacuees such as 
these in the first place” (pp. 62-63). Reroute the public funds absorbed by the Superdome into 
any number of public institutions—schools, housing, and shelter as three examples—and perhaps 
some of those 30,000 would have had the resources to leave the city ahead of the storm.  
New Orleans has poured considerable funds into the Superdome and neighboring 
Smoothie King Center, “both built and operated by taxpayers,” and received nothing in return 
(O’Donoghue, 2017, ¶23). That is no exaggeration. Neither of New Orleans’ major professional 
teams, the NFL Saints and NBA Pelicans, pay rent to play in either arena. Meanwhile the teams’ 
owner, Tom Benson until his 2018 death, receives all of the “money made from ticket sales, 
concession sales and parking” (¶23-24). That is the mere tip of the iceberg in New Orleans, 




From 2009-12, the state paid Benson $23.5 million a year just for keeping the Saints in New 
Orleans (and $8 million for the then-Hornets57), an arrangement that “had become an 
embarrassment to both sides” (McClendon, 2017, ¶5). The sides did away with the annual 
payment, replacing it with $85 million in taxpayer funded upgrades for the Superdome, $55 
million in improvements to the Smoothie King Center, a real estate deal with the state that netted 
Benson almost $4 million in profit, and giving Benson the ability to sell naming rights to the 
Superdome (McClendon, 2017). Mercedes-Benz purchased Superdome naming rights in 2011 
under a ten-year deal worth $50-60 million (Hogan, 2011). That the spectacular public giveaway 
has come amid a slow recovery for New Orleans’ poorer wards—the heavily-damaged Lower 
Ninth Ward was still in rebuilding mode as late as 2018 (Williams, 2018)—is in keeping with the 
bifurcated city space noted earlier.  
New Orleans’ largesse toward Benson is not unique. When NHL Edmonton Oilers owner 
Daryl Katz, “one of the wealthiest men in Canada,” threatened to move the team, the city entered 
into an agreement with the billionaire in which it would “debt-finance nearly all of the total cost” 
of a new $607 million arena and entertainment district, while ceding “all revenue from the city-
owned arena … including concessions and the lucrative naming rights” (Scherer, 2016, p. 39, 
emphasis in original). Such generous deals are an object of admiration among owners, according 
to Leibovich (2018). “Few maneuvers are more respected among NFL owners than finagling a 
sweet stadium deal from a sucker municipality” (p. 304). 
Legal opposition. The stadium subsidy situation is not exactly hiding under the radar. It 
is a convenient target that has generated enough backlash across the political spectrum to 
generate the occasional policy proposal. As far back as 1986, Congress has sought to reduce the 
use of taxpayer funds in stadium construction. A tax bill passed that year eliminated tax 
exemptions on bonds if more than 10 percent of the debt was covered by private revenue, but 
that created a significant loophole. As noted by The New York Times: 
With team owners precluded from tapping the public bond markets and reluctant to use 
more costly taxable debt, sports-starved cities stepped in to build and own the stadiums 
                                                           




themselves, using municipal bonds. And since the 1986 tax act prevents stadium revenues 
from being used to pay off any tax-free, stadium-related debt, a bizarre situation has 
developed. The municipality is often forced to pay with its own dollars for all of the 
borrowings, but the team owner virtually alone gets the revenues from the stadium. 
(Wayne, 1996, ¶8) 
Since the 1986 bill, the Congressional focus has been on the use of municipal bonds. In his 2016 
budget proposal, President Barack Obama called for a ban on the use of tax-exempt municipal 
bonds in stadium construction (Povich, 2015).58 In 2017, U.S. Senators Cory Booker and James 
Lankford sponsored a bill that would have done the same (“Booker, Lankford,” 2017). Later that 
year, an early version of a Republican tax bill included a provision removing the tax exemption 
for stadium bonds, though that was left out of the final version (Delaney & Waldron, 2018). 
Thus far, the only bill Congress has passed to reduce public funding of stadiums is the one that 
unwittingly paved the way for the modern era of public funding. 
 On a local level, cities have tried to fight back against the subsidy/relocation cycle. In 
2018, the state of Ohio filed a lawsuit against Major League Soccer—a single entity league that 
runs all franchises—to prevent the planned relocation of the Columbus Crew to Austin, Texas. 
The suit was based on an Ohio law, informally named after former Browns owner Art Modell, 
barring owners from relocating their franchises unless they met certain conditions (McCann, 
2018b). Lawsuits to block relocation are common and the bar for success is low. Cleveland sued 
Modell two decades earlier when he sought to move the Browns to Baltimore. The city was 
unable to stop the move, though the legal action did result in the NFL and Modell agreeing to 
major concessions that, eventually, led to the launch of a new Browns franchise (McCann, 
2018b). In 2008, Seattle sued Supersonics owner Clay Bennett to keep the team in Seattle two 
more years, until the expiration of the team’s lease at Key Arena. The sides reached a settlement 
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that allowed Bennett to move the team immediately in exchange for $75 million and Bennett 
relinquishing the Supersonics’ name and colors to the city (“Supersonics, Seattle,” 2008). 
 Some efforts have been more drastic. When the Raiders announced a move from Oakland 
to Los Angeles in 1980, the city of Oakland initiated an eminent domain proceeding with the 
goal of seizing the team from owner Al Davis. While the California Supreme Court ruled that 
Oakland had the right to seize the Raiders, the city was never able to show the “valid public use” 
required to do so under California eminent domain law (Barnes, 1983). An appellate court 
further ruled that allowing Oakland to seize the Raiders would “impermissibly burden” interstate 
commerce, in this case NFL operations. “An involuntarily acquired franchise could, at the local 
government’s pleasure, be permanently indentured to the local entity,” according to the appeals 
court ruling. “The League's interests would be subordinated to, or at least compromised by, the 
new owner’s allegiance to the local public interest in matters such as lease agreements, ticket 
prices, concessions, stadium amenities, scheduling conflicts, etc.” (City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders, 1985, p. 420). Furthermore, the mere threat of other cities engaging in the same action 
“would seriously disrupt the balance of economic bargaining on stadium leases throughout the 
nation” (p. 420). The prospect of an empowered community and public, the court seemed to 
argue, would pose a serious threat to the way the NFL does business. 
 Later in the 1980s, the city of Baltimore sought to use eminent domain to seize the Colts 
from owner Bob Irsay to prevent him from moving the team to Indianapolis. When the Maryland 
state legislature began drawing up a bill that would allow Baltimore to seize the team, Irsay 
moved the Colts out of the city in the dead of night (Margolick, 1984). Since, eminent domain 
has been occasionally suggested—including when Modell moved the Browns in 1995 (deMause 
& Cagan, 2015)—but never again seriously pursued. While law scholars have argued that 
eminent domain is cities best bet to keep teams from moving (Stein, 2003), it is worth noting that 
such a move has only become more complicated with time. Given the franchise values of major 
league teams in the late 2010s, providing the ‘just compensation’ required by eminent domain 




 Public opposition. One might ask how public funding of stadiums has managed to 
persist despite apparent bipartisan opposition, consistent polling showing public opposition, and 
a virtual consensus among economists that the benefits do not make up for the costs.59 Farren 
(2017) suggested that teams’ ability to leverage fans’ loyalty and fear of losing their teams was 
the culprit. It is hard to argue with that, given it is an open secret that the threat of relocation can 
be used to make cities pay up.  
 Beyond relocation threats, stadium subsides may persist for the same reason that the 
industry’s other exploitative practices persist. There is no organized fan movement with the 
numbers to make a difference, and when there are pockets of resistance, they face strong 
headwinds. In the aforementioned case of Edmonton, the city’s agreement to pay for a new 
Oilers arena generated grassroots opposition, including the formation of a nonprofit volunteer 
group called Voices for Democracy (VFD). VFD was vocal in its opposition to the arena deal, 
and polls showed that the public was also opposed, but the group was ultimately “unsuccessful in 
marshalling public opposition to the arena development” (Scherer, 2016, p. 49). Scherer 
identified four reasons why resistance to the deal was futile: VFD has insufficient resources, 
financial and otherwise, to mount an effective campaign; it did not have access to, or full 
understanding of, all the relevant data surrounding the deal; there were consequences to opposing 
the deal that included intimidation by supporters; much of the public had become resigned to the 
deal. To the latter of those four points, Scherer noted: 
[I]t became clear that many citizens who supported VFD’s political claims had concluded 
that there was simply nothing to be gained from opposing the arena development more 
forcefully … VFD was unable to overcome the subsequent resignation of citizens and 
despite innumerable polls that demonstrated city-wide opposition to the arena deal, 
countless political organizations, community groups, churches and other constituencies 
inevitably retreated from a political process that was widely perceived to have been 
stacked in favor of proponents. (p. 50) 
                                                           
59 As Farren (2017) noted, “there are few policy topics on which economists agree more – only one out of 
35 of the top economists polled by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business believes that the 




Key to the endurance of neoliberal capitalism has been the cowing of opposition, whether by 
manufacturing consent as in Gramsci’s hegemony, or by stowing impotent anger as in Martin 
(2004)’s venting model of public discourse. Add to that the cultivation of apathy.  
Long before the neoliberal turn, Baran and Sweezy identified the disengagement of the 
public as key to capitalism. In a lost chapter of their book Monopoly Capital published by 
Monthly Review in 2013, the authors argued that corporate media stoked dissatisfaction and 
cynicism among the public through the “persistent mendacity of what is being broadcast” (Baran 
& Sweezy 2013, ¶60). The “tendentious, utterly misleading image of reality” displayed in 
television programming, through its “very incongruity with real life,” had the effect of sapping 
one’s faith in the programming itself, the media in general, and the broader societal institutions: 
[A]s this sham dominating the world of mass communications becomes increasingly 
transparent through daily confrontation with reality, the individual brought up under its 
incessant impact cannot but lose his faith in what he reads, watches, and listens to. 
Learning from childhood that the mass media are for the most part purveyors of swindle, 
he “matures” by growing increasingly cynical about all the purported values and truths he 
is urged to accept. The knowledge that the racket constitutes the normal way of life 
merges with the impotent feeling “Who am I to say what is right and wrong?” (¶66) 
Though pertaining specifically to the media, Baran and Sweezy’s critique is applicable to the 
cultural industry that is professional sport. Particularly in the case of stadium subsidies, pro sport 
is conditioned on the belief that teams are part of the community rather than a billionaire’s 
private property; that having a team elevates a city to world-class status. Scherer (2016) noted 
the “familiar historical script in which the retention of a major league sports franchise and the 
promotion of spectacular entertainment districts are understood by civic elites as valuable 
showcasing opportunities” (p. 40). That most of the public opposes public funding of stadiums 
would seem to indicate that those civic elites are out-of-step with the popular sentiment.  
What does it say to the public when such stadium deals get done, despite broad 
opposition? What does it say to the public when cities become ‘developed’ while the typical 




(2013), Hausknecht (1960) provides an answer: “In modern American society there is a secret 
understanding, shared by almost everyone and obliquely expressed by the mass media only in 
tabloids and exposé magazines, that all public life and all public institutions are a fraud. 
Contemporary society itself is widely assumed to be fixed” (¶66).  
If everything is fixed, then nothing can be fixed. Hence the discrepancy between 
opposition and action. McChesney (2014) wrote of the “tremendous pessimism” that set in after 
the 2011 Occupy protests faded. Despite widespread support for his critiques of capitalism, he 
found people had reached the conclusion “that there were no alternatives to the status quo. Or, if 
there were alternatives, that there was no way to bring them into being. The fix was in, and 
political activity could not yield positive results. It was hopeless, and only deluded fools would 
bother to think otherwise” (p. 16). If the deck is stacked, why act—especially when acting takes 
away from one’s time and subjects one to potential wrath? Between disempowered players and a 
disengaged public, team owners face little threat to the status quo. 
The above leads one to wonder how the common post-structural critique of economic 
determinism could possibly apply in a professional sport system so thoroughly exploitative. 
What counter-hegemonic power can the public realistically exhibit under such a system? Can 
such power disrupt the structural apparatus in a meaningful way? Though the task of opposing 
the private ownership system is daunting, resistance—even if ineffectual in the long run—still 
serves to challenge the core rationale of the private ownership system, which is that sport is truly 
the property of billionaires, rather than of the players, the fans, or the cities hosting the teams.  
Recall the quotes by Shaquille O’Neal and Rick Welts from a previous chapter, about owners 
being mere stewards of the game and players and fans the true owners. The owner-as-steward is 
an important component of the myth of pro sport, which is that the teams are community pillars 
rather than private property. That myth has helped sustain the system of private ownership by 
essentially distracting the public from the true nature of the industry. The teams disguise their 
true allegiances by putting “New York” or “Boston” on the jerseys, rather than “Dolan” or 
“Henry.” Yet that proverbial ‘false consciousness’ also serves to undermine the private 




play for are the rightful property of the owners? How strong is the ideology underpinning the 
private ownership system if nobody really believes it?  
Conclusions 
 Returning to the question at the beginning of this chapter, what function for capital does 
the sports industry serve? It appears clear. The sports industry is an engine for an exploitative 
form of capitalism, one that dehumanizes employees, consumers and communities as cogs in a 
perpetual revenue machine. The logic is to make as much money as possible while spending as 
little as possible, hence salary caps and maximum salaries and stadium subsidies in times of 
exponentially rising television deals and franchise values. In this way, sport is really no different 
than any other industry.  
Where sport differs is in its ability to dress it all up as something different. To turn a 
billionaire’s holdings into objects of civic pride or a series of head injuries into ‘America’s 
game.’ Or at the most basic level, to turn a massive enterprise laden with economic, social, and 
political implications into a simple child’s game, an entertainment product so uncomplicated as 
to be unworthy of serious study.  
To be sure, all sports viewers see the advertising on every inch of play, the commercials 
in the arenas and on television, and all the other accoutrements of modern capitalism. There is no 
mistaking pro sports, or even its amateur counterpart, as a not-for-profit zone. Yet it is one thing 
to see it and quite another to think about it. As one watches the crowd at U.S. Bank Stadium rise 
as one in a deafening cheer for Stefon Diggs’ game winning touchdown in the playoffs, it might 
never cross one’s mind how much tax money went into the stadium that could have gone to 
schools. As one cheers a clutch Super Bowl touchdown pass, one might overlook the number of 
brain injuries suffered by the offensive line protecting the QB in the pocket. All of the ways in 
which pro sports’ economic model exploits everyone—save for the owners and their media 
partners—are not merely obscured, but passively absorbed as normal. So much so that sport, 
which in its core is committed to the enrichment of an elite class at the expense of everyone else, 




Capitalism has thrived in large part because its worst effects have been obscured, either 
by a focus on communism or socialism, or by purposeful obfuscation. The negative effects of 
capitalism are difficult to completely ignore, however. Donald Trump, a Republican and 
billionaire, won the Electoral College in no small part because even he was able to speak to 
capitalism’s failures (albeit disingenuously). Sport is one of the few places in society in which 
the excesses of capitalism operate under the radar. Its function for capital is an assumed, and 
entirely undeserved, neutrality. “The neutrality of sports,” Brower (1977) wrote,  
“is the equivalent of what is done throughout the society. Education is simply to teach, 
medicine is simply to cure, etc. The people in charge generate consensus for support of 
their institution by keeping the ‘inappropriate matters’ … out of it. … To close off these 
topics is a political act, the purpose of which is to prevent any kind of correction from ever 
taking place.” (p. 97) 
The purpose of the preceding analysis was twofold. First, to dispel the notion that the private 
ownership model of sports team ownership was a naturally occurring or inevitable phenomenon. 
It was in fact the product of conflict between the upper and working classes, with the former 
seeking to exclude, and later control, the latter’s participation. Second, to demonstrate that pro 
sports under private ownership serves to benefit the ultra-rich—whether pro sports owners, allied 
politicians, or media moguls—and exploit employees, consumers, and communities.  
The popular perception that sport is neutral, or apolitical, or a trivial child’s game, works 
to shield its true nature. Organized sport in the West, and the United States specifically, is a 
triumph of class warfare. It is the transformation of play into status, status into exclusion, and 
exclusion into exploitation and control. It is capitalism unrestrained, a proxy in a national, 
decades-long campaign to funnel public resources and labor into private coiffeurs. 
Returning to Mander (2013), the author identified five aspects of capitalism intrinsic to 
the system. Capitalism is amoral, with no mandate other than the expansion of wealth; it is 
growth-dependent to the point of resource depletion; it is prone to war; it is fundamentally and 




of these characteristics apply to the privately-owned sports model, particularly the propensity to 
war or the undermining of democracy, but it is worth examining the ones that do. 
 To say professional sport is amoral is not to suggest that it is necessarily immoral. It 
simply is not concerned with morality. Players and coaches who have committed serious ethical 
violations, criminal or otherwise, often have such misdeeds overlooked if they can help a team 
win. That is not limited to professional sport, as college sport is replete with stories of abhorrent 
behavior being overlooked in pursuit of wins. Beyond its tolerance for misbehavior, professional 
sport is also prone to the kind of exploitation discussed in earlier chapters. It bears repeating that 
NFL owners and executives for years covered up the toll of repeated blows to the head, making 
millions off of athletes in their playing careers and doing nothing once those athletes retired, 
bodies broken, to a life of steady decline. 
 Professional sport also shares capitalism’s tendency toward capital accumulation—
described by Foster (2017) as “a juggernaut in which each new level of economic growth 
becomes the mere means to further growth, ad infinitum” (p. 94, emphasis in original). The NFL, 
so growth-focused that even Mark Cuban once referred to it as a ‘greedy hog’ (McMahon 2014), 
is indicative. Upon league revenue hitting $8.5 billion in 2010, league commissioner Roger 
Goodell set the goal of tripling that figure—or reaching the $25 billion mark—by 2027 (Kaplan 
2010). The NFL is of course not alone. Team owners have proven their willingness to shut down 
their entire leagues in order to set themselves up for greater growth, including in Cuban’s NBA. 
As noted in this chapter, the NBA locked out players in 2011 over dubious claims of losing 
money and we able to engineer a transfer of billions from players to owners. As a result, when 
the NBA experienced a TV-driven financial windfall in the latter half of the 2010s, the majority 
of the money accrued to the owners, rather than the players. 
 Pro sport is also fundamentally unequal. The players’ enormous salaries are a drop in the 
bucket to what owners are making off of pro sports, with the very best players likely missing out 
on tens—if not hundreds—of millions in career earnings. As for fans and the general public, the 




for by the public, set ticket and concession prices at exorbitant levels, and still wield the threat to 
leave as a weapon to extract more. 
 Finally, it is worth asking whether pro sport helps one achieve happiness. The civic joy of 
winning a championship cannot be overstated, particularly in markets where championships have 
been few and far between. Yet sport in its current form is the very definition of what Mander 
(2013) termed “a constant quest for external satisfactions” (p. 15). It is trite to suggest that a city 
with hundreds of millions worth of libraries and other public spaces might be happier than a city 
with a pro sports team, but it is hard to imagine that a championship parade every 20 or 30 years 
is preferable to having a functioning and bustling public square. The time spent agonizing over 
the local team—and in certain markets, it is year after year of agony—could be better spent.  
None of the above is either/or. One can experience the civic pride of a local sports team 
without it depleting all other resources, or threatening the health of its players, or exploiting both 
spectators and participants. It just requires an entirely new model.  
A common refrain in critical work, either stated explicitly or between the lines, is that ‘it 
does not have to be this way.’ That is especially the case for sport, which even under the current 
private ownership model can be entertaining, thrilling, even uplifting. When watching world-
class athletes perform incredible physical feats in front of a cheering throng of fans, it is easy to 
forget that the biggest winner is a billionaire lurking in a luxury box. Team owners are virtually 
invisible during sporting events, the likes of Mark Cuban and Jerry Jones excluded, yet nearly all 
of the economic value of pro sports goes into their pockets. Viewers do not tune in for the 
owners and players do not play for the owners. If all else was the same and there were no 
owners, who could tell the difference? The Packers are one of pro sports’ glamour franchises. 
The Bundesliga is one of the world’s biggest leagues. The Players’ League nearly outlasted the 
National League. All without private ownership. The following chapter proposes a pro sports 
future without owners, wherein the players, fans, and communities control the teams and the 






CHAPTER FIVE: A WAY FORWARD 
 
To conclude the analysis in this dissertation, the following chapter examines how the 
present system of private ownership can be opposed by players and by the fans/public. The 
earlier chapters have mentioned the repeated instances in which players, fans or the public have 
exercised their autonomy to oppose the private ownership system. Whether John Ward and the 
Brotherhood abandoning the National League to form a direct competitor, or cities mounting 
doomed efforts to seize franchises through eminent domain, it is not the case that those exploited 
under the private ownership system have taken their lot sitting down. This final chapter proposes 
a combined effort among players, fans and the public to mount a competitor to the privately-
owned leagues, one that would seize on the greatest vulnerability of the current model—that the 
owners are just not necessary. 
The previous chapters outlined how the private model of professional team ownership 
formed out of class conflict, how it has integrated with other dominant institutions, and how it 
has failed to serve players, fans, and communities. This chapter examines how to remove the 
owners from the equation and organize sport in a way that benefits those doing the work, and 
those footing the bill. 
Existing Alternatives  
Before outlining this dissertation’s proposal for non-private ownership in professional 
sport, it is necessary to note that there is previous scholarship proposing alternative structures, 
both in and outside of sport. Some of those will be outlined presently.  
Szymanski and Ross (2008) suggested two reforms that would reduce team owners’ 
power and influence without disrupting the existing private ownership model: adopting a 
promotion and relegation model as in English soccer, and transferring control of the leagues 
from owners to an independent organizer, as in NASCAR. In the latter scenario, team owners 
would “be required to sell the assets necessary to reorganize the competition into a separate 




Such reforms would leave owners in control of their teams but remove their ability to 
govern and also reduce their leverage over cities. Such a system would eliminate self-serving 
rules that benefit owners more than they do players or fans, such as player salary restrictions; 
force all team owners to put their best product on the field lest their team be relegated; and—as 
noted in the previous chapter—eliminate the threat of relocation. The authors were under no 
illusions about the feasibility of their solutions, acknowledging that it was highly unlikely that 
team owners would agree to a promotion/relegation plan: “the fundamental elimination of 
monopoly power will have to come from public pressure” (p. 128). If adopted—a key caveat—
the proposals would go a long way into making pro sports less exploitative of cities and fans. 
 Economist David Berri suggested a more feasible alternative during NBA owners’ 2011 
lockout of players. Instead of relying on owners to accede to public pressure and consent to a 
wholesale restructuring of their respective leagues, Berri (2011)’s proposal would create a new 
professional basketball league that would rely on the NBA’s various extortion cities. Using the 
NBA’s smallest metropolitan area—Salt Lake City—as a baseline, Berri identified sixteen non-
NBA markets that could host a professional basketball team. The markets would range from 
Seattle to Buffalo and Calgary. In Berri’s proposed league, the Basketball Players Association 
League (BPAL), 
the cities would act as owners. Already—as noted—the cities are providing much of the 
capital. In the BPAL that practice would continue. But instead of just giving the capital to 
the 30 men who happen to own the teams, the cities would keep the capital and earn the 
economic returns this capital generates. Meanwhile, the players would continue to provide 
the labor (and earn the returns generated by their labor). (¶10) 
Berri’s system did not provide much of a role for players, with the caveat that the article likely 
had to be light on details to appeal to a mass audience. 
 Outside of sport, CPE/PEM scholars have outlined alternatives to neoliberal capitalism in 
general. McChesney has written multiple times of what a post-capitalist democracy would look 
like, and at least at the outset, it would maintain the economic system absent its exploitative 




that markets would actually thrive in this environment. But it would be a different type of 
capitalism, and point the way toward a possible post-capitalist future—what I call socialism” 
(McChesney 2014, p. 26). The system he envisioned would include markets and for-profit 
enterprises, “but under the overarching logic of the system, the surplus will be mostly under 
nonprofit community control” (McChesney 2013, p. 230). Such a system would include non-
profit, non-commercial institutions ranging from journalism outlets and television stations to, 
notably for this analysis, sports leagues. It would eliminate private profit motives from crucial 
institutions such as the military, prisons, banks, energy and health insurance, where said profit 
motives have created perverse incentives.60 McChesney’s version of socialism is “[a] democratic 
society with real self-government … An economy that serves the people rather than an economy 
that demands the people serve the needs of the owners” (Foster, 2017, foreword, p. 13).  
 The common thread through the above examples is the transfer of power and influence 
from profit-driven capitalists to a separate entity. Whether through the establishment of an 
independent commission or through community ownership, it is clear that the first step is to 
remove monopoly capitalist motivations from the equation. 
 Szymanski and Ross (2008) were idealistic in suggesting that public pressure could get 
team owners to relinquish power. Perhaps if there was an organized, nationwide strike of sports 
fans, but such a concept is frankly unlikely—even in the alternate reality where sports fan union 
organizations were prominent, rather than little-known. It may actually be easier to reform 
capitalism generally through public pressure, where candidates can be voted into office with a 
mandate to change the status quo, than to get owners to agree to a new system. In the absence of 
such public pressure, an alternative model of team ownership would have to begin with an 
entirely new league, ala Berri’s BPAL. 
                                                           
60 A quote by Washington NFL owner Daniel Snyder is indicative. Explaining how he made his money in 
marketing, Snyder noted that he simply capitalized on others’ maladies: “We were looking at trend lines. 
We saw that the aging baby boomer demographics were coming on strong. That meant there’s going to be 
a lot more diabetic patients, a lot more cancer patients, et cetera. How do we capture those market 




 There have of course been successful alternative leagues in pro sport history, though none 
other than the P.L. that used an alternative ownership structure. Alternative leagues had their 
heyday from the late 19th through the mid-20th century, before the “Big Four” North American 
leagues were fully established. The American League in baseball, American Football League 
(AFL) in football, American Basketball Association (ABA) in the basketball, and World Hockey 
Association (WHA) in hockey provided stiff enough competition to the dominant leagues—the 
“National” League, Football League, Basketball Association and Hockey League—that mergers 
became desirable. Since the last of those mergers, the NHL with the WHA in 1976, alternative 
leagues have sputtered after a few years, or lasted in a diminished enough format that they 
provided no serious threat. The United States Football League (USFL) was briefly successful, 
before one of its owners—a businessman named Donald Trump—engineered a move from a 
spring schedule to direct competition with the NFL in the fall. Outside of the USFL, alternative 
leagues have barely gotten off the ground in the modern age. A recent example is the Alliance of 
American Football, which launched with a degree of fanfare in 2019, but suspended operations 
midway through the season. The reason may sound familiar. The league’s majority stakeholder, 
Carolina Hurricanes owner Tom Dundon, wanted immediate results and cut ties when he could 
not achieve them (Dator, 2019). 
 Alternative leagues have lacked the financial resources, and general clout, to compete 
with the established leagues on the most significant terrain, that of talent. If any star player ends 
in an alternative league, it is typically because they are at the end of their career—or committed 
so many serious transgressions that they have no other option. Since the end of the USFL in 
1985, “there hasn't been a competitor big enough or rich enough to put into question which 
league boasts the best talent in the world” (Moore, 2015, ¶1). The USFL was able to attract 
college stars like Herschel Walker and Doug Flutie by offering more money.61 “Both Walker and 
Flutie could have been NFL millionaires. Instead, they chose to be USFL multimillionaires” 
(Boswell, 1985, ¶16). In the era of the reserve clause, the ABA and AFL provided the only true 
competition for NBA and NFL players at the end of their contracts. If there was no open market 
                                                           




in their own league, they could jump to the alternative—and many did. After reaching a $34 
million television deal with NBC in 1964, the AFL was able to attract college stars with salaries 
in excess of what they could make in the NFL, including the likes of Joe Namath. The ensuing 
bidding wars between the NFL and AFL led to the leagues’ eventual merger: “The AFL, which 
had never been profitable, took big losses, but it did not matter. The NFL was losing money for 
the first time in over a decade and sued for peace” (Besanko, Darnove, Shanley & Schaefer, 
2009, p. 348). A similar dynamic emerged between the NBA and ABA. In the ABA’s first year 
in 1967, NBA All-Star Rick Barry jumped to the new league’s Oakland Oaks, whose $75,000 
annual salary dwarfed what his NBA team, the Golden State Warriors, was offering (Smith, 
2017). While Barry’s reasons were not solely economic—his father-in-law coached the Oaks—
the ABA’s ability to compete with the NBA on salaries resulted in several all-time greats playing 
in the league.62 While the ABA never achieved the same level of stability of the NBA, the 
presence of those all-time greats kept the league afloat for long enough that the NBA, weakened 
by the competition, pursued a merger.  
None of the challengers of the 1960s or 1970s survived into the 1980s, but a combined 
eighteen teams from the ABA, AFL, and WHA remain active to this day—the NFL Patriots, 
Bills, Titans (née Oilers), Dolphins, Jets, Bengals, Chiefs, Broncos, Chargers and Raiders, the 
NBA Nuggets, Spurs, Pacers and Nets, and the NHL Oilers, Hurricanes (née Whalers), 
Avalanche (née Nordiques) and Coyotes (née Jets). If a failure in the most basic sense of the 
term, those alternative leagues were able to use their ability to compete with the dominant 
leagues to achieve a level of staying power that other alternative leagues have lacked. Based on 
those examples, it is not mere speculation to assume that an alternative league made up of well-
known, prominent athletes could have a greater chance at success than other recent alternatives. 
 The need for star athletes is one primary reason why the alternative model suggested in 
this analysis would rely as much on the Players League example of 1890 as on the community-
based model used by the Packers and advocated by Berri, McChesney, and others. The Players 
League challenged the National League in large part because it was able to siphon away the 
                                                           




biggest stars, most of whom were motivated to move out from under the suffocating aegis of 
league owners. Pro players today may understand that, despite ever-restrictive collective 
bargaining agreements, they still have it better in an established league than in a new, unproven 
entity. Hence the need to provide some incentive: ownership interest and the ability to craft rules 
and policies. 
A Players’ League For the 2020s 
 Based on the precedents cited in the previous section, for an alternative league to have 
any chance of success, it would need to consist of, or at the very least compete for, the best talent 
in the game. The Players League was led by the greatest baseball players of the era, and a viable 
alternative league will need the same level of star power. The example used in this analysis will 
be basketball, as that league includes many of the most recognizable athletes in the world. 
 Professional basketball players are keenly aware of their individual value. “I know how 
much the [Cleveland Cavaliers] cost when [Dan Gilbert] bought it,” LeBron James told The 
Athletic in 2017. (Gilbert bought the team in 2005 for $375 million and, per Forbes, it was worth 
$355 million the year after James left for Miami in 2010.) “And I know how much it’s worth 
now—over $1 billion if he wanted it” (Lloyd, 2017, ¶16). While that increase is modest by NBA 
standards,63 it is an indication of the power one player has to goose the owners’ bottom-line. 
By moving from one team to another, the highest-level players can single-handedly 
swing franchise valuations. James’ decision to leave the Cavaliers for the Miami Heat in 2010 is 
the quintessential example. “No player in the 64-year history of the [NBA] has come close to 
having the immediate and profound impact” that James had in leaving the Cavaliers for the Heat, 
Forbes reported in 2010. “[James’] move accounted for both the biggest gain and drop in team 
values: the Heat’s worth increased 17% … and the Cavaliers plummeted 26%” (Ozanian, 2011, 
¶2). After James’ 2014 return, the Cavaliers valuation climbed as high as $1.33 billion in the 
final year of his second stint with the team, 2018 (Badenhausen, 2018a). In the first year after his 
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after James left the franchise) to 2018 (the final year of James’ second stint with the team), but that was 
merely the 21st-biggest increase over that span. The Cavaliers were the 15th-most valuable NBA 




second departure, the team’s estimated value dipped four percent to 1.28 billion—a smaller drop 
than after his first departure, but the only decline in value suffered by any team in Forbes’ 2019 
estimates (Badenhausen & Ozanian, 2019). One player’s decision had a greater impact on the 
teams’ value than any action taken by ownership. 
Acquiring a star player has specific benefits for a franchise, such as a greater chance of 
winning, prolonged runs of contention, increased exposure on national television, and higher 
attendance and merchandise sales. Franchises such as the New York Knicks or Los Angeles 
Lakers have built-in value stemming from their presence in large metropolitan markets and from 
a history of winning, hence the Knicks and Lakers are perpetually ranking among the most 
valuable NBA franchises. For franchises with little tradition, acquiring a star player through free 
agency, trade or the NBA draft can turn an also-ran into a juggernaut.  
The Cavaliers were a non-factor in the NBA for most of their existence until winning the 
2003 NBA Draft Lottery, which allowed them to pick James first overall. In the decades prior to 
drafting James, the team was perhaps best known for the mismanagement of original owner Ted 
Stepien, so severe that the NBA passed a rule to protect the franchise from his poor decision-
making.64 While it is likely that the Cavaliers would have been more valuable in 2018 than in 
2003 regardless of whether they drafted James—recall from a previous chapter that team 
ownership has become increasingly foolproof—it is hardly in dispute that he was the single 
biggest factor in the team’s resurgence. If a single player can turn a franchise with little tradition 
into one of the more recognizable sports brands, could that impact extend to a franchise with no 
tradition at all? To put it another way, if LeBron James can revitalize the Cleveland Cavaliers, 
who is to say he could not have a similar effect on an entirely new franchise?  
The following proposal concedes that even with the starpower brought by players like 
James, Kevin Durant, and others, a new league would not immediately vault to the same level as 
the present-day NBA. Even so, based on the difficulties established leagues have experienced 
when faced with a talent-rich rival—from the National League struggling against the P.L. to the 
                                                           
64 During his three years as owner, Stepien traded the Cavaliers’ 1982-86 first round draft picks, leading 
to an NBA rule prohibiting teams from trading their first-round pick in consecutive years. The NBA also 




more recent examples of the NFL and NBA vs. the AFL and ABA—a new league featuring the 
majority of NBA stars would seem to have the potential of siphoning basketball fans from the 
NBA. The key is to withstand a weak first two or three years and allow the league to achieve a 
foothold in the sporting scene. The Players’ League was unable to do so because the capitalists 
who provided much of the funds balked after just one year of losses. Had the P.L. merely lasted 
into a second season, it is entirely plausible that the National League would have collapsed from 
the competition. A simple long-term plan may have been enough for the P.L. to survive, if not in 
perpetuity then at least for more than one year, and its survival could have seriously threatened 
the private ownership system in professional sports before the turn of the 20th Century. 
 Key to the future of a new, alternative league is a long-term plan that accounts for early 
losses and, more importantly, gives players, fans, and communities greater say in the viability of 
the league than the kind of easily-spooked businessmen who doomed the Players’ League. The 
following sections will discuss 1) how the new league would be set up, 2) why it would be able 
to attract players, fans, sponsors, and media partners, 3) ways in which it can avoid potential 
pitfalls and 4) the timetable for success. There is no expectation that a player-run basketball 
league would be a success right away, but given the time to grow, such an alternative could 
eventually take hold. The Packers are a useful guide, as the team’s rocky beginnings eventually 
gave way to enduring prosperity. 
 Setting up the new league. For the purposes of an easy-to-read discussion, the proposed 
league will from here on be referred to as the Hypothetical Basketball Association (HBA). 
Borrowing from the Players League of 1890, which was developed by members of the 
Brotherhood players union, the HBA would originate from within the National Basketball 
Players Association (NBPA). With the NBA and NBPA in relative harmony at the end of the 
2010s, both so flush with television money that a work stoppage was not even considered during 
the 2017 CBA negotiations, it may seem unlikely that the players union would kill the proverbial 
golden goose to begin a new, untested venture. Indeed, that is true. For the purposes of this 




following hypothetical, it is December 15, 2022,65 and the NBA owners have announced their 
intention to opt out of the CBA. Just as in 2011 and 1998, owners are complaining of losses and 
high player salaries. The league’s television deal is expiring in just over two years, and ESPN 
and Turner, who by this point have become even more damaged by television’s changing 
economics than in the late 2010s, are unwilling to pay much more than the current $2.66 billion. 
That number was massive in 2014, but not so much a decade later. If the NBA is to experience a 
financial crunch, the owners intend for the players to bear the brunt. 
 It is typical in the course of protracted labor-management negotiations to hear one or two 
players speak about launching a player-owned league. Recall the Amare Stoudemire anecdote 
from earlier in this text. In this hypothetical, the usual musings about starting a new league 
become more realistic. Perhaps LeBron James, who by 2018 had already become known almost 
as much for his business ambitions as his on-court performance, serves as the driving force. By 
December 15, 2022, he would be 15 days shy of his 38th birthday and, assuming he stays healthy 
in the intervening years, in the twilight of his career. Serving as the John Montgomery Ward of a 
new basketball league would be his most ambitious move yet, and one in keeping with his 
history of union involvement. James served as first vice president of the NBPA from 2015-19, a 
role he took on so he could be involved in then-upcoming collective bargaining negotiations. 
 In this hypothetical, the players would negotiate with ownership as is typical, but behind 
the scenes the planning begins for what might occur during a lockout. Instead of the usual 
process of negotiating in fits-and-starts, losing games and eventually giving up ground, talks of a 
real back-up plan begin at the highest levels of the union. When talks went south in 2011, the 
players’ trump card was decertification of the union, a drastic move that ultimately did little to 
prevent the owners from routing the players with a 12-point swing in basketball related income. 
A realistic plan for a new, alternative league would be more likely to force the owners’ hand.  
 It is at this point that one should note that the union is rarely of one accord. The highest-
paid stars and the rank and file do not face the same issues, and rank-and-file players simply 
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cannot hold out for as long during negotiations. The league, particularly during David Stern’s 
tenure as commissioner, has exploited this division early and often during negotiations. It is 
likely that rank-and-file players would be far less willing to abandon the established NBA in 
favor of a new league, and one can imagine said players would be more focused on pursuing 
negotiations with management over what could be perceived as a risky pipe-dream. Even in the 
P.L., some players refused to join the Brotherhood’s new league for that very reason: “Baseball 
playing is my business and I expect to make money out of it,” one player told The New York 
Times in 1889, “and for that reason I don’t want to jump into an airy project at the sacrifice of 
what I now have” (“Ball Players,” 1889, ¶7). 
 With that said, it is also the case that the league’s biggest stars occupy the leadership 
positions in the union. As of 2018, the union’s executive committee included James and fellow 
all-stars Chris Paul, Carmelo Anthony, Stephen Curry, Andre Iguodala, Pau Gasol, and C.J. 
McCollum, with the only role players being Garrett Temple and Anthony Tolliver, the latter 
serving as secretary-treasurer (“Leadership,” n.d.). The potential for internal discord is real, but 
under the current set-up of the union, the new league plan would have a potentially powerful 
constituency.  
 Over the course of the 2022-23 season, with a lockout looming at Midnight ET on July 1, 
members of the union begin quietly developing the idea behind the scenes, consulting with 
financial advisors, economists, and friendly members of the media. By the All-Star break, the 
players have come up with a general outline, described below. 
A single-entity solution. The HBA would be run by the union as a single-entity 
structure, wherein the league owns all teams and negotiates all contracts. Single-entity structures 
are a relatively new way of organizing professional sports leagues, becoming popularized in the 
1990s, and require some level of explanation. 
Typically, sports leagues are structured as single entities to avoid antitrust scrutiny and 
more easily limit player agency. In a traditional private ownership structure, teams operate as 
individual businesses for whom collective action—such as instituting a cap on player salaries —




bargaining. A single entity league could impose otherwise anti-competitive policies because the 
teams are not in competition with each other, functioning “more like departments in a single 
company than rival businesses” (McCann, 2018a, ¶19). Given that, it should be no surprise that 
the traditional leagues have sought to be recognized as single entities and gain what would be “a 
de facto antitrust exemption” (Belson, 2015, ¶4). The NFL appeared poised to achieve single-
entity status in 2010, when the Supreme Court agreed to evaluate whether the league constituted 
a single-entity as part of a long, sprawling court case involving a manufacturer. In a unanimous 
9-0 decision, the Court ruled that while “NFL teams have common interests such as promoting 
the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities” (American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League, 2010, p. 2213).  
In the most prominent North American league organized as a single entity, Major League 
Soccer, the league “retains significant centralized control” over all operations. “MLS owns all of 
the teams that play in the league … as well as all intellectual property rights, tickets, supplied 
equipment, and broadcast rights. MLS sets the teams' schedules; negotiates all stadium leases 
and assumes all related liabilities; pays the salaries of referees and other league personnel; and 
supplies certain equipment” (Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 2002, p. 53).  
There are no team owners as the league controls all operations unilaterally. MLS uses 
“investor-operators” rather than owners, though their level of influence is functionally the same 
as in the traditional leagues. Investor-operators hire and fire staff, handle local promotions and 
broadcast rights, and pay half of the stadium fees (with the league footing the other half). They 
also control a majority of the MLS board of governors, in charge of securing national media 
rights and hiring the league commissioner (Fraser, 2002). While MLS has drifted away from 
single-entity status in recent years, its precedent is useful in developing the HBA. 
With power centralized within a league apparatus that is fully accountable to the union, it 
would not be necessary for the HBA to have a president or commissioner. The union executive 
director would instead fill that role, serving primarily as a representative for the league to 
sponsors and media partners. The union executive committee, whose members would be voted 




sponsorships. The full union would vote on other aspects of the league, including whether to 
award a franchise to a prospective city, a process that will be outlined briefly below.  
While the players would run the league itself, each individual team would be controlled 
by the community in which it is based. Unlike in the Players League, where the Brotherhood 
depended on businessmen to provide much of the funding, the HBA would borrow from the 
Green Bay Packers and European Soccer in relying on members of the public. Combining 
elements of the Packers’ shareholder model, the socios of Real Madrid and Barcelona, and the 
50+1 format of the Bundesliga, HBA teams would be organized thusly. Community shareholders 
would own a controlling 60 percent stake of each team, with the remaining 40 percent split 
between the league itself and any interested investors. Profits, when they are made, will be split 
in the same proportion, with 60 percent going to the shareholders and 40 percent going back to 
the league or to investors. 
In Green Bay, the Packers’ shareholders vote on whom to elect to the team’s 43-person 
board of directors, and then the board of directors selects the members of the seven-person 
executive committee, which includes the team president and CEO. The HBA would operate 
under a slightly simplified format. Each team would have a ten-person board of directors, with 
the shareholders voting to fill six seats, including the chair, and the league appointing the 
remaining four seats. The board of directors would serve the same role as the Packers’ executive 
committee, naming the team president and CEO, in addition to other executive positions. The 
team executives would then operate as in any traditional league, hiring the coaching staff and 
filling other game-related positions. 
One position that would not be filled is that of general manager. Under the single entity 
structure, players negotiate contracts not with individual teams, but with the league itself. In a 
privately-owned single entity league, such an arrangement can become grossly exploitative. 
Single-entity leagues, absent antitrust scrutiny, can “unilaterally impose aggressive wage 
restrictions, strict drug-testing procedures and other workplace requirements that would surely 
attract opposition” from players’ unions in traditional leagues (McCann, 2018a, ¶11). A player-




independent general manager to handle all salary negotiations. Players would negotiate their 
salaries with the league and then sign with the team of their choice. There would be no salary cap 
and no maximum salaries. If a team can no longer afford to pay a player the desired salary, said 
player can go into the marketplace and find another team that will. If there is no team in the 
league that can do so, the player would have the option of the NBA, or another alternative that 
could rise up in its place. It goes without saying that such an outcome—a player leaving the 
HBA because the salaries are not high enough—endangers the entire conceit of the league, 
which is that it features the world’s best players. The potential issue of insufficient salary is 
addressed in a section later in this chapter.  
As for players entering their professional careers, the HBA would do away with the entry 
draft and 19-year-old age limit for incoming prospects. The NBA Draft has been challenged by 
the NBPA on multiple occasions, surviving only because of the non-statutory labor exemption 
that protects otherwise anticompetitive policies that were negotiated in collective bargaining. In 
the HBA, any interested player who has graduated high school enters the free agent market and 
can negotiate a contract with the league. 
The above outline leaves many questions. Where will the teams be located, and how will 
the host cities be selected? Is there enough demand among fans to support a publicly-owned 
franchise? How will the league generate enough funding to get itself, and its teams, off of the 
ground? What would the players, and the fans, get out of the arrangement? The following section 
addresses, and attempts to resolve, the various potential problems with the concept. Can this 
really work? 
Public ownership of teams. The HBA would ideally consist of teams in markets not 
currently served by the NBA. The number of teams would be limited to no more than 20, fewer 
than the NBA’s 30, but roster sizes would expand to ensure that interested players have a place 
to play. As noted previously, each team would be publicly owned, with community shareholders 
owning a majority 60 percent stake. Even so, the league would still control which cities are 
awarded franchises. First, the union executive committee would identify possible host cities, 




City); markets that have been passed over by the NBA (ex. Virginia Beach, Louisville)66; and 
markets that are large enough to support both the NBA and HBA (ex. New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago). It would then determine which of those cities met certain criteria. In the established 
leagues, those criteria typically include a new or renovated arena, either immediately or in the 
near future; a prospective owner capable of paying a massive expansion fee; and sufficient fan 
support. Absent the profit-motivations of private ownership, the HBA would not require state-of-
the-art arenas or massive expansion fees. It would, however, need evidence that the city could 
support a team through stock sales.  
In the established leagues, prospective owners typically stage season-ticket drives to 
gauge the level of interest in a potential market, a common way for a potential expansion or 
relocation city to show that it has built-in fan support. In 2018, the prospective ownership group 
seeking to bring an NHL team to Seattle held a season-ticket drive in which fans “were required 
to put down a deposit of $500 per ticket or $1,000 for club tickets” (“Waitlist starts,” 2018, 4). 
Over 30,000 locals put down a deposit, and the NHL awarded Seattle a team not long after. In 
each potential market, the HBA would similarly hold a stock drive in which interested fans 
would put down a deposit on shares of the team. In the event that there is enough interest to 
support a franchise, the city would be awarded a team and the fans would own the shares they 
purchased. If not, the city would not be awarded a team and the fans would get their money back. 
 In the HBA, the public would in essence take the place of the capitalists who supported 
the Players League. Unlike those capitalists, who ultimately sank the P.L., it is the expectation 
here that members of the public who would choose to invest into a professional sports team 
would do so with on-court results in mind, rather than profit. That assumption is not unfounded. 
Fans who purchase stock in the Packers receive zero financial benefit, their return on investment 
being the continued existence of the team. The Packers even say outright that prospective buyers 
“should not purchase the stock to make a profit or to receive a dividend or tax deduction or any 
other economic benefits” (Florio, 2012, ¶4). Of the Packers’ stock, The Wall Street Journal 
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noted: “It costs $250 a share, pays no dividends, benefits from no earnings, isn’t tradeable and 
has no securities law protection … a purchase doesn’t even bump buyers higher up the Packers’ 
96,000-strong waiting list for tickets or allow them to buy T-shirts and cheesehead hats at a 
discount” (Saunders, 2012, ¶1, 6). Deadspin called owning Packers stock a “feel good scam” 
noting that buyers do not get money or a say in how the team is run. “What Packers fans/owners 
are doing, in essence, is making a donation without the tax break. The team wants money for 
renovations and other things, so they send up the Pack Signal and the cash just rolls in” 
(Petchesky, 2011, ¶10).67  
It seems clear that purchasing Packers stock is not a rational decision motivated by strong 
business sense. Then why would more than 360,000 people purchase more than five million 
shares of the team (Simon, 2017)? The simplest answer is because of an emotional attachment to 
the team, such that even token ownership is worth spending hundreds. That is to say nothing of 
the stability provided by public ownership, which as mentioned in earlier chapters eliminates the 
kind of uncertainty privately owned teams face when owners suddenly decide they need a new 
stadium. If a raw deal on paper, Packers stock ownership is worth quite a bit to those who care 
about the team. 
It is going out onto a limb to suggest that a brand-new team could engender the emotional 
attachment the Packers currently enjoy in Green Bay. Yet there are reasons to believe that the 
Green Bay model can work elsewhere. The first is that Green Bay’s aberrational status is entirely 
a creation of league owners. The Packers model has not been tested elsewhere due to specific 
decisions made by leagues and by owners, not due to a lack of appetite for public ownership. It is 
entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that absent restrictions on public ownership there would be 
other publicly owned teams with fanbases so devoted as to buy up shares with no expectation of 
financial benefit. If Green Bay is unique because of specific policies meant to keep it that way, 
then there really is no reason to believe Green Bay is unique. 
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The second reason is that potential sports fans have long been underserved by the 
artificial scarcity of professional leagues. Beyond concerns about diluting the product, there is no 
particular reason why the NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB have to have between 30-to-32 teams. 
The number of cities that are capable of supporting a team is far greater. As Szymanski and Ross 
(2008) noted, capping the number of teams allows sports-starved markets to exist as potential 
extortion cities. As discussed earlier in this text, such untapped markets give leagues and teams 
the flexibility to play hardball with member cities, either because the city would agree to replace 
it, or because the team would move elsewhere. 
Untapped markets have unique benefits for pro sports teams that go beyond mere 
extortion. In a 2008 article about the Sonics’ relocation, The New York Times noted that cities 
starved for pro sports have an advantage over more established markets:  
It may be that a midsize market like Seattle, with its big-league baseball and football teams 
and a wealth of recreational and entertainment options, has outgrown professional 
basketball, or at least the desire to fight terribly hard to keep it. A more appropriate home 
for a franchise these days seems to be a smaller city on the rise, with maybe a million to a 
million and a half people, plenty of money, local and regional art museums and a few 
ambitious restaurants but not too much else for its population to do, and an excess of civic 
pride ready to be harnessed. A place, in other words, exactly like Oklahoma City. 
(Schoenfeld, 2008, ¶5) 
It may well be the case that an upstart league with sufficient talent could benefit from the pent-up 
potential of markets without a team. In major markets that have never had a pro team, like 
Birmingham, Alabama or Louisville, Kentucky, the prospect of suddenly becoming a big-league 
city could conceivably drive stock sales. Even in Seattle, one imagines there are spurned Sonics 
fans willing to fund the creation of a new team.  
Of course, one does not have to be a fan of the team or sport to purchase shares in a 
sports franchise. Packers shareholders are exclusively fans of the team because there are no other 
benefits to purchasing the stock. The HBA would primarily sell common stock, as the Packers 




ownership. It is a safe assumption that the HBA could generate millions in shares sold to 
interested investors, depending on how many were set aside for that purpose. In 2017, a team in 
the fledgling Champions Basketball League was able to raise over $600,000 from nearly 1,700 
investors by promising “a roster full of former NBA players, a home arena at the Nassau 
Coliseum, a broadcast deal with ESPN, a front office staffed by legends like Walt Frazier and 
Earl Monroe, and a 14-game season against teams comprised of other former NBA players” 
(Ley, 2017, ¶2). The CBL, which as of 2018 still had yet to launch, overpromised in many of 
those areas.68 If such a flimsy idea could generate more than half a million in investments for a 
single team, it stands to reason that the HBA—backed by the biggest NBA stars—could 
command a far greater sum. To avoid the pitfalls of the Players League, no individual or group 
would be able to exceed more than a ten percent stake in any team. Such a rule prevents any 
potential investor from having outsized influence over team operations, and also protects the 
league from suffering a significant blow if any single benefactor walks. 
Paying for the team. It is important at this point to note that launching a new team in the 
existing major sports leagues is an endeavor requiring hundreds of millions of dollars. Recall the 
Chris Rock joke from earlier in the text: athletes are rich, but owners are wealthy. Launching a 
new franchise in one of the established leagues is cost-prohibitive. As Szymanski and Ross 
(2008) noted, membership in the leagues is granted by the existing owners, and only in exchange 
for the required expansion fee.  
Expansion fees have steadily grown as pro sports has become increasingly lucrative. 
When the NHL expanded for the first time in 1967, the six new teams each had to pay a $2 
million fee. That grew to $6 million when Vancouver joined in 1970 and $7.5 million when four 
World Hockey Association teams joined in 1979. By the time San Jose, Ottawa and Tampa Bay 
were awarded teams in the early 1990s, the fee was $45 million. In 2016, the [Las] Vegas 
Golden Knights paid $500 million (Carp, 2017). Two years later, when the NHL approved 
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expansion to Seattle for the 2021-22 season, the as-yet-unnamed team’s ownership group paid an 
expansion fee of $650 million (Clipperton, 2018). 
Keep in mind that the NHL is the least lucrative of the major North American leagues. In 
2017, one unnamed NBA owner told reporter David Aldridge that the league’s expansion fee 
should start at $2 billion, the price Clippers owner Steve Ballmer paid for that team two years 
earlier (Aldridge, 2017).69 The NFL’s expansion fee—which began at $100 in 1920 and topped 
out at $700 million when the Houston Texans joined in 2002 (“NFL expansion,” 2005)—would 
surely be even higher. 
Expansion fees serve the purpose of making entry to the major leagues so financially 
onerous that few would ever attempt doing so, and the few that try would be the uppermost sliver 
of the super-rich. The artificial scarcity of major league teams keeps member cities on their toes 
as there are plenty of extortion markets waiting in the wings, which in turn drives up franchise 
values by allowing owners to pursue the most advantageous financial situation. In essence, 
expansion fees are a tool of private ownership for the enrichment of private ownership. In an 
alternative model, such fees are not necessary. 
So far, this proposal has covered only one portion of how the HBA will be funded—the 
60 percent stake shareholders would own in each individual team. Those funds could cover some 
of the start-up costs, and the essentials of professional sport such as leasing arenas and securing 
charter flights. In order to get the league off the ground, however, considerably more funds will 
be necessary. To go about acquiring such funds, the HBA would rely on much the same tools as 
the existing NBA, which would be media rights and sponsorships. 
It may seem counterintuitive to argue for a player-owned league doing business with 
oligopolies in other industries. Is it possible to use one socializing institution to tear down 
another? What happens to the utopian ideals outlined in chapter one when corporate media and 
advertisers are added to the mix? 
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Legitimate as those questions are, it is simply the case that the HBA is not doable without 
engaging—to a significant degree—with major corporations. The amount of money in 
professional sport at this juncture makes it impossible to create a player-owned league that any 
pro player would want to play in without a reliable source of billions of dollars. Engaging with 
major corporations is less a compromise than a necessity, and at the very least, the television and 
sponsorship money would go directly to the players and communities, rather than the owners. 
More than in any other sport, the players are responsible for the NBA’s appeal. While 
teams such as the Los Angeles Lakers and Boston Celtics have significant cachet in and of 
themselves, it is the league’s stars that move television ratings, game attendance and sneaker and 
merchandise purchases. A player-run league featuring the NBA’s biggest stars would likely have 
its pick of media partners. The Big 3, a 3-on-3 basketball league comprised of retired, past-their-
prime players, was able to reach media rights deals with Fox Sports, and later CBS Sports, that 
included primetime exposure on over-the-air broadcast television (“Fox Sports,” 2017; “CBS 
Sports,” 2019). It is unlikely the HBA would be able to match the NBA’s $2.66 billion/year deal. 
Perhaps it could only manage a third of that total at first, or $880 million—equal to $44 million 
per team if there are 20 teams. 
The teams would control their own media rights, and with members of the public owning 
a controlling stake, it seems more likely that each team would prioritize putting the games in 
front of the largest possible audience rather than generating the largest possible rights fee. In the 
existing leagues, the majority of local media rights are held by cable regional sports networks. It 
is fair to assume that media rights in the HBA would be less restricted, perhaps even available 
for free through some television or internet platform. In the NBA, the Lakers made $149 million 
in local media rights during the 2016-17 season, while the Grizzlies brought up the rear at just 
$9.4 million (Windhorst & Lowe, 2017). Let us assume that the most any local media outlet 
would commit for an HBA team, in year one is $1-2 million. 
Sponsorship opportunities represent still another revenue stream, including presenting 
sponsorships at the league and team levels, uniform ads as in the NBA, in-arena ads at courtside 




billion on the NBA during the 2017-18 season, the first in which advertisements appeared on 
jerseys, a league record (“Sponsorship spending,” 2018). Let us assume that the HBA would 
make about a third of that, or just over $370 million. Split between each team, that would be 
between $15 and $19 million depending on the number of teams. 
Even estimating that the HBA would not generate even half of what the NBA is currently 
making, media rights and sponsorships would provide tens of millions in funds to each team. The 
goal for year one would be for each team to start with about $100 million between media rights, 
sponsorships, stock, and investments. Such an amount would not be feasible in the long-term, but 
would be sufficient to get an upstart league up and running. Comparably, the WWE CEO Vince 
McMahon estimates he will spend $500 million total on his upcoming XFL football league 
(Rovell, 2018).70 
Perhaps such assumptions are overly optimistic. Given the HBA is an untested concept in 
the modern age, an educated guess is as much as is possible to judge its efficacy. The concept 
relies on the idea that pro athletes would be willing to sacrifice the comfort of the current pro 
sports model for less money and more risk, just to experience the autonomy of ownership. It 
relies on the idea that sports fandom can exist independent of the famous, billion-dollar brands 
that, in many cases, predate most fans’ time on earth. 
The argument here is that the benefits make up for the shortcomings, specifically what 
would be a revolutionary shift away from private ownership. For the players, that means making 
what their labor is worth. For the fans, that means the tangible and intangible benefits of having a 
true public trust. For both, it means removing the middle man. If one were to pitch the average 
sports fan on eliminating the owners entirely, there would likely be some pushback and 
skepticism, but in markets where bad owners have reigned for years, there would also be a great 
deal of eagerness. Lest one think that mere speculation, recall the general happiness in Chicago 
after Blackhawks owner Bill Wirtz passed away. That fans have to wait for owners to die, or to 
be taken down in scandal, or to simply lose interest in order to save their teams from bad 
management is a state of affairs that few would want to preserve. 
                                                           




The next section examines the benefits of the HBA system for players and the public, and 
whether said benefits are enough to outweigh the shortcomings in the idea. 
 Would the players really sign off? NBA players may not be compensated adequately 
for their labor, but they are still compensated handsomely. It is not 1890 and the players’ 
livelihoods are far superior to those of their Players League ancestors, even after accounting for 
the general improvements in the sporting economy over that span. Why would they risk what 
they have for something that might not work? Even if it does work, there is simply no way they 
could make as much money in the initial years as they currently make in the NBA. 
 To be sure, the glaring vulnerability in the HBA concept is the fact that the players may 
well not go for it. All players, from stars to those on the end of the bench, would have to accept 
lower salaries in the short term—sharply lower salaries, more than likely. While players would 
no longer have to put up with a 50-50 split of basketball-related income, the money simply 
would not compare to what the NBA generates. How many stars would realistically be willing to 
sacrifice their enormous salaries? How many role players would be willing to give up the 
security of an NBA contract? 
 In the long term, the players would assuredly be better off in the HBA than the NBA. In 
the best-case scenario, wherein the HBA supplants the NBA as the primary professional 
basketball league and is able to establish a fan, sponsor and media base comparable to that which 
the NBA enjoys today, players would be empowered like never before in North American 
professional sports. Beyond the obvious financial benefits, players would be able to establish the 
rules and policies that guide the game of basketball at all levels. In the NBA, decisions about the 
game of basketball are made largely by 30 men whose commitment to the game is primarily 
financial, who by and large never played the game. Those decisions filter down to the college 
and high school levels, such as the NBA age limit barring players from entering the league 
straight out of high school and ensuring—in the vast majority of cases—at least one year playing 
as an amateur in college. Players have input through the CBA, but in an era where sporting 




NBA players have long had an interest in moving to the other side of the negotiating table 
and becoming owners. Michael Jordan became minority owner of the Washington Wizards in 
2000, just two years after his retirement from playing, and eventually became majority owner of 
the Charlotte Bobcats (now Hornets) in 2010. Other former players have become members of 
ownership groups, including Grant Hill with the Atlanta Hawks. Since Jordan’s move to the 
owners’ box, other players have discussed the possibility. James, for example, has said 
emphatically that he “will own a team someday” (Berger, 2017, ¶9; emphasis in original). The 
prospect of offering a player a piece of a team in exchange for signing is already a popular 
suggestion within NBA circles,71 even though it is against the rules. 
 For the first time, the highest level of basketball would belong to the people who play the 
game. Moreover, for the first time since the 19th century, a major professional league would 
belong to those who originated in the working class, not to the upper-class magnates who have 
sought to exclude or control them. From the Knickerbocker Club and onward, the goal of 
sporting magnates has been to reduce and/or control sporting participation by the working class. 
That element of control, specifically, has guided the relationship between owners and players in 
the modern age, filtering down to ever-increasing micromanaging of behavior and dress, such as 
the NBA’s 2005 dress code or the NFL’s various bans on players wearing messages on their 
uniforms and helmets. Simply having control over league operations would represent a 
revolutionary shift in how pro sports is organized. The HBA structure would provide autonomy 
heretofore unprecedented for professional athletes. 
 The long-term scenario is worth sacrificing for, but that is easy to say when one does not 
have millions on the line and a finite number of years in which to make as much money as 
possible. There are not many players who can afford to ride it out with a developing league for 
four or five years. The players make more money when exploited under the current ownership 
system, but less of what they have earned. The players would make less money under the HBA, 
at least in the short term, but get everything they have earned. Which is preferable is a matter of 
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principle. With that said, there is precedent for professional basketball players sacrificing money 
to support a league as a broader cause—one need only look at the Women’s National Basketball 
Association (WNBA). 
 Financially, WNBA players have less on the line than their NBA counterparts. There are 
no scenarios in which a women’s professional basketball player can expect to make anything 
close to an NBA salary. Even so, it is the case that most WNBA players make more playing 
overseas than playing in the league, where average salaries are a minuscule-for-pro-sports 
$75,000 per year and the players collectively receive an estimated 22 percent of basketball-
related-income (Berri, 2018). For the biggest stars, overseas salaries can reach into the millions. 
Even if not the kind of eight-figure salary an NBA player would risk playing in the HBA, there 
are WNBA players for whom playing in the league is a financial sacrifice. If WNBA players 
were purely pursuing their own self-interest, they would play elsewhere in the summer months—
or not at all. In 2015, Phoenix Mercury star Diana Taurasi accepted a $200,000 offer from her 
Russian team, which pays her $1.5 million per year, to skip the WNBA season (Fagan, 2016, 
¶35). That episode remains an aberration in league history.  
In the early years of the WNBA’s existence, several players described the lower salaries 
as somewhat of a necessary evil. In 1998, Mercury player Jennifer Gillom was sanguine about 
the league’s salaries, which at that time barely exceeded that of the average teacher. "I don't 
think it's fair, but I'm not complaining, either. I'm just glad there's a league and that it's 
progressing every year. … At my age and at this point in my career, I won't be able to see the big 
money. But at least I know that I was a pioneer to help develop this program for younger 
generations” (Lewis, 1999, ¶13). Indeed, the perception in those early days was that the current 
players would have to take the financial hit in order to ensure the league’s existence for future 
generations. Gillom’s teammate Michelle Timms painted an optimistic picture. “[O]ver the next 
decade, people will be earning a million dollars for a season in the WNBA. For the young kids 
coming through, it will happen. If I were a high-school kid, I'd be looking forward to playing in 
the league because they'll be able to make good bank playing in the WNBA” (¶32). The league’s 




Bob Cousys and George Mikans, the pioneers. They are making it possible for players in 10, 20, 
30 years to reap the economic benefits the league is capable of generating” (Dixon, 2002, ¶13). 
Gillom, Timms and Ackerman have, to this point, been dead wrong. How much longer 
WNBA players are willing to sacrifice is an open question, as complaints about the league’s low 
salaries proliferated throughout 2018. There are limits to how long one wants to pay one’s dues. 
Even so, it is telling that despite 22 years of substandard compensation, the WNBA has never 
had a work stoppage. In 2002, when the players came close to striking, the NBA’s commissioner 
David Stern—whose hard line on labor yielded NBA lockouts in 1995 and 1999 (and later, 
2011)—threatened to cancel the season (Orton, 2003). That was enough to keep the union in line. 
“WNBA players wisely chose survival instead of a suicidal confrontation with management and, 
of course, the NBA,” former NBA player Len Elmore said at the time, adding that the result 
“would have been lights out on the league” (Elmore, 2003, ¶9). Keeping the league alive took 
precedence over adequate compensation. Players have been more willing to play year-round 
schedules—balancing their WNBA commitments with play in other leagues worldwide—than to 
strike or endure a lockout due to the threat that would pose to the league.  
It is arguably unrealistic to ask NBA players to do the same, especially given WNBA 
players’ sacrifices have yet to bear fruit, but if there is ever going to be an alternative to the 
current model, that is what will have to be done. One advantage the NBA players would have 
over their WNBA counterparts is that the league they would be trying to preserve is one they 
themselves would own. Whereas WNBA players’ desire to keep the league alive has been a 
liability exploited by management, such a dynamic would not exist in the HBA. That the players 
would be fully compensated for their labor, in charge of all operations, would also presumably 
make their sacrifices far easier. 
Would fans really support a player-run league? While the public would own a 
majority stake in each HBA team, the players would run the league itself and own a large stake 
in each team. There is an argument that such unprecedented player power would not be received 




It is certainly the case that players do not always share the same goals as the general 
public, fans or otherwise. The relationship between professional athletes, particularly in 
predominantly black leagues like the NFL and NBA, and the majority white sport fanbase has 
always been fraught—and sometimes volatile, as in the 2004 melee between Indiana Pacers 
players and Detroit Pistons fans. The fact that both players and fans are exploited under the 
current ownership structure does not in any way imply a kinship between the sides. For as much 
distaste as fans have for sports owners, their feelings about the players are rarely better—and 
often worse. As Schiavone (2015) noted, pro athletes are often viewed as “selfish individuals 
who have no idea how ordinary people live” (p. 1). Players are not generally perceived as facing 
the same kind of exploitation as fans, but as contributing to the exploitation of fans. The idea that 
player salaries are the cause of exorbitant ticket prices—rather than the owners’ own greed—is 
so common as to represent “conventional wisdom” (Szymanski & Ross, 2008, p. 17), never mind 
that said salaries are themselves artificially depressed. In one characteristic letter to the editor, a 
reader suggested that if NFL players were “concerned about social justice,” they should “cut 
their salaries by 75 percent and, with a generous contribution from the owners, use those funds to 
raise the salaries of stadium workers, pay for their health insurance and set up college funds for 
their children” (“Letters: readers,” 2018, ¶7). That players—themselves employees—would be 
deemed more responsible than owners for paying stadium workers’ salaries is indicative of a 
broader mindset in which players are deemed as much, if not more, responsible for the economic 
state of pro sports as the men who control the games. 
During labor-management conflicts, the perception of players is at best that they are no 
better than the owners, the issues at stake reduced to a battle of ‘millionaires vs. billionaires’ 
(Martin, 2004). Such cynicism—stoked by a corporate media that is ideologically in simpatico 
with ownership—erases the players’ own exploitation and prevents any scrutiny of the owners, 
and of the broader ownership structure. At worst, the players take the blame. One 1994 column 
on the baseball players’ strike condemned the athletes for behaving “as if their salaries came out 
of some bottomless well” and lamented that the owners “unflinching resolve” had “earned them 




The latent hostility in the player-fan relationship tends to particularly bubble toward the 
surface in circumstances in which the players are viewed as insufficiently compliant. That 
includes labor-management negotiations, whether players’ strikes or owner-imposed lockouts; 
contract negotiations and free agency departures, such as LeBron James’ much-criticized 
departure from Cleveland in 2010; conflicts with coaches and other authority figures; and—
particularly in the late 2010s—social activism. NFL players’ protests of police brutality during 
the U.S. national anthem incurred vocal opposition from presidential candidate Donald Trump, 
which intensified after the reality show host won the Electoral College and the presidency. One 
of the recurring threads in the criticism was the suggestion that protesting athletes were, in the 
words of one characteristic comment, “overpaid” and “ungrateful” (Leighton, 2017, ¶7). That 
those words would be used to describe pro athletes is no real surprise; the distaste for 
professional athletes, which dates back to the beginning of organized sport, never truly 
dissipated. Recall from the earlier chapters that the decision to pay players was made out of 
necessity, not because the athletes were thought to have deserved the money.72 Furthermore, 
recall that the players were widely regarded as uncouth denizens of the underclass—or 
‘worthless, dissipated gladiators’— who needed to be kept under tight control. Such a mindset 
was built into the foundation of pro sports and informs fan perceptions of the players, 
particularly black and brown players. 
With all of that said, what would the appetite be among fans for a league made up 
entirely of players, fully autonomous from ownership? Particularly in the small and midsized 
untapped markets that the league would need to in large part fund the league? 
It is typical in sports for fans to engage in a bit of cognitive dissonance when it comes to 
their own team, not unlike the polling that shows disapproval of Congress, but approval of one’s 
own member of Congress. Provinciality could well win out over the anti-athlete biases outlined 
above, particularly in untapped markets starved for a professional team. One need not look far to 
find evidence that fans can dislike pro athletes in general and still support their local team and 
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their favorite player(s). Even in the Players League, which existed when perceptions of pro 
athletes were arguably more negative than they are today, attendance was healthy enough to put 
the existing National League at risk. 
 Yet in the face of a racialized distaste for pro athlete power, one that stretches back more 
than a century, blind faith in provinciality is not enough. The argument here is that the fans are 
better off in the HBA than in the current system, and that will be enough to overcome their 
biases against the players. 
 To begin with, a player-run league will by default be less exploitative than the current 
privately-run leagues. Pro sports owners have unique incentives that are not generally shared by 
the players, ones that invariably deplete the resources around them. Players want to be paid what 
they are worth; owners want exponential profit. If that seems a simplification, just look at the 
labor-management battles in sports history. Whether the Brotherhood in 1890, or Curt Flood, 
Oscar Robertson, and John Mackey in the 1970s, the players have sought to be paid according to 
what their labor has generated. As Schiavone (2015) argued, when players have gone on strike, 
they “generally did not do so to just fatten their wallets, but also for matters of principle” (p. 2). 
The owners, on the other hand, have instituted policy after policy to generate far in excess of 
their contribution, whether through salary caps, or maximum salaries, or stadium subsidies. 
Simply, the motivations are different for those seeking compensation for their labor and those 
seeking profit maximization. Pursuit of the latter tends towards exploitation, depending as it does 
on extracting the greatest reward for the least risk.  
 In addition, unlike the owners who control their own teams and, collectively, the full 
league, the players would control league operations but not team operations, which would be 
under the majority control of the team’s shareholders. As such, the proposed HBA model gives 
fans and the public far greater power than under the traditional, private ownership system. With 
the public owning a majority stake in each team, issues such as relocation are off the table. So 
too are higher ticket prices and unnecessary new stadiums built with public funds. Rather than 
hoping an incompetent owner sells the team, fans can address team mismanagement directly. 




actually exist as a public trust. In the HBA, each franchise can truly be part of the community, 
rather than a private plaything that can exit at any time. The sense of ownership Packers fans 
have in their team may seem farcical, but it is a real part of the team’s appeal in Green Bay. 
Explaining why he purchased a share of the Packers despite its lack of benefits, one writer was 
blunt: “It’s pride, really. It may be manipulation of the fans by the powers that be at 1265 
Lombardi Ave. in Green Bay, Wis., but we all know it, and we’re going along with it like 
lemmings. … It is truly pathetic. But I don’t care. Put it on my American Express” (Britt, 2011, 
¶8, 24). 
 Any discomfort with the level of player autonomy in the HBA would seemingly be 
outweighed by the benefits of public ownership that the fans would enjoy. Yet it is still fair to 
wonder whether that would be enough to get enough members of the public on board with the 
HBA for the concept to succeed. Thus, the HBA would offer other benefits to the public that go 
beyond team operations. In Green Bay, the Packers’ operating profits “are invested in the team, 
the Lambeau Field fan experience, the community and a fund to sustain the viability of the 
franchise” (Green Bay Packers, 2017, p. 19). During the 2017 season, $8 million of the Packers’ 
$65.3 million in operating profit went to community outreach (Green Bay Packers). In the 
Bundesliga, each team is required to operate a youth academy in order to maintain membership 
in the league. Since the requirement was put into place in 2002—as a response to Germany’s 
disappointing performances in the 1998 World Cup and Euro 2000—Bundesliga teams have 
spent 80 million euros per year on the academies (Merkel, 2012). 
 Donating a portion of profit to the community is certainly laudable, but it is ultimately 
insufficient in a league like the HBA, which would be unlikely to generate profit in its initial 
years. Requiring that teams fund youth programs, such as an equivalent to the Amateur Athletic 
Union (AAU), seems unnecessary given the sheer wealth of youth basketball options in the 
United States and Canada. 
 For the HBA to provide a substantive benefit to the communities in which it is based, it 
would need to budget a portion of team and league revenue to the public sphere. An unlikely 




anthem in 2017, league owners proposed creating a social justice fund that would contribute tens 
of millions over a seven-year period “to causes considered important to African-American 
communities” (Trotter & Reid, 2017, ¶2). While some players welcomed the offer, others viewed 
it as the owners trying to buy the protesters off.73 The Players’ Coalition, a group of players that 
had taken the mantle of social justice, publicly split over the deal (Zirin, 2017). The remaining 
members agreed to the NFL’s deal, and in 2018 the league officially announced the plan. Under 
the program, titled Inspire Change, the league would contribute up to $12 million per year 
through 2023. Individual owners would put up $250,000, in the expectation that the players on 
their team would match that amount. A quarter of the money would go to the United Negro 
College Fund,74 another quarter would go to Dream Corps, and half would go to The Players 
Coalition, with that money overseen by a nonprofit called the Hopewell Fund (Zirin, 2017, ¶12). 
 To be sure, the NFL model leaves much to be desired. Specifically, it comes off, as NFL 
player Eric Reid said, as a “publicity stunt” (Zirin, 2017, ¶10). If one can avoid the questionable 
motives and apparent pandering, however, the NFL plan provides a roadmap that the HBA can 
follow. It begins with identifying a cause to which both the players who run league, and the 
communities who run the teams, are both presumably committed. 
 In the current professional sports model, wherein team owners obtain generous public 
subsidies for new stadiums, one of the primary losers is the education system. Public funds that 
could have been directed to school infrastructure or teacher salaries end up spent on a garish, 
$2.5 million home run sculpture in center field, to use one example (Hanks, 2017). Education 
also happens to be a cause that professional athletes, particularly in the NBA, have demonstrated 
interest in. In 2018, LeBron James’ foundation and Akron Public Schools partnered on a new 
public school for third-and-fourth graders. The James foundation spent $2 million on the school 
in its first year and has pledged to spend $2 million more per year once it is at capacity 
                                                           
73 In return for donating to African-American causes, Zirin (2017) noted, NFL owners “expect players 
who have been protesting racial inequality during the anthem to shut up and play” (¶2). 
74 As Dave Zirin (2017) noted, “in addition to having nothing to do with police brutality, [the United 
Negro College Fund] absolutely sounds like the first organization Jerry Jones would think of when it 




(O’Donnell, 2018).75 Other players have donated to schools, with Kevin Durant pledging $10 
million to help Prince George’s County public schools fund a college preparation program 
(Babb, 2019). There is at least one example of a privately-owned team engaging in charitable 
giving to fund schools, with the Chicago Bulls donating $2 million in 2008 to launch a Chicago 
high school called Chicago Bulls College Prep (“Bulls announce,” 2008). It should be noted that 
the Bulls’ effort is a charter school—publicly funded but privately run, in keeping with the 
general ethos of neoliberal capitalism that runs through the pro sports industry.76 
 Borrowing from the NFL, the HBA could set aside portions of both team and league 
revenue to donate to the public schools in each city that hosts a team. In the initial years of the 
league, it could commit a certain percentage of league revenue to a fund that would be divvied 
up equally between each host city. With players no longer having to split revenue with owners, 
even a 75-25 split, wherein the players receive 75 percent of revenue with 25 percent going to 
the league’s charitable fund, would represent a significant improvement over the status quo. 
Beyond the league contribution, each team could also contribute a portion of revenue to public 
schools in its own market. Recall that under the single entity format, all contracts are handled at 
the league-level. Without having to pay players, the teams could contribute an even larger 
percentage of revenue to local schools, perhaps even a full third. 
 It is entirely possible that education would not be the point at which the interests of the 
players and of the communities in which they play meet. The debate about what types of schools 
should be funded—public or charter or private—is significant and beyond the purview of this 
analysis. Alternatively, other potential areas of common ground could include housing and 
infrastructure, job training, or even healthcare. The kind of civil rights platform pursued by NFL 
players could conceivably attract some support as well, though given the racial divide between 
players and fans, it may be difficult to find agreement on an agenda that would solve problems in 
any meaningful way. 
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 No matter how the money is spent, by carving out a set portion of funds for community 
investment, the HBA would represent a complete reversal of the pro sports norm. In the current 
model, pro sport is part of the broader, neoliberal siphoning of public funds by private profit. It 
contributes to the destruction of public space. In the HBA model, pro sport is truly a public trust, 
contributing to the local economy in a tangible way, rather than the trickle-down effect on bars 
and restaurants that is so often cited as a benefit of having a team. In the face of the likely 
skepticism that a player-run league can serve the interests of the community, the HBA’s 
investment in the public sphere would be a necessary indication that the new ownership structure 
would not be business as usual, the same exploitation but with different masters. It would instead 
be a true partnership, wherein the players have their autonomy and are paid for their labor, the 
fans have their public trust sans exploitation, and the community actually benefits. 
 Can it be replicated, and if not, does any of this even matter? The HBA is conditioned 
on a very specific set of circumstances: some of the most independently famous individuals on 
the planet—who just happen to be unionized—deciding to leverage their fame into working for 
themselves. Surely other pro sports unions could follow suit, but the others would have a more 
difficult time. Football, hockey, and baseball are more dependent on the history and prestige of 
the franchises rather than on individual starpower. There is no baseball player bigger than the 
New York Yankees. One can argue that the Players League proves that, at least in baseball, a 
player-run option is feasible. Yet when the Brotherhood broke away from the National League, 
the N.L. was in its 14th year of existence and hardly as established as modern day MLB. It is the 
case that, absent quality players, the existing leagues would lose popularity—one need only look 
at those occasions on which the NFL and MLB used replacement players. It is also the case that 
if the players in those sports formed their own league, they would be unlikely to ever gain the 
level of notoriety they had in the existing leagues. It would be mutual destruction. 
 It is likely that in another sport, starting a player-run league would be more difficult than 
in basketball. Yet the significance of the HBA would not be limited to whether additional player-
run leagues followed. In the event that the HBA became a success, overtaking the NBA, it would 




private ownership model. It would serve as a warning to ownership in the other leagues and 
potentially upend the dominant trend of the last 40 years in pro sports, and indeed all 
industries—the steady advancement of management goals and erosion of gains by labor. 
 Even in a scenario where the HBA struggled, the threat of a player-run league siphoning 
players and fans would be sufficient to put a rare scare into ownership. The National League 
could easily have faded into oblivion in its head-to-head with the Players League, surviving 
largely due to subterfuge of its rival. As mentioned in earlier chapters, there have long been 
threats from players’ unions to start a player-run alternative league, and those threats have been 
of little merit. A real players’ league would make that possibility suddenly plausible and provide 
a threat to the existing order. A successful HBA changes the game, even in sports where such an 
alternative is less realistic. 
Can It Work? 
 Make no mistake, transforming the HBA from a hypothetical proposed in a doctoral 
dissertation into a league so successful that it supplants the NBA—and provides a model for 
other leagues to follow—is an unlikely proposition, to put it mildly. However, the purpose of this 
proposal was not to provide a blueprint for a new league to follow, but to show that a blueprint 
could be created. There are many ways in which the league could fail, from the players balking 
at lower salaries to fans not wanting to support a player-run league, to issues of basic popularity. 
The league’s dependence on media rights and sponsorships at the outset would leave it heavily 
dependent on television ratings and merchandise sales, and while the Players League of 1890 
was able to compete with the National League in attendance, neither league did as well as the 
N.L. did in 1889. Even with less television and sponsorship money built into the early 
expectations, the league would be dependent on broad popularity in a way that makes it 
vulnerable. 
Yet the primary takeaway from this analysis is not intended to be whether a player-run 
league is entirely feasible in the modern era, but whether it is possible. Can a league exist in 
today’s sporting economy without billionaire owners? The answer is yes. Private ownership of 




experience for players and fans than under the current system? The answer is again yes, even if 
with caveats. Players would have to sacrifice to make it work and fans would have to put aside 
longstanding biases. Perhaps neither is likely, but fortunately hypotheticals allow for a touch of 
utopianism. Under a best-case scenario, the league structure presented in this chapter would 
eliminate the kind of exploitative private ownership that has channeled player labor, fan interest 
and taxpayer money into billionaires’ wallets. 
The status quo of the past 150 years does not have to continue. There are other ways of 
organizing pro sports, likely better ones than outlined here, and the employees and consumers of 






 At the risk of overstating the scope and significance of this project, the goal of this 
dissertation is to challenge the cynical idea that the way things are is the way things have always 
been and the way things will always be. In the professional sports industry, it is not so much 
taken as an article of faith that teams should be owned by a group of billionaires, but so 
unquestioned as to rarely be mentioned at all. Complaints about ownership, while common, 
rarely reach the point at which the system of ownership comes under question. 
 Relying on the tradition of political economic scholarship, the previous five chapters 
have sought to render visible what is invisible to most observers of professional sport—not the 
owners, but ownership as an institution. Specifically, it has sought to answer the following 
questions. How did owners take over pro sports? Why has their power gone unchallenged? How 
can we move beyond them? To put it simply, professional sports exists in its current form as the 
result of a decades-long process of class-based exclusion and control. It has avoided scrutiny in 
much the same way as capitalism broadly, through brute force, yes—but also through a process 
of obfuscation in which all can identify individual problems and culprits, but few the overarching 
system in which they operate. It is only through interrogation of that system—through 
understanding how and why it exists and who it is intended to benefit—that we can move beyond 
the status quo to a less exploitative alternative. This dissertation sought to aid in that process by 
calling into question the inevitability, neutrality, and necessity of the private ownership structure. 
 Private ownership of professional sports teams is not inevitable. The current system 
of private ownership was the product of a years-long effort by upper-class men of leisure to 
restrict and control the sporting participation of the lower classes. The expression ‘history is 
written by the winners’ has merit, but there is perhaps no greater victory than writing oneself out 
of history. In the general sporting public, there is little knowledge of how professional sport 
came to take on its current form, and that knowledge is vital to understanding how the industry 




That professional and amateur sport developed largely in the service of enforcing class 
hierarchies explains a great deal of the sporting culture. It explains why a group of billionaires 
runs every pro league, why college players do not get paid, why fans so resent when players use 
any leverage to get a better deal. The working class was never intended to freely and 
autonomously join in the sporting practices of the upper class. The amateurism model sought to 
eliminate working class participation entirely by banning compensation. The intention was to 
force those who could not afford to play into a stark choice—either do not play or jeopardize 
your livelihood to do so. The professional model developed from a place of self-interest, a 
knowledge that under the right kind of control, one could benefit from pro athletes’ labor. If that 
required paying them a few dollars, so be it. Western sport developed along those two paths, 
with a class-based ideology of control and exclusion forming its underpinnings. 
The understanding of how we got here is important to figuring out how to move forward. 
That is the case not just in this example, but generally—which is why history is such a crucial 
component of critical political economy. The system of pro sports ownership exists as it does not 
because it is the natural state of affairs, but because it reinforces a particular economic structure 
of hard class boundaries in which the working class is never fully compensated for its labor.  
 Private ownership is not neutral. Pro sports’ system of private ownership is not 
ideologically neutral: instead it is intrinsically part of the broader capitalist project. The same can 
be said of most industries, but sport over and above all other cultural forms is perceived as 
apolitical, a respite from real world concerns. One need look no further than the enduring 
criticism of NFL players’ police brutality protests to find the continued refrain of ‘keep politics 
out of sports.’ All the while, the very way pro (and amateur) sport operates is a political act, an 
endorsement—and faithful recreation of—corporate capitalism.  
 Through policies such as the NFL’s ban on public ownership, and through the continued 
plunder of municipalities across the country, the major leagues endorse a policy of ‘private 
wealth and public squalor,’ to borrow Galbraith (1998)’s famous phrase. Control of the leagues 
remains in private hands, but the public is stuck with the bill. One might look at that as simply 




capitalism. A fair point, but basic capitalism is political. It is a public policy issue when an 
industry worth billions is controlled by a small group of billionaires, who generally have little to 
do with the product’s success and are gorging on public funds.   
 Through their interactions with labor, namely their success in forcing the players into 
concession bargaining over the past 30 years, the major leagues are at the forefront of a broader 
attack against unions. One might suggest that owners are acting out of simple self-interest in 
trying to limit player salaries as much as possible. Another fair point, but the counter remains the 
same: capitalism is ideological. The portrayal of capitalism as neutral—while communism and 
socialism are regarded as not just political, but radically ideological—is to its benefit. It is a 
matter of political significance that the major sporting unions have been engaged in concession 
bargaining for the past 40 years; it means that even the most powerful unionized employees in 
the United States cannot win in the current environment. 
 The heavily restricted nature of the competition—the imposition of salary caps, 
maximum salaries, luxury taxes—is its own political statement, albeit one the owners would not 
tolerate in any other context. It is an endorsement of centralized regulation of economic activity 
to ensure that everyone gets a fair shake. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, even NFL 
commissioner Roger Goodell has admitted that pro sport is inherently socialist, at least within 
the confines of league operations. Even in this way it is fundamentally capitalist. What better 
encapsulates capitalism in its current form than one set of rules for the rich and another for 
everyone else? 
 Private ownership is not necessary. Not only is the current system of ownership not 
inevitable, it exists solely to satisfy the owners’ self-interest. Pro sport is not organized to best 
serve the players, or the fans, or the communities in which the teams play. The entire billions-
dollar enterprise is skewed to serve the interests of a sliver of the ‘one percent.’ Some of the 
money trickles down to the players, or to communities in the form of (highly-disputed) economic 
windfalls, but make no mistake—the only group getting what it wants with no compromise is the 
owners. Players have to take less money, communities have to pay for stadiums, fans have to pay 




game, quite literally. As mentioned above, this was no accident, but the result of a concerted 
effort of exclusion and control. 
The private ownership model has survived to no small extent because private interests 
have sabotaged efforts to institute alternative models of ownership. In the Players’ League of the 
1890s, the profit-motivated ‘contributors’ were easily picked off by the National League after the 
first and only season produced financial losses. In the NFL, league bylaws prohibit other teams 
from engaging in the same successful ownership structure used by the Green Bay Packers. Such 
bylaws were found to have violated anti-trust laws when held up to judicial scrutiny, but the 
court decision was overturned on appeal due to a technicality. Absent those efforts, the private 
ownership system might already have fallen by the wayside. 
In the preceding chapters, this dissertation sought to demonstrate that the current situation 
is unnecessary. It is true that in the privately-owned system, players are making far more than 
they would in the initial years of an alternative league. It is true that in the current system, fans 
can continue to support the same teams that they have followed, in some cases, since before they 
can remember. Both sides would ultimately have to sacrifice—the players obviously more than 
the fans—in order to move away from the status quo. Yet if the question is, can organized sport 
exist without owners, the answer is a resounding yes. It has been done before, in the Players’ 
League. It is being done in Green Bay and in the Bundesliga. Is the willingness there? That is a 
different story entirely. 
Perhaps the alternative suggested in this dissertation is flawed, but as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, it is at least in the realm of possibility. A proposal can be discarded, yes, but it 
can also be debated, expanded upon, countered. The primary goal of this dissertation is to expand 
the idea of what is possible in an industry that takes up increasing space in public life. Consider 
the HBA the beginning of an overdue conversation on how to shift organized sport in a less 
exploitative direction, away from the billionaires who have for too long used it for their own 





Starting the Conversation 
 One could argue that outside of taxpayers no longer being fleeced for stadium subsidies, 
the remedies offered in this dissertation only benefit those who play in, and those who watch, 
professional sports. What is the significance, really, of millionaires improving their lot, or of 
sports fans getting a better deal on mindless entertainment? How does this solve the pressing 
issues of an increasingly frayed society? Is this ‘overdue conversation’ really worth having? 
What does this dissertation add to society in general, and to scholarship in particular? 
 This dissertation has cautioned against the view of sport as insignificant. Professional 
sport is among the dominant cultural industries in Western society, and firmly ideological. That 
it is controlled by billionaires and mimics capitalism’s exploitative dynamics, from the looting of 
the public till to the squeezing of unions, is neither a coincidence nor insignificant. A player- (or 
community-) run league would be ideological as well, its existence serving as a counterweight to 
an economic order that has largely gone unchallenged outside of the academic niche. That the 
players would still largely be millionaires is a feature, not a bug. Making the amount of money 
one is worth is not inconsistent with a point of view that is skeptical of capitalism. An industry in 
which the richest people are the ones doing the actual work, rather than the ones profiting off the 
work of others, is arguably radical in an era defined by an ethos of making as much money as 
one can for as little effort and expense as possible. In its current form, the professional sports 
industry only serves to reify the dominant economic system and ideology. In an alternative form, 
perhaps it can challenge both and, through its influence, affect even greater change. In an earlier-
cited article considering the potential impact of a player-run NBA, Pulver (2014) noted that 
sport, more so than popular protest movements, has the power to  
bring revolutionary ideas into living rooms, sports bars and playgrounds across the 
country. It is conceivable that such a remedy for the league might rouse the imagination of 
Paul family libertarians, Bernie Sanders-wing progressives, and many in the great swath in 
between. “Why can’t we all own where we work?” Americans might start to ask. (¶7) 
The attention the HBA would surely generate, even if it failed, would carry the potential of 




necessity of owners in basketball and pro sports generally, but perhaps of ownership in all 
economic settings. 
As far as what this dissertation contributes to the existing scholarship, and political 
economy in particular, it is the hope that the preceding analysis will represent a significant 
contribution to the relatively thin scholarship on the structure of professional sport. While other 
scholarship has chronicled the development of sports such as baseball in the U.S. or soccer in 
Great Britain, it is the belief of this author that this dissertation was among the few to do so from 
a critical political economy perspective. The examination of the professional sports industry as 
an oligopoly equivalent to that of the corporate media, a socializing institution that reinforces the 
overarching capitalist class structure, and tool for maintaining the ideological and political status 
quo, is not necessarily new. It is, however, somewhat unmarked territory in critical scholarship, 
which as mentioned previously has largely examined the problems caused by the sports industry, 
rather than the industry itself. There are of course exceptions as noted earlier in this text. Among 
the goals of this dissertation was to stress the relevance of sport in and of itself, not just as a 
symptom of or proxy for other societal problems. The sports industry is one of the most powerful 
and influential oligopolies and should be the subject of even more structural, political economic 
analysis. Examining how and why the industry exists as it does, what interests it serves in its 
current form, and what ideologies are propagated by its structure, should serve as the cornerstone 
of a political economy of sport. 
In addition, this dissertation offers a unique solution to the current state of professional 
sports. It is the belief of this author that the single-entity, player-run, community-funded proposal 
offered in this text is a new contribution to a fledgling field. As mentioned previously, the 
proposed league structure is not intended as a model on which to build a new league, but the 
starting point of a broader discussion of how to move beyond the private ownership structure. 
Ideally, this discussion would extend beyond the academy, reaching those who are dissatisfied 
with the sports industry and motivating them to consider how it can be changed. 
Given the worldwide tumult of the late-2010s, it may be difficult to see sport as an 




aspects of human life, play, came to be coopted and transformed into an economic boon for the 
superrich is the story of how all aspects of human life have been plundered by the same. The 
story of how athletes from the economic underclass were first excluded, and then constrained, by 
the rich(er) men in charge is the story of how corporate capitalism has enforced class barriers and 
maintained inequality. The story of how team owners soak up public funds to pay for their 
stadiums is the story of how the proverbial ‘one-percent’ has continually depleted the public, 
replacing notions of community with a thin simulacrum from which to profit—a stadium 
taxpayers paid for but must pay to enter, a team that wears the name of the city but is owned by a 
single man. The story of how sport came to take on its current form is the story of capitalism in 
the West, of lost opportunities and limited possibilities. 
Extending the conversation. The scope of this analysis was limited to professional sport 
in the West, particularly the United States, out of necessity. Of the roads not taken, a few stand 
out as possibilities for future research.  
Recall from the historical analysis earlier in this text that amateur sport is based on the 
same system of exclusion and control as the professional leagues. The difference between 
amateur and professional sport developed out of a split between those in the upper class who 
could tolerate paying players—so long as they could control and profit from them—and those 
who were firmly against paying players under any circumstances. The professionals went in one 
direction and the amateurs the other. Amateur sport has since developed into a colossus of its 
own, primarily at the collegiate level in the United States, with universities making and spending 
billions on sports teams that are often professional in everything but name. Analyses of the 
structure of amateur sport are more commonplace than of the professional game, as are 
suggested alternatives. Even so, political economic analysis of amateur sport would serve as a 
useful complement to this text. 
 A second offshoot of this research would be a closer examination of the ownership 
structure in European leagues. While this dissertation addressed the development of soccer in the 
United Kingdom and the ownership structure of the German Bundesliga, the primary focus was 




commonplace than analyses of the “Big Four” North American leagues, so this is far from 
uncharted territory. Even so, such scholarship is a natural fit next to the work done in this 
dissertation, particularly scholarship focused on the recent transition in European soccer toward 
billionaire ownership. 
 Finally, the most obvious extension of this work would be an alternative suggestion of 
how to excise owners from professional sports leagues. Perhaps another scholar could come up 
with an ownership structure in which the players own the individual teams, rather than the 
single-entity format proposed in this text. Or a community-owned league, a la the Bundesliga, in 
which there is enough groundswell of interest—and enough resources—for members of the 
community to develop and launch a franchise. There are ownership models not yet tried, such as 
leagues owned and run by the government, or even by other employees within the sports industry 
system—coaches and managers, for example. Such concepts did not seem feasible in the course 
of writing this text, but others may disagree, and may very well be able to argue for their 
superiority to the structure suggested here. 
Final Thoughts 
 Watching professional sport requires no small degree of cognitive dissonance. There are 
numerous people who understand the dangers of football and disapprove of the way the NFL—
and college teams—treat players. Yet they continue to watch each weekend, not out of a callous 
disregard for player safety (though that is a factor for some) but due to an all-too-common ability 
to compartmentalize. “[J]ust when you’re ready to pronounce the NFL dead beneath an 
avalanche of its own greed and bullshit,” Leibovich (2018) wrote, “you hit the payoff. The game 
starts, and with it the best part of pro football: football” (pp. xix-xx). 
Knowing how sport took on its current form, and knowing who benefits from the system, 
does not necessarily dissuade one from tuning into the games or following the leagues. It is 
difficult to blame the fans, or the players, for their apparent complacency. It is easy to be 
complacent. As a fan, so long as the product on the field remains compelling, it is possible to 




those salaries remain high, it is possible to overlook everything else—until the next CBA 
negotiation. 
 One of the difficulties in addressing the private ownership system is that when all is said 
and done, people’s conception of sport from the outside looking in is based in the concept of play 
explicated earlier. Professional sport is so obviously not mere play, but during the 2-4 hours of 
game action, it is easy to get caught up in the action on the field or court. The emotional 
investment, ridiculous as it may be, is real enough that for that brief period of time one does 
forget he or she is supporting billionaires’ property. 
 The structural apparatus of professional sport is designed to be ignored; hence the general 
anonymity of most owners. All the more reason why it is important to observe professional sport 
with a critical eye. As compelling as the games may be, as much heart and soul as one might put 
into the result, do not forget that regardless who wins or loses on the court, the real winners are 
in the owners’ boxes. The true final score, the one that actually counts, will not be found in the 
sports pages. One can instead find it in Forbes’ lists of franchise values and highest net worths, 
in FEC filings showing campaign donations, or even in one’s own taxes. The next time a team 
owner hoists a trophy at the end of the season, know that they have reason to celebrate after 
every single game. 
 If there is one message to be taken from this dissertation, it is that things do not have to 
be this way. The importance of critical scholarship is not in the criticism itself, but in the hopeful 
alternatives that criticism can facilitate. Once aware of how pro sports operates, it is up to those 
exploited by the system to pursue change. Perhaps the benefits of an alternative system do not 
outweigh the comforts of the status quo. Fair enough. Yet if one is dissatisfied with artificially 
depressed salaries and limited power, with rising ticket prices and relocations, with taxpayer-
funded stadiums, with indirectly paying for political causes one does not support—if one is 
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